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ABSTRACT
With intensifying pressure to not only solve public problems by collaborating with actors
situated outside the confines of city hall but also to address complex, long-term challenges like
climate change adaptation and sustainability, local government public managers find themselves
working in increasingly difficult public management environments. Currently, public
management theory fails to fully prescribe management strategies and behaviors that enable
managers to best achieve their goals in these situations. This dissertation addresses this gap
between theory and practice by tracing the public management processes that lead to outcomes in
a set of municipality-led brownfield remediation and redevelopment projects.
Utilizing an integration of public management, policy tool, and network theories, this
research compares four project-level case studies in Rochester and Buffalo, New York, to
address two primary questions. First, in what ways do brownfield projects function as public
management networks? Second, to what extent do network management behaviors by city-level
public managers impact project outcomes?
Contrary to prior research, my findings revealed that neither relationship management nor
policy tool strategies alone sufficiently explained project outcomes. Instead, effective public
management occurred when high levels of political legitimacy were coupled with an integration
of policy tool and relationship management strategies, either through network-centric public
managers themselves or through the actions of political champions operating in partnership with
them. These findings imply that public management researchers focusing solely upon
relationship management or policy tool explanations separate from political influences are not
fully capturing the true public management story.
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Thanks Mom and Dad . . .
And Chip, here’s to our next steps.

6
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I moved in in 97 and I moved in knowing about the contaminated property. The mess
that was back there. I walked around the neighborhood with the dogs and got to meet
some of the neighbors and they talked about how it was this catastrophe back there . . .
You'd be sitting here and next thing you know a stick of dynamite would go off or
somebody would be out back at 2 or 3 in the morning and you'd see a backhoe start up
and they are digging and burying and hiding stuff and illegally bringing trucks in from
main street down through the street that was there and dump in the middle of the night
and we'd call 911 and say "look! Somebody is back there and they are dumping or
whatever" and nobody would ever come and investigate it. – Neighbor, Rochester, NY
This story is one of many involving the problems put upon communities by the presence
of environmentally contaminated properties, or brownfields, in their neighborhoods and
downtown districts. Symbols of neglect, brownfields create health hazards and serve as magnets
for illicit activities by both property owners and trespassers alike. As implied by the quote
above, brownfield problems involve multiple stakeholders competing over limited resources to
address a diverse array of environmental, social, and public policy problems. Addressing a
brownfield problem requires more resources than any single government agency is able to put
together and more expertise than any single government agency is able to maintain.
In the early 1970’s Rittel and Webber (1973) described such public policy problems that
defied traditional bureaucratic solutions as “wicked” problems (Rittel and Webber 1973).
Grounded in the planning profession, the authors wrote that wicked problems could not be
addressed by one entity accumulating all of the necessary knowledge to determine, and then
implement, the best solution. “We shall want to suggest that the social professions were misled
somewhere along the line into assuming they could be applied scientists – that they could solve
problems in the ways scientists can solve their sorts of problems.” (160) Instead these problems
require multiple iterations of imperfect policy solutions generated through interactions of
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multiple actors and organizations acting as a network – a complex and messy process for public
managers to untangle.
In recent years, research suggests that addressing complex problems with cross-sector
networks is more efficient and effective than the alternative of internalizing the problem within a
government bureaucracy (Andrews and Entwistle 2010). However, many questions remain
unanswered as to the mechanisms that increase the efficiency and effectiveness of these
networks, including the impacts of public policy tools and the extent to which the strategic use of
these tools by public managers shapes network actor behaviors (Mandell and Keast 2007;
Hicklin, O'Toole Jr., and Meier 2007; O'Toole Jr. and Meier 2006). To what extent can a single
public manager steer multiple organizations towards a common goal? Is it more effective to
influence network actors through policy incentives or by appealing to relational trust and
reciprocity? What factors moderate the effectiveness of these strategies? One school of thought
suggests that public managers operating in task-specific networks should focus their attention on
the former, shaping the rules and norms, or institutions, which guide network actor behaviors
(Edelenbos and Klijn 2006; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004). This dissertation adds to this
knowledge base by examining network management practice within a new context – that of
brownfield remediation and redevelopment.
The Brownfield Problem. In the face of today’s economic crisis, many municipalities
in the United States with industrial pasts face difficult challenges in maintaining the delivery of
government services and ensuring the quality of life expected by their citizens. Once heralded as
prominent centers of production and manufacturing up through the 1950s, these municipalities
carry the burdens of decaying water, sewer, and street infrastructures, aging housing stock, and
inadequate space for new commercial and industrial employers (Vey 2007; Goldman 2007).
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Embedded within the economic struggle of these cities is extensive soil and water contamination
resulting from decades of underregulated commercial and production activity. From steel
milling to chemical refining to food processing, companies large and small polluted the air and
water around them, often directly impacting the very neighborhoods in which their employees
resided (Yount 2003; Heberle and Wernstedt 2006). As property owners left for greener areas
and local governments tried to resell what they acquired through tax foreclosure, the extent of
this contamination became known. Yet, while environmental clean up costs posed new barriers
to redevelopment, these properties presented new opportunities for new construction amongst
limited land supply (Greenberg et al. 2001; Nijkamp, Rodenburg, and Wagtendonk 2002).
Formally, brownfields are real properties lying underused because of fears, real or
perceived, that they are contaminated with pollutants1. Some brownfields exist in highly
marketable locations where private investors willingly acquire and transform them into more
productive spaces. Others qualify for state and federal hazardous waste cleanup programs such
as Superfund due to the extent of their contamination. A third category of properties exists in a
sort of “twilight zone” where market forces alone do not compel their cleanup but the regulatory
hammers of Superfund laws do not apply. It is these properties that brownfield public policy
programs primarily target.
Over the past fifteen years, federal, state, and local governments have innovated a wide
array of brownfield policy programs, or policy tool packages, intended to incentivize the
assessment and remediation of contaminated properties by shaping the rules and norms

1

http://www.epa.gov/brownfields accessed December 13, 2010
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governing the interactions of public and private actors engaged in brownfield processes2.
Examples of these tools include liability waivers, tax credits, planning and remediation grants,
revolving loan funds, and technical assistance. Most of these tools exist at the state and local
levels, creating a wide variation in tool availability across state and local contexts (DeSousa
2005). However, simply remediating a brownfield property only addresses half of the problem.
To be considered successful, projects also need to improve property usage by addressing
housing, employment, aesthetic, and infrastructure challenges (Lange and McNeil 2004).
Because brownfield remediation and redevelopment projects link the environmental,
economic, and social policy arenas and bring together three distinct expert areas (environmental
science and engineering, planning, and construction) and groups of stakeholders, the
effectiveness of brownfield policy tools relies upon adequate integration of environmental,
economic and social domains over the life of the project (Meyer 2003; Greenberg et al. 2001;
Heberle and Wernstedt 2006; Hula 2001; Lafferty and Hovden 2003). Achieving this integration
requires a great deal of information diffusion to a range of stakeholders operating within and
around the project network (Thomas 2003; O'Toole Jr. 2004). Private investors need to
understand project risks and uncertainties, local government officials need to be aware of
available policy tools, and elected officials, regulators, interest groups, and citizens need to
understand remediation and redevelopment processes to create a political process for moving the
project forward (Thomas 2003; Simons and El Jaouhari 2001; DeSousa 2006). Together, these
characteristics of brownfield projects require that understanding the extent to which public
2

For a more detailed discussion of policy tools, see Chapter Three, p.46. However, throughout
this dissertation, the term “policy tools” and “policy instruments” are used based upon the
definition presented by Salamon (2002) in which he writes that a policy tool is a mechanism used
by government actors to address public problems. While this is a broad definition, it
encompasses the range of policy mechanisms commonly used in brownfield projects.
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managers play a role in shaping outcomes involve an examination of network, policy tool, and
public management processes and how, when overlapping, outcomes occur (Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1: Theories for Explaining Brownfield Project Outcomes

Policy	
  Tools	
  

Networks	
  

Outcomes	
  

Public	
  
Management	
  

Research Questions. This study therefore addresses two primary research questions.
1. How do brownfield projects function as networks?
2. To what extent do management behaviors by city-level public managers within these
networks impact project outcomes?
This first question requires an exploration of the multi-actor nature of brownfield remediation
and redevelopment projects to determine the extent to which these projects conform to existing
public management network theory. The second question subsequently requires the deductive
use of theories about interorganizational networks, the selection and implementation of policy
tools, and public management to explain why different brownfield project outcomes occur across
multiple projects.
Two motivations drive this research. First, local governments play a key role in
brownfield remediation and redevelopment processes (Simons and El Jaouhari 2001; DeSousa
2006) but research has primarily focused upon the policy tools employed during implementation
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processes rather than actual management practice. Practitioners need a greater understanding of
the organizational and managerial capacities behind successful project implementation. The
second motivation is to fill in existing gaps between network, public management, and policy
tool theories by examining the interactions of network structures, public managers, and policy
tools over time. Existing literature fails to account for the complete context in which public
managers influencing network outcomes operate. If theory is to inform practice, it is important to
examine the details of these network functions over time.
Theoretical Implications. This dissertation carries theoretical implications for
brownfield researchers and public management theorists alike. First, for brownfield researchers,
the study describes brownfield projects in a manner not yet seen in the brownfield literature. By
viewing these projects through a network lens, the study produces insights into the nature of
multiple relationships occurring simultaneously, not just the relationship between local
government and a private developer. Second, in their original discussion of problem
“wickedness”, Rittel and Webber (1973) describe how natural science problems “are definable
and separable and may have solutions that are findable” while social problems “are ill-defined
and they rely upon elusive political judgment for resolution” (160). Analyzing network structures
and management strategies within the brownfield remediation and redevelopment arena provides
a window through which the convergence of natural and social science knowledge areas in
public management practice may be further understood.
For public management theorists, current research lacks focus on how networks evolve
during their life spans (Provan, Huang, and Milward 2009), particularly in the area of short-term,
temporary networks. The application of social network analysis to brownfield projects helps to
fill this gap. In addition, as described above, the study builds theory regarding the interactions
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between network structures, policy tools, and public management when explaining outcomes of
management activity. Simultaneously integrating these theories better matches the complex
management environments they are intended to explain.
Practical Implications. By contributing to theory, this dissertation simultaneously
contributes to practice. The findings provide practical insights to public managers engaged in
projects spanning the arenas of environmental regulation and economic development. A stronger
understanding of which actors occupy what network positions across multiple project phases
enhances the abilities of public managers to identify and target project actors at the appropriate
times. In addition, this research informs policy makers at the state and federal levels about how
different sets of policy tools become used at the project level. As many brownfield policies face
reauthorization at these levels, smart redesign relies upon more a complete understanding of how
tools impact processes. Finally, this work explains the inner workings of local governments
during brownfield projects for private firms engaged or interested in engaging with their
governments on these projects. A greater understanding of the constraints and opportunities
facing their public counterparts enables private partners to make more informed decisions about
project selection and public-private partnership development.
Summary. As more municipalities struggle with increasingly complex wicked policy
problems like brownfields, the need to understand cross-disciplinary, cross-sector public
management networks becomes imperative. Public managers must understand how to leverage
policy tools in order to leverage project partners, policy makers must understand the extent to
which public policies constrain or enhance public managers, and researchers must fully
comprehend the dynamic nature of networks unfolding over time. Without these understandings,
the prospect of governments solving wicked problems diminishes, for, as one public manager
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interviewed for this study commented, addressing a brownfield problem “was like two octopuses
making love, it was hard to figure out where the beginning of one was and the end of the other
was.” Through careful study, we may be able to untangle the tentacles of network management
and organize our cross-sector public management networks with greater efficiency, ultimately
realizing greater effectiveness.
Organization of Dissertation. The dissertation contains five substantive chapters in
addition to this introduction and the conclusion. Chapter Two provides a thorough background
of the size and scope of the brownfield problem and the policies put in place to address the
problem in the United States today as well as the state of New York. Chapter Three provides an
overview of network, public management, and policy tool theories and constructs a theoretical
framework for explaining brownfield project outcomes. Chapter Four describes the research
design and methodologies used to select project level cases, to collect necessary data, and to
perform data analysis. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven present analytical case studies that
examine how network characteristics and policy tool use interact with public management
behaviors to shape individual project outcomes. Chapter Eight summarizes the extent to which
key findings across these cases address the propositions and Chapter Nine summarizes the
theoretical and practical contributions of the study. As a special addendum, Chapter Ten
presents an example of how complex network research may be used to train practitioners.
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CHAPTER TWO BACKGROUND ON BROWNFIELD PROPERTIES AND THEIR
REMEDIATION AND REDEVELOPMENT

Overview. When the first federal legislation addressing the brownfield problem occurred
in 1995, policy makers and academics viewed it as a remediation challenge for environmental
engineers. This point of view quickly shifted when policymakers realized the potential for
private redevelopment investment to help pay for remediation costs. This integrated the
environmental aspects of brownfield properties with existing local community and economic
development strategies (Hula 2001). Over the past twenty-five years, the brownfield arena has
evolved to produce a rich public management phenomenon about which research has just started
to scratch the surface.
This chapter presents an overview of the brownfield problem in the United States and,
more specifically, the state of New York, as well as a summary of brownfield research. The first
part of the chapter covers the history of the term “brownfield”, the scope of the problem, the
causes and contaminants, phases of brownfield remediation and redevelopment processes, types
of property reuse, and theories about project stakeholders. The second section examines the
barriers to remediation and redevelopment, particularly as they relate to the issue of
marketability, and describes the evolution of federal and state brownfield policy tools designed
to address these barriers. The final section overviews the measurement of brownfield
remediation and redevelopment success.
Definition and Policy Background. Contaminated properties reached the national
consciousness in the late 1970s when numerous toxic waste fires occurred and the extent of
contamination at Love Canal in New York and Times Beach in Missouri became known. These
events and the resulting public outcry led President Carter and the U.S. Congress to pass the
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Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), funding
remediation of the most contaminated sites and setting liability rules regarding responsibility for
past, present and future damages. However, while this legislation addressed a serious
environmental problem, it also erected significant liability barriers for those who might
voluntarily redevelop properties containing far less severe contamination (Yount 2003; Heberle
and Wernstedt 2006; Page and Rabinowitz 1994). By erecting elaborate joint and several
liability structures to hold multiple parties responsible for remediation, policy makers effectively
created disincentives for the transfer of titles of contaminated properties to those who might
willingly clean them up (McGregor 2003).
Recognizing this negative side-effect of CERCLA, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) enacted its Brownfields Action Agenda in 1995 to clarify liability
issues and to support efforts underway in various states that incentivized voluntary clean up of
brownfield properties (Yount 2003; Heberle and Wernstedt 2006). The resulting revisions of
federal laws freed states to innovate policy instruments intended to lessen market constraints on
brownfield redevelopment for private firms. These laws had the additional effect of empowering
local governments to pool existing resources and proactively address their own brownfield
problems in anticipation of attracting private investment. It is at this point that “brownfield
remediation and redevelopment” emerged first as a subsector of the environmental engineering
profession and then as part of the economic development sector.
The official definition for “brownfield” in the United States comes from Public Law 107118 and states that “brownfields are real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of
which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance,
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pollutant, or contaminant3.” The law excludes properties whose contamination is so extensive
that they qualify for the National Priorities List of hazardous waste sites and properties that have
binding legal agreements regarding their remediation. Key components of this definition are the
phrases “presence or potential presence” and “may be complicated”, signifying that the
brownfield status of a property is based both on perceptions of contamination as well as actual
contamination (Schoenbaum 2002). This ambiguity led to the development of a diversity of
brownfield policy tools as well as multiple calls for more specific definitions (Yount 2003).
Extent and Nature of Problem. The lack of a clear definition and the diversity of
public policiy at the state level make it difficult to nail down the extent of the brownfield
problem in the United States (Coffin and Meyer 2002; Yount 2003). For example, the USEPA
estimates that 450,000 brownfield properties sit underused in the United States4. Yet, in a series
of surveys conducted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, city managers from over 500 of the
nation’s largest municipalities estimated only 40,000 brownfield properties in their communities
(Table 2-1) (Mayors 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010).

3
4

http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/ accessed August 1, 2010
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm accessed August 1, 2010
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Table 2-1: Brownfields Data – U.S. Conference of Mayors
City Population

Less than
100,000
351
9397
54921
5.84
$241,758,110
868

100,000 to
249,999
97
9586
44261
4.62
$59,336,000
603

250,000 to
499,999
31
8961
29584
3.30
$69,170,556
282

500,000+

# Respondents
25
Total # Sites
11314
Total # Acres
450227
Ave Acres
4.44
Est Tax Revenue
$260,010,000
Sites
575
Redeveloped*
Data compiled from responses across 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010 U.S. Conference of
Mayors brownfield surveys using most recent year containing total # sites and total # acres data
for each unique case. Survey questions and format differ for each year. All responses are
estimates made by the respondent. Not all responses complete.
* Excludes cities whose only data comes from 2000 survey.
At the same time, it is difficult to designate and count privately owned brownfield
properties as brownfield designation lowers the value of the property and adjacent parcels,
particularly in commercial and residential areas and property owners lack reporting incentives
(Ihlanfeldt and Taylor 2004; Leigh and Coffin 2005; Longo and Alberini 2006; Meyer 2003).
Therefore, public inventories that do exist usually only contain those properties that are likely to
be or become owned by the local government through foreclosure or purchase.
Strong evidence exists linking brownfield properties to economically struggling
communities. A report by the Brookings Institution (2006) empirically identifies 139 cities in 24
states with populations of at least 30,000 that have been underperforming economically the past
ten years and highlights how most of these cities are those with industrial pasts and have left “a
tremendous environmental legacy” (Vey 2007). Superimposing these data on the Conference of
Mayors data shows how properties in Brookings' “Weak Market” communities in the American
northeast and midwest report a disproportion of Conference of Mayors brownfield properties
(Table 2-2), a relationship confirmed by existing research (XLEnvironmental 2002; Heberle and
Wernstedt 2006; Page and Berger 2005).
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Table 2-2: Older Industrial Cities and Brownfields
All Cities in U.S.
Conference of Mayors
(COM) Data
430
34,819

Brookings Older
Industrial Cities in
COM Data
40
7,101

Proportion of
Brookings Data to
COM Data
9%
20%

cities
est # brownfield
sites
est # brownfield
214,477
30,484
14%
acres
est average acres
33.88
5.61
Derived from Brookings (2006) and U.S. Conference of Mayors (2001, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010)
Causes and Contaminants. Brownfield properties occur due to a wide range of land
uses across urban, suburban and rural landscapes. However, research indicates a majority of
brownfields derive from industrial and commercial activity in areas of high population densities
(Bjelland 2004) and persist due to liability, uncertainty, and the availability of uncontaminated
land, or “greenfields”, in suburban areas drawing development activity away from brownfield
properties (Brachman 2004).
Brownfield contamination comes from a variety of sources through a variety of means
and includes a wide range of contaminants. Many of the large industrial site contaminations in
the northeast and midwest stem from the manufacturing and processing of glass, chemicals,
plastic, paint and construction materials (Bjelland 2004; Gorman 2003; Page and Berger 2005).
A host of smaller businesses such as dry cleaners and fuel service stations also contribute to the
problem, particularly in smaller communities (Page and Berger 2005). Contamination may occur
through intentional or accidental waste dumping, surface runoff, and contaminant migration by
means of both groundwater and air (Greenberg et al. 2001; Howland 2003). Contaminants are
hazardous substances posing health risks via air, soil, and water pathways and include substances
such as petroleum derivatives, PCBs, lead, and dioxins (DeSousa 2001; NADO 2006).
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Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Processes. Individual brownfield
projects vary along multiple characteristics including time to completion, size, extent of
contamination, number of project partners, and political support for the project (Yousefi et al.
2007; Lange and McNeil 2004; Meyer and Lyons 2000). However, remediation and
redevelopment processes remain largely the same across the board (Schilling and Logan 2008;
Sagalyn 2007; Mayors 2007; Dixon 2007; NADO 2006; Heberle and Wernstedt 2006; DeSousa
2006; NADO 2004; Davis 2002; Wood 2000, 1998; Blair, Govan, and Atkinson 1995; Dennison
1998). This suggests a reliable theory-based model of brownfield project processes (Table 2-3).
The process generally begins with site selection and assembly and a Phase I assessment
for contamination. Site selection occurs via a mix of political and economic development
priorities, land use planning, citizen preferences, end use, and voluntary action. Phase I
assessments provide a quick overview of contamination. Concurrently, project initiators use
Phase I data to determine the economic feasibility of site redevelopment and select the best end
use for a remediated property. If the Phase I assessment reveals levels of contamination
requiring remediation, property owners conduct a much more detailed Phase II assessment to
determine contamination details, quantify contamination concentrations, and evaluate the surface
and subsurface conditions. Remediation soon follows and redevelopment occurs.
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Table 2-3: Phases of Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment
Phase

Stage
Site Identification
and Assembly

Remediation

Redevelopment
(Overlap)
Remediation

Initial Site
Assessment – Phase
I Investigation
Detailed Site
Assessment – Phase
II Investigation
Remedial
Assessment
Economic
Assessment and
Planning
Project
Development and
Financing

Description
Potential developers (public and private) identify
contaminated sties of interest with assistance from
public brownfield directories or through marketing
by current property owners.
Assessing to determine whether contamination is
present through historical records and examination of
neighboring sites.
Environmental engineers sample and analyze
chemical parameters of site if Phase I Investigation
suggests potential for contamination.
Assessing for potential economic return vs. cost of
restoring site to productive use. Sites categorized
into viable, threshold, and nonviable groups
according to this potential/cost ratio. End use plans
generated.
Assuming financial feasibility studies are complete,
developers arrange financing for clean up and
redevelopment. This is a likely stage for meetings
between multiple stakeholders.
Selecting and implementing a clean up plan in
compliance with regulations.

Remediation
Planning and
Execution
Redevelopment
Redevelopment of
Altering the site for suitability to its new use.
Site
Derived from Dennison (1998, pp. 142-147)

For the most part, property owners initiate and drive project processes. In situations
where private owners do not voluntarily begin assessment, municipalities will occasionally
acquire the properties through tax foreclosure, direct purchase agreements and eminent domain
and initiate assessment and remediation processes (Brachman 2003; Wernstedt and Hersh 2003).
When local governments are the property owners, redevelopment phases often occur through a
public-private partnership where both partners strive to leverage financial resources from the
other (Sagalyn 2007; Bartsch 2006; ICMA 2005). In certain instances, municipalities themselves
serve as both the remediation facilitator and the redeveloper.
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End Use. The end uses of brownfield properties range across the industrial, commercial,
and residential spectrum of economic and community development. Once project drivers select
end uses, the stakeholders likely to be involved in remediation and redevelopment processes
become clear. In addition, the levels to which remediation must occur under the appropriate
regulatory framework becomes known. For example, residential end uses typically engage more
citizens in planning processes and require higher standards of remediation (Kirkwood 2001).
The location of the brownfield and the enthusiasm for its proposed end use can drastically
shape the marketability and demand for the property (Lange and McNeil 2004). For example,
properties on waterfronts, near downtown areas, and lying at key intersections of urban
infrastructure often “rise to the top” of project priority lists. Meanwhile, properties lying in areas
outside the public interest often remain unaddressed for long periods of time. Studies of end use
indicate that industrial and commercial reuse prevail when private firms drive project processes
while parks, public buildings and housing projects dominate municipality-led projects (DeSousa
2004; Page and Berger 2005; Silverstein 2003).
Stakeholders. Stakeholders and actors in brownfield remediation and redevelopment
projects (Table 2-4) range across environmental, economic development, and urban planning
professions and include elected representatives, public and private developers, landowners,
investors, citizens, activists, regulators, and clients of developers (Dair and Williams 2006;
Greenberg et al. 2001; Silverstein 2003; Alker et al. 2000).
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Table 2-4: Brownfield Stakeholders
Stakeholder Group

Stakeholder Type
Regulators, service
providers, elected officials

Those involved in land-use
planning and regulation
Interest groups, private
consultants, individuals

Those involved in
development and construction

Property developers and
developer interests
Professional advisors

Those involved in end use

Consumers

Example
Environmental regulators, zoning
and planning regulators, city
council members, city officials,
health and safety regulators
Business interests, community
activists, individual citizens
Public and private developers,
investors, landowners,
shareholders, construction
workers, suppliers
Lawyers, architects, engineers,
surveyors, conservationists,
archaeologists, insurers
Clients of developers, residents
of new homes, proprietors of
commercial business,
manufacturers, adjacent
landowners

Derived from Dair & Williams (2006)
Actor composition varies by project based upon property ownership, remediation
requirements, the policy tools used, and the proposed end use (Dair and Williams 2006). The
degree to which actors engage in the project also varies across project phases and the tasks at
hand. For example, remediation largely occurs through a set of contracted and sub-contracted
relationships where the property owner, or a private consultant acting on behalf of the property
owner, formally contracts with firms that specialize in different pieces of the site-specific
remediation plan. Table 2-5 provides an illustration of how stakeholder composition may vary
over the course of the project.
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Table 2-5: Public and Private Actors in Remediation and Redevelopment Processes
Phase

Stage
Site Identification

Remediation

Stakeholders
citizens
elected officials
public managers (planners,
engineers)
private property owners
insurers
Initial Site Assessment – public managers
Phase I Investigation
environmental engineers
Detailed Site Assessment environmental engineers
– Phase II Investigation
public managers
Economic Assessment
and Planning

citizens
elected officials
economic development officials
developers
lawyers
public managers
insurers
Redevelopment Project Development and lenders
Financing
developers
clients
Remediation
Remediation Planning
environmental engineers
and Execution
consultants and contractors
Redevelopment Redevelopment of Site
developers
consultants and contractors
clients
public managers
Barriers to Brownfield Remediation and Remediation. The challenges facing
successful implementation of an individual brownfield project largely depend upon the
marketability of the property and the extent to which public or private leaders are willing to incur
financial risks (McCarthy 2002). Public and private actors have different needs, goals,
motivations, and accountability structures and have varying perceptions in these situations.
Private sector actors seek positive returns on investment and list remediation uncertainty,
liability concerns, the time required for regulatory compliance, and funding availability for
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remediation as primary reasons for avoiding brownfield properties (Meyer and Lyons 2000). On
the other hand, political forces drive public actors to pursue public health, economic
development, and sustainability goals through brownfield redevelopment (Greenberg and
Schneider 1995). However, the cost of these efforts provide strong incentives for local
governments to focus their efforts on diminishing barriers to potential private investors (Page
and Rabinowitz 1994).
Marketability. Like the “brownfield” concept itself, “marketability” is perceptual and
influences the extent to which public subsidy plays a role in remediation (Howland 2003).
However, there is debate as to whether or not environmental liabilities challenge brownfield
redevelopment more than fundamental real estate problems (Wernstedt et al. 2004). Since many
contaminated properties exist in already struggling real estate markets, discerning between the
two factors is difficult. Figure 2-1 exhibits how this function impacts drivers of brownfield
processes. Area A contains viable sites where sufficient market demand drives voluntary
remediation and redevelopment by private investors. Area B contains threshold sites where, with
public subsidization, private investment occurs. Area C contains unviable sites where private
actors not invest no matter how extensive the public subsidies (Davis 2002; Howland 2003;
Silverstein 2003). This study focuses upon those properties in Area B, which receive a moderate
to high levels of public subsidy.
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Figure 2-1: Property Marketability and Brownfield Redevelopment

Surveys of developers indicate that many factors shape private actor interest in
brownfield properties. Property acreage, proximity to existing infrastructure, availability of
government funding and liability protections, access to insurance products, and potential return
on investment all impact private actor behavior (Alberini et al. 2005; Alberini, Meyer, and
Wernstedt 2004; Wernstedt et al. 2006). Large properties tend to attract large investors (Meyer
and Lyons 2000) and, as perceived marketability increases, it becomes more likely a private
property owner will initiate remediation (Alberini, Meyer, and Wernstedt 2004). While the study
of public actors initiating brownfield projects remains limited, the literature suggests that costs,
liability, time, information, and political support are factors mediating the involvement of both
public and private actors.
Costs. Remediation costs pose the greatest barrier to actors from both sectors (Page and
Rabinowitz 1994; Stephenson 2005; Alberini et al. 2005; Wernstedt and Hersh 2003; Davis
2002). For some properties, remediation costs may be greater than the redevelopment costs.
While uncertainty regarding the extent of contamination amplifies the financial risks to private
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investors, public actors face financial barriers made more complex by the public accountability
issues tied to using tax dollars.
Liability. Private actors acquiring brownfield properties also weigh the threat of liability
for future contamination problems brought on by property ownership (McGregor 2003; Alberini
et al. 2005; Wernstedt et al. 2006). This liability was the original barrier created by CERCLA
that federal and state brownfield laws subsequently addressed by exempting remediation
initiators from lawsuits if they fulfilled remediation due diligence (Sigman 2005; Wernstedt et al.
2006).
Time. Another major barrier to private investment is the time required for the
implementation of public policy instruments, particularly when interest groups intervene to
pursue additional agendas (Sigman 2001). Not only does regulatory compliance add time to the
redevelopment project, but so do requirements for citizen engagement and collaborative planning
(Wernstedt et al. 2006). As the old adage goes, “time is money”, especially for private actors
operating within a competitive market. Therefore, the anticipated time between Phase I
assessments and completed redevelopment of the site factors into project initiation decisions
(Lange and McNeil 2004).
Information. The contamination component of brownfield remediation and
redevelopment projects creates greater demand for information by public managers, citizens,
elected officials from developers, environmental engineers, and lawyers (Thomas 2003). The
uncertainty surrounding actual contamination and the potential for lawsuits if remediation is not
carried out sufficiently places the burden for generating accurate information on the property
developer themselves (Wernstedt et al. 2006). Another information barrier creating uncertainty is
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the lack of sophisticated or consistent data collection techniques by governments (Coffin and
Meyer 2002; Thomas 2003).
Political Support. Finally, many brownfields remain underused and unaddressed because
the political will and leadership required for remediation and redevelopment remains insufficient
(Brachman 2004). Many threshold properties that prevailing market forces do not address
require individuals with political power willing to champion them and push them through
political and bureaucratic processes.
Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Policies. The primary means by which
governments address these barriers is through the development and application of public policies
that, over the past fifteen years, have successfully created artificial brownfield markets
(Wernstedt et al. 2006; Meyer and Lyons 2000). At the federal level, the USEPA serves as the
primary agency administering brownfield policy programs with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) playing a role for those projects with residential end uses. The
primary incentives and programs currently offered by these agencies for local-level brownfield
redevelopment include assessment and remediation grants, revolving loans, technical assistance,
temporary assignment of federal employees with states and municipalities, and designation of
areas with large densities of contaminated properties as brownfield showcase communities that
qualify them for additional support.
At the state level, most governments provide what are known as voluntary cleanup
programs (VCPs) which offer an array of policy tools designed to meet private property owner
needs (Alberini, Meyer, and Wernstedt 2004; Blair et al. 1995). These tools address propertyspecific issues of liability, uncertainty, and risk in order to lower remediation costs and increase
potential investment returns. In addition, many states have additional programs tailored to public
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and nonprofit developers that reimburse assessment and remediation costs. Table 2-6 lists the
major categories of state level policy tools used in brownfield redevelopment.
Table 2-6: Common Brownfields Policy Tools
Tools
Environmental
insurance

Barrier Addressed
Risk of future liability

Target Actor
Public, private,
nonprofit
developers

Tax relief
Tax increment
financing
Low-interest loans

Cost of assessment,
remediation and
redevelopment
Cost of assessment,
remediation and
redevelopment
Cost of assessment and
remediation
Citizen outreach
Risk of future liability

Private developers

Technical assistance
Liability waiver
Assessment and
remediation grants
Redevelopment
authority

Cost of assessment and
remediation
Timeliness of
government service
delivery

Private, nonprofit
developers
Public, private,
nonprofit
developers
Public, private,
nonprofit
developers
Public, nonprofit
developers
Public, private,
nonprofit
developers

Mechanism
Protect developers
from third party
liability and provide
cost cap protection
Financial incentive to
commit to specific
property
Revolving loan fund
enabling more
affordable clean up
Provide information
enabling more
efficient processes
Statutory protection
Project-specific block
grant
Administrative entity
with greater flexibility

Studies of brownfield tools primarily examine the effectiveness of individual tools. For
example, Carroll and Eger (2006) investigate the performance of tax-increment financing (TIF)
and determine that, when applied on an area-wide basis, aggressive TIF increases brownfield
property marketability (Carroll and Eger III 2006). However, this tool-by-tool approach to
performance measurement does not fully capture the reality of how public managers apply
packages of instruments to meet developer needs (Wernstedt et al. 2006).
Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Policy in the State of New York.
Brownfield policy development in the State of New York has followed a path unique to all other
states in the U.S. due to the impact of its most famous contaminated property, Love Canal. This
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case involved the siting of a neighborhood and elementary school on top of a poorly designed
hazardous waste dump in North Tonawanda, NY just south of the city of Buffalo, NY. When
toxic mud began bubbling up around playgrounds and backyards during a particularly rainy
spring, the news took the media by storm, placing the environmental regulatory schemes in the
state of New York under intense political scrutiny5. Ultimately leading to a federal policy
change regarding hazardous waste clean up with the U.S. Congress approving the Superfund
program in 1980, Love Canal also triggered New York policy makers to establish high levels of
redundancy in the contamination and redevelopment rules for local governments to prevent such
an incident from occurring again. As a result, New York State, according to one brownfield
expert, maintains a regulatory framework and bureaucracy more extensive than the remaining
forty-nine states6. It is therefore important to consider this regulatory context for New Yorkbased brownfield projects when applying findings from their analysis to governmental
jurisdictions outside New York State.
The three brownfield policy programs currently offered in New York State are the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) Brownfield Remediation
Program (BCP), the Environmental Restoration Program (ERP), and the Brownfield Opportunity
Area (BOA) Program. Originally established as the Voluntary Remediation Program (VCP) in
1994, the BCP supports private developers. The NYSDEC subsequently established the ERP in
1996 to assist in remediation activities initiated by municipalities and the BOA program
appeared in 2003 to encourage municipalities to develop area-wide plans with the input of
various community-based actors. The NYSDEC initially operated the BOA program in

5
6

http://www.justice.gov/enrd/Anniversary/2412.htm
Conversation with Preston Gilbert, SUNY-ESF, April 26, 2011
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partnership with the New York State Department of State (DOS) but the DOS now implements
the entire program. Together, these programs offer a mix of policy tools that address
remediation and redevelopment barriers. These tools include a Certificate of Completion
limiting owner liability, tax credits, planning and remediation grants, a revolving loan fund,
status in economic development zones, and technical assistance (Table 2-7). Participation in the
VCP/BCP and ERP occurs on a site-by-site basis and certain projects do not qualify if the
contamination is too high and there is pending litigation. In addition, the BCP and the ERP
require certain types of citizen participation such as public notices, comment periods, and public
forums.
Table 2-7: New York State Brownfield-related Policy Tools and Participation Requirements, by
Program
Tool
BCP
ERP BOA
Liability Relief to Innocent Parties
x
x
Environmental Liability Limitation
x
x
Covenant Not to Sue
x
Tax Credits1
x
Technical Assistance Grants ($50,000)
x
Remediation Grants (90% onsite; 100% offsite)
x
Revolving Loan Fund
x
x
x
2
Empire Zone/Environmental Zone Designation
x
x
x
Planning Grants (90%)
x
Citizen Participation Required at Various
x
x
x
Milestones
1
Tax credits offset costs associated with real property taxes, site preparation, groundwater
remediation, property improvements, environmental insurance premiums.
2
Enhances existing tax credits if property lies in designated zone.
In addition, fifty-three municipalities have entered the BOA program, which takes an area-wide
approach that is different than the site-based approaches of the VCP, BCP, and ERP. Table 2-8
summarizes total program participation.
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Table 2-8: New York State Brownfield Program Participation (August, 2010)

Total
properties
Properties
accepted
(A-Class)
Properties
cleaned up
(C-Class)

VCP
(1994-2003)

BCP
(2003present)

ERP
(1996present)

TOTAL
PROPERTIES

414

287

185

886

237

218

141

596

177

69

44

290

BOA
(2003-present)
Total
municipalities:
53
Step 1 (33)
Step 2 (15)
Step 3 (5)

Additional NYSDEC programs available for addressing contaminated properties include
the Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Site Program, the Corrective Action Program for
Hazardous Waste Facilities, the Bulk Storage Program for chemicals and petroleum with its Spill
Response Program, and the New York Environmental Protection and Spill Compensation and
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Funds. Together, these programs utilize reporting
requirements, liability tools, certification, technical support, and compensation payments (when
responsible parties are not identifiable) to achieve remediation goals7. The New York State
Departments of Education, Health, Agriculture, and the Division of Housing all offer various
grant programs that, while not directly related to property assessment or remediation, may be
applied to specific aspects of contaminated property redevelopment.
Measuring and Explaining Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Success.
Measuring brownfield project outcomes and assessing the success of these outcomes is a
complex affair. Outcomes range from the municipality to the microscopic levels of analysis and

7

http://www.dec.ny.gov/25.html (accessed June 8, 2010)
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consideration of each outcome for a measure of success depends upon stakeholder preferences.
As a result, brownfield project performances and successes become measured in multiple ways.
Brownfield Project Outcomes. Brownfield outcomes and their relative importance
generally fall into two categories; those related to remediation and those related to
redevelopment. Remediation outcomes include the reduction in liability for future property
owners, the diminishing of health risks, and the removal of unusable structures. Redevelopment
outcomes include increased property values, the addition of new jobs, and the triggering of
additional private development (Wernstedt, Meyer, and Alberini 2006; Wedding and CrawfordBrown 2007; Bacot and O'Dell 2006). Additional measures include the actual time required
from initial assessment to reuse, total remediation and development costs, community and
political support and satisfaction, and ratio of private to public investment (Lange and McNeil
2004; DeSousa 2005; Bacot and O'Dell 2006). However few of these are easily reducible to
quantifiable terms, creating performance measurement challenges (Bacot and O’Dell 2007). For
example, simply recording changes in property values, as many municipalities are prone to do,
does not necessarily measure the full impacts of the project nor does it isolate brownfield project
effects from changes in broader market forces (Alberini 2007; Meyer 1998).
Wedding and Crawford-Brown (2007) provide the most extensive tool for assessing
brownfield project performance. Adopting an “indicator” strategy used to measure advances in
sustainable development, they list forty measurable outcomes broken down between
environment and health, financial, social and economic, and livability categories. They then
transform these individual outcomes into measures of success by assigning weights derived from
stakeholder surveys about indicator preferences. Table 2-9 lists the indicator categories and the
top two indicators for each category.

33
Table 2-9: Brownfield Project Outcome Indicators
Categories and Indicators

Weights (1-10)

Environment and health indicators
1 Probability of health risks*

8.56

2 Reduction in energy use
Financial indicators

8.55

1 Reduction in liability*

8.89

Categories and
Indicators
Social and economic
indicators
Increase in tax
1 revenue for the site*
Net jobs created per
2 acre*
Livability indicators
Improved
1 community*
Reduction in crime
2 rate

2 Internal rate of return
8.78
From Wedding and Crawford-Brown (2008).
* Also determined to be “very important” or “important” by DeSousa (2005).

Weights (110)

7.78
7.11

8.56
8.33

Brownfield Project Success. The key challenge to accurately measuring brownfield
project success is capturing stakeholder perceptions and goals (Wedding and Crawford-Brown
2007). As a result, empirical work examining brownfield project outcomes and success must
include both tangible outcomes such as time required or money spent as well as perceptual ones
such as satisfaction with outcomes and processes. Even if this level of data collection is feasible,
the researcher must also be able to aggregate these measures into a meaningful score enabling
project comparisons. The measurement of brownfield success requires more thought and
development (DeSousa 2005; Lange and McNeil 2004; Wedding and Crawford-Brown 2007).
Determinants of Outcomes and Success. Existing research clearly indicates that multiple
factors influence the project outcomes summarized above. In general, these factors fall into
environmental, economic, and managerial categories (Table 2-10). Environmental variables
affecting outcomes include the type and extent of contamination, the technology available for
proposed remedies, and the flexibility of regulatory agencies (Wernstedt and Hersh 2003).
Economic variables shaping outcomes range from prevailing market strengths to the ability of
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policy instruments to impact marketability and provide financial resources (DeSousa 2005;
Wernstedt et al. 2006). The most cited managerial variables are the effective use of partnerships
(Wernstedt 2001; Silverstein 2003; Bartsch 2006; Dair and Williams 2006), the entrepreneurial
abilities of public and private actors to leverage marketability factors, the capacity of municipal
governments to compete for public grants (Greenberg and Issa 2005), and the abilities of
managers to effectively communicate data to appropriate stakeholders (Nijkamp, Rodenburg, and
Wagtendonk 2002).
Table 2-10: Major Determinants of Brownfield Project Outcomes
Environmental
Degree of contamination
Available technology
Regulatory flexibility

Economic
Market strength
Policy instrument availability
Financial resource availability

Managerial
Strength of partnership
Entrepreneurial capacity
Intergovernmental relations

The fact that multiple factors may explain each outcome measure and that these factors
are, in turn, explained by a second level of variables further complicates the explanations for
brownfield project success. As exemplified in Table 2-11, the ratio of private to public
investment depends upon the degree and extent of environmental contamination, the availability
of public and private resources (financial, informational, technical), the level of liability
protection for the end-use owner, and the comparative difference of project costs and benefits all
drive private investment (Silverstein 2003; Alberini et al. 2005; McCarthy 2002).
Table 2-11: Layers of Causal Variables
Outcome:
Primary
Causal
Factors:
Underlying
Causal
Factors:

Environmental
contamination
Past property use
Soil, groundwater flow
Climate

Public-private investment ratio
Resource availability
Liability protection
Tax policies
Real estate market
Negotiation behaviors

Policy tools selected
Remediation processes
End use
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Public Management of Brownfield Projects. Public managers seeking to steer
brownfield project processes need to diffuse a great deal of interdisciplinary information across
the project network (Thomas 2003). Private investors need to understand project risks and
uncertainties, local government officials need to be aware of available policy tools, and elected
officials, regulators, interest groups, and citizens need to understand remediation and
redevelopment processes to create a political process for moving the project forward (Thomas
2003; Simons and El Jaouhari 2001; DeSousa 2006). Evidence of the interdisciplinary nature of
brownfield projects may be seen in the placement of brownfield managers in economic
development, planning, community development, and environmental quality departments, as
well as within quasi-independent development corporations8. However, while these managers
may carry the title “brownfield coordinator”, few local governments employ managers for whom
steering brownfield project processes is their only job and few local governments contain single
agencies whose mission is to address brownfield problem.
True to the title of “coordinator”, the professional best practice literature overwhelmingly
suggests that developing public-private partnerships, engaging with citizens and organizations at
the community level, and maintaining positive relationships with a wide variety of stakeholders
may all help overcome remediation and redevelopment challenges (Mayors 2007; NADO 2004;
Simons and El Jaouhari 2001; Elliott and Bourne 2005). However, other than an examination of
negotiation strategies in forming cooperative partnerships (Yousefi et al. 2007), very little
systematic research has focused on actual management practice, particularly as it applies to
managing interorganizational relationships and coordinating networks of actors.

8

Evidence gathered from extensive internet searches of municipality websites for brownfield
programs (2009).
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Modeling Brownfield Project Processes. Currently, the literature presents two primary
models of brownfield remediation and redevelopment projects. The first is normative and
describes brownfield processes as rational and linear (refer back to Table 2 in this chapter). This
model assumes rational behaviors by project actors, near perfect information, and is most often
found in practitioner reports and best practice guides (Mayors 2000; Davis 2002; Brachman
2004). The second model draws more heavily upon existing brownfield theory and articulates a
dynamic system of multiple forces acting upon a continuum of outcomes. This model depicts
complex systems whose outcomes result from arrays of stakeholders impacting key variables at
different decision points in the process (Dixon 2007; Nijkamp, Rodenburg, and Wagtendonk
2002; BenDor and Metcalf 2003; Healey 1992). Variables common to this model include
property marketability, area-wide economic conditions, liability assignment, redevelopment
demand, uncertainties surrounding information and financial resources, extent of contamination,
the push of available policy instruments, and the pull of developer preferences (Figure 2-2).
Figure 2-2: Forces Influencing Brownfield Outcomes

Derived from Dixon 2007; Nijkamp et al 2002; BenDor and Metcalf 2003
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While both the rational linear and dynamic system models contribute to understanding
the context in which brownfield remediation and redevelopment occurs, neither one directly
addresses the need for theory-based guidance for public managers. How should public managers
tasked with steering brownfield projects utilize policy tools to activate the involvement of key
project actors? The next chapter mends this gap by reviewing the literatures addressing crosssector public management networks, the strategic management of these networks, and the policy
tools used by network managers in order to develop propositions regarding the extent to which
these three qualities of brownfield projects interact to shape project outcomes and, ultimately,
project success.
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CHAPTER THREE LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROPOSITIONS
Introduction. Understanding how brownfield projects function as cross-sector public
management networks and how public managers influence these networks to produce outcomes
requires a careful understanding of how public policy tools, network structures, and the
interpersonal behaviors of network actors interact over time. Fortunately, the increase in the
reliance on non-governmental actors for government service delivery over the past thirty years
has led to increased analytical focus on these networks (Rittel and Webber 1973; Agranoff and
McGuire 2001; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Weber and Khademian 2008). At the same time,
studies of how policy tools aid managers in leveraging these networks have also increased
(Clingermayer and Feiock 1990; Peters 2002; Salamon 2002; Howlett 2005; Feiock, Jeong, and
Kim 2003; Sandfort, Selden, and Sowa 2008), as has research examining network management
strategies at the individual and interpersonal levels (Ansell and Gash 2008; McGuire 2006;
Agranoff and McGuire 2003).
Woven together, these theories suggest that policy outcomes in brownfield networks stem
from neither the proper arrangement of network actors nor the correct design of policy tools nor
the appropriate application of management strategies. Rather, outcomes are best explained by a
combination of all three. But what does this combination look like at the project level? Are the
structures of policy tools more influential than public management behaviors, or vice versa?
How do evolving structures at the network level impact public management behaviors at the
individual level? How can this combination be used to explain varying levels of brownfield
project success across multiple projects?
Integrating these literatures with the brownfield research summarized in Chapter Two
provides the basis for five propositions about the influence of public managers on the outcomes
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of municipality-initiated brownfield projects. First, all brownfield projects, as networks of
actors, will display different network characteristics and will exhibit the use of different policy
tools across project phases. Second, successful projects will distinguish themselves with high
levels of network stability and consistent occupation of network centers by skilled public
managers across project phases. These public managers will, in turn, obtain influence over
network actors by using policy tools to secure network actor commitments. Finally, relationship
management will augment these strategies when new uncertainties present themselves.
Telling management stories embedded in a context of network structures and rules
requires navigation of the tensions between the primacy of agency (the strategic actions of
individuals) and structure (broader institutional and market forces) in explaining outcomes.
Therefore, the first section of this review overviews these tensions and addresses why they
matter when examining cross-sector public management network performance. The second
section describes what is known about network structures, network management, and their
relationships to network outcomes. The following section describes how the introduction of
policy tool research has influenced institutional theories of network management. The final
section summarizes these research strands and restates the propositions described above
regarding the successful public management of brownfield projects.
Bridging the Structure-Agency Divide. Existing research that addresses questions like
“does management matter in public management networks?” tends to assume either that
outcomes are best explained by “structure” or “agency”. In public administration research,
structuralists view government action as the result of a range of norms, rules, and patterns
shaping human action and would therefore suggest that outcomes and policy success or failure is
due to success or failure in policy design (Borgatti and Foster 2003). On the other hand, agency-
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oriented researchers see network outcomes as a result of individuals exercising the opportunity to
act freely in decision-making (Hitlin and Elder 2007). Under this assumption, policy success or
failure subsequently occurs due to strong or weak decision-making on behalf of leaders and
managers. Most public management research suggests a strong agency perspective, or at least an
assumption that, in certain situations, individual actors weigh heavily on organizational
performance. However when explaining network outcomes it is important to not over determine
agency over structure because structure and agency are not mutually exclusive and, instead,
impact one another (Giddens 1979). Therefore, viewing structure as either the mechanism for or
the outcome of action only tells one piece of the story. Instead, theoretical frameworks that
model network processes should allow for simultaneous relationships between agency and
structure (Healey and Barrett 1990; Guy and Henneberry 2000; Doak and Karadimitriou 2007;
Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997). Failure to do so would
misrepresent network realities. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) underscore the challenge of doing
so in these processes . . .
. . . where many factors and actors influence each other, and actors consciously respond
to events in their environment, causal relations are highly complex, dynamic and
reciprocal. They can hardly be captured in causal schemes that create a static idea of the
relation between dependent and independent variables. In reality, the relations are
constantly in flux, and we can see a continuous interchange between factors and process.
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004: 12)
It is for these reasons that this review examines both the structuralist and the agency-focused
public management literatures to formulate the research propositions.
Cross-Sector Public Management Networks. Much research over the past ten years
examines the phenomena of government agencies working with private, non-profit, and citizen
partners. These cross-sector public management networks occur in issue areas such as
watersheds and natural resources (Imperial 2005; Clark, Burkardt, and King 2005), health and

41
human services (Sowa 2008; Bardach and Lesser 1996; Provan, Huang, and Milward 2009) and
economic development (McGuire 2000; Agranoff and McGuire 2003, 1998; Teisman and Klijn
2002). Aggregated together, this research spans multiple levels of analysis while addressing a
variety of questions. It also consists of four perspectives defined by the core questions; how
organizational characteristics impact a single organization’s ability to work with a partner, how
network structures impact the performance of individual organizations, how an individual
organization impacts network structures, and how multi-level actions and structures shape
network level outcomes (Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007; Galaskiewicz 2007). With a state
interest in management impacts on brownfield outcomes, this dissertation concentrates upon this
last perspective in the literature.
Network Structures. In organizational networks, “structure” refers to the ties between a
defined set of actors (Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979; Wasserman and Faust 1994). These
relationships are normally measured as information and resource exchanges but may also
represent other linkages such as memberships, affiliations, and personal commitments (Milward
and Provan 1998). Generally, different patterns of network ties correlate with different patterns
of information dissemination and resource exchange which, in turn, impact decision making and
network outcomes (Dawes, Cresswell, and Pardo 2009; Droege, Anderson, and Bowler 2003).
Network ties may be quantified to produce measurements of centrality, density, multiplexity,
brokers, and cliques. These measures may, in turn, be viewed as variables that differentiate
networks and their relative performances (Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007; Wasserman and Faust
1994; Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979).
Centrality refers to the number of direct links an organization or an actor maintains with
all other members of the network. The greater the number of these direct links, the more the
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actor is positioned to influence information and resource exchanges (Berardo 2008; Schalk,
Torenvlied, and Allen 2010; Provan and Milward 1995). For example, high degrees of centrality
exhibited by an actor have been shown to be related to the actor’s trustworthiness, reputation,
and influence in mental health service networks (Provan, Huang, and Milward 2009).
Density is the degree to which the entire network experiences interconnectivity.
Research indicates that the greater the density, the more the network experiences communication
saturation and group cohesion (Pryke 2005; Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000). While this
may seem like a positive network attribute for performance, high network densities are also
associated with high coordination costs for managing these integrated ties (Milward et al. 2010).
Therefore, higher performing networks likely maintain enough density to ensure adequate crossactor communication but not so much that the network becomes bogged down with the costs of
maintaining those ties.
Multiplexity is the strength of ties in a network measured by the number of different
kinds of relationships, or roles, between two actors (LeRoux, Brandenburger, and Pandey 2010).
Should one type of relationship be discontinued, additional ties still remain between those actors
(Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979). Multiplexity tends to increase over time as actors learn
which relationships provide the greatest benefits to them in the network and form multiple layers
in the relationships. Relationships characterized by actors with high values of multiplexity, or
relationship strength, indicate greater maturity and are more likely to endure exogenous shocks
to the network (Provan and Milward 1991, 2001).
Gaps between network actors, or “structural holes”, also provide opportunities for
network actors to gain influence by acting as brokers filling these holes, or gaps, between subgroups, or cliques, in a network (Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979; Rowley, Behrens, and
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Krackhardt 2000). By occupying these positions, brokers control information and resource flows
between cliques (Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007). Brokers maximize their position by
negotiating with actors within their home organization to gain appropriate authority for
managing actors outside their organization (Balogun et al. 2005; Honig 2006). Generally, central
actors and brokers maintain network influence by gathering large amounts of information and/or
resources to create dependencies in other network actors (Tsai 2001). Networks experiencing
high levels of network stability over long periods of time may therefore develop similar
structural attributes to that of a hierarchy with the centralized actor enjoying the control benefits
afforded by hierarchal rules and norms (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Tenbensel 2005).
Recent research indicates that, in public management situations, these measurements of
network structure are not static and instead evolve over time. Comparing two social service
provision networks, Provan et al (2009) found that actor-level characteristics like trust,
reputation, and influence, mature over time the more the actor becomes embedded in the
network, particularly in terms of their central positioning for information diffusion. It is
important to note, however, that different networks have different life spans based upon their
stated purposes and goals. They may be open-ended and long-term, as in the case of natural
resource management networks (Lubell and Fulton 2008; Thomas 2003) or health and human
service networks (Isett and Provan 2005; Milward et al. 2010; Provan and Milward 1995), or
they may be short-term and focused on specific outcomes, as in the case of infrastructure
construction projects (Teisman and Klijn 2002).
While few studies examine the significance of time frame differences on network
processes, projects exhibiting clear goals and a short life span likely produce loosely coupled
networks relying less upon maturing trust-based relationships and more upon arms-length linking
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mechanisms (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Pryke 2005) to coordinate “linear” sets of tasks that
clearly follow one another (McGuire 2002). Therefore, the importance of formal agreements
made between actors early on in the project in maintaining likely increases with decreasing
network life spans where the network is more susceptible to changes in the organizational
environment (Pryke 2004, 2005).
Integrating the brownfield research from Chapter 2 with these network structure theories
produces the following propositions about brownfield projects as cross-sector networks where
structures evolve over time.
1. Brownfield project performance will increase with increasing network centrality,
network stability, and multiplexity.
Network theory suggests that successful brownfield project networks, with their short life
spans, clear project goals, and multiple expert domains, require highly central and stable formal
structures to achieve successful outcomes. However, the entry and exit of project actors to and
from the network across project phases challenges stability, suggesting that successful
brownfield networks also exhibit high levels of multiplexity, or layers of ties between network
actors. These ties ensure that, while project actors may exit the network after they have
completed their primary task, ties remain to highly central actors enabling the transfer of relevant
information.
2. As short-term, goal-specific networks characterized by distinct task phases,
brownfield project network characteristics, such as centrality and composition, will
change according to the expert-orientation of each phase.
Actor composition, and the structural ties between actors, will shift over the course of a
brownfield project due to the environmental and construction domain orientations and planning
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and implementation characteristics of each project phase. Contamination assessment and
remediation tasks will require actors knowledgeable of chemistry, geology, and engineering.
End use design and sales will require actors knowledgeable of marketing, economics, real estate,
and architecture. In essence, this proposition states that, despite the project network being
comprised of individuals from multiple organizations both inside and outside city government,
more successful projects will assume managerial structures similar to a hierarchy.
Institutions and Network Ties. The extent to which public managers arrive at highly
central positions in project networks depends largely upon prevailing rules and norms (Kickert,
Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004).
Theory about rules and norms, or “institutional” theory, stems from work in both economics and
sociology examining how institutions in an organization’s environment impact organizational
behavior (Williamson 1998).
Institutions, as rules, derive from cultural norms, the preferences of legitimacy-granting
actors, formal governance agreements, and laws and mandates (Marchington and Vincent 2004;
Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004; Provan and Milward 1991; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004) that
both enable and prevent ties between network actors as they interact with one another to find
shared meanings, manage conflicts, and make resource allocation decisions. In brownfield
remediation and redevelopment projects, policy tools serve as an important source of institutions,
particularly regarding ways in which public managers may influence project partners by shaping
institutions. In the words of Lascoumes and Gales (2007), policy tools:
. . . partly determine the way in which the actors are going to behave; they create
uncertainties about the effects of the balance of power; they will eventually privilege
certain actors and interests and exclude others; they constrain the actors while offering
them possibilities; they drive forward a certain representation of problems.(9)
Therefore, integrating policy tool theory into ideas about network structures provides a
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mechanism for linking theories about network structure to theories describing network
management.
Policy Tools. A resurgence in policy tool research has accompanied the recent rise in
networked approaches for addressing policy problems (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007). In this
research, Hood (2007) identifies three distinct streams of analysis that have asked three distinct
sets of questions. First, the “politics-of-instrumentality” approach emphasizes how policy tools
come to be created and selected. Researchers adopting this perspective ask why certain decision
makers prefer some instruments to others (Peters 2002; Hood 2007; Linder and Peters 1989).
Second, the “institutions-as-tools” approach asks questions about the nature of particular service
delivery forms. This approach considers whole organizations to be tools, a unique approach that
does not separate organizational forms from laws, rules, and guidelines. The third analytical
stream encompasses a range of approaches that sort policy tools into broad, generic categories.
Coined “carrots, sticks, and sermons” to reflect the incentives and means of delivering those
incentives behind them, these approaches ask questions about how characteristics endemic to the
tools themselves impact targeted actors (Hood 2007). When considering the strategic application
of policy tools to management situations, this third analytical stream provides the most insights.
In describing categories of policy tool characteristics, Salamon (2002) proposes that
policy tools consist of products and activities, delivery vehicles, and delivery systems. Products
and activities may include in-kind payments, restrictions, information, etc. Delivery vehicles and
systems refer to the structures through which products and activities occur, such as a grant, loan,
or direct service. Delivery vehicles and systems may be further classified by degree of
coerciveness, directness, automaticity, and visibility, allowing public managers to assemble tool
sets that match the management situation (Salamon 2002). For example, a public manager may
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perceive reluctance on behalf of private developers to commit to investing in a politically
charged redevelopment and may select a tool that is both coercive and less visible.
Hood (2007) challenges Salamon’s (2002) inclusion of organizations/institutions, arguing
that, because an organization may use a tool, they are empirically distinct from also being a tool.
He points to work by Lascoumes and Gales (2007) as an alternate typology that not only
distinguishes between organizations and tools but also provides more precise language about
them. Their scheme includes five tool types associated with five different types of relationships
(Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007). Legislative and regulatory tools direct social behaviors,
economic and fiscal tools promote resource distribution, agreement and incentive-based tools
appeal to specific interest of the tool target, information and community-based tools indirectly
impact decisions through regulation of information, and best practices provide venues in which
free choice behaviors may occur. Each type subsequently suggests a particular form of structure
between the implementing actor and their target.
Combining Lascoumes and LeGales’ typology with Salamon’s tool list creates a general
framework linking tools to management behaviors (Table 3-1). Despite Hood’s argument, this
framework includes “direct action”, or direct activities taken on by the implementing actor, as a
legislatve means for achieving outcomes. For example, in brownfield projects, local government
may utilize internal resources and personnel to assess properties, providing the necessary
information for potential private partners to make decisions about risk. This is consistent with
ideas of ways in which local government influence economic development (Blair 2002).
Throughout the rest of this paper, policy tool discussions will occur with “direct action” listed as
a legislative tool, understanding that it is not a tool in the theoretical sense but is a relative
measure for tool use and will be in bold font to indicate its conceptual difference.
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Table 3-1: Policy Tool Typology
Type of Tool
Legislative/Regulatory

Type of Relations
Social Guardian State - Government
directs actor behaviors

Economic and Fiscal

Wealth Producer/Redistributive State Government influences actor behavior by
appealing to resource dependencies

Agreement/IncentiveBased
Information/
Community-Based

Mobilizing State - Government
negotiates actor behavior
Audience Democracy - Government
shapes actor behavior by providing or
withholding relevant information
Best Practices
Civil Society Adjustments and
Competitive Mechanisms - Government
creates venues for actor behavior
Derived from Salamon, 2002 and Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007

Examples (Salamon, 2002)
Economic and Social
Regulation
Tort Liability
Direct Action
Taxes
Grants
Loans
Insurance
Contracts
Public Information
Tradable Permits
Vouchers
Government Corporations

Applying this policy tool typology to existing brownfield research suggests that
brownfield policy tool programs mostly offer economic/fiscal, legislative/regulatory, and
agreement-based tool types (Table 3-2).
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Table 3-2: Brownfield-related Policy Tools
Tool

Type of Tool

Type of Relations

Liability Relief to Innocent
Parties

Legislative/Regulat
ory

Social Guardian
State

Environmental Liability
Limitation
Covenant Not to Sue

Legislative/Regulat
ory
Agreement-Based

Social Guardian
State
Mobilizing State

Tax Credits1

Economic and
Fiscal
Economic and
Fiscal
Economic and
Fiscal
Economic and
Fiscal
Economic and
Fiscal
Economic and
Fiscal
Community-Based

Redistributive State

Technical Assistance Grants
($50,000)
Cleanup Grants (90% onsite;
100% offsite)
Revolving Loan Fund
Empire Zone/Environmental
Zone2
Planning Grants (90%)
Citizen Participation Required
at Various Milestones
Quasi-governmental Agencies

Redistributive State

Implementer→Targ
et
State→Municipality
→
Developer
State→Municipality
→ Developer
Municipality→Devel
oper
Municipality→Devel
oper
State→Municipality

Redistributive State

State→Municipality

Redistributive State

State→Developer

Redistributive State

State→Developer

Redistributive State

State→Municipality

Audience
State→Municipality
Democracy
→ Developer
Best Practices
Civil Society
N/A
Adjustments
1
Tax credits offset costs associated with real property taxes, site preparation, groundwater
remediation, property improvements, environmental insurance premiums.
2
Enhances existing tax credits if property lies in designated zone.
Breaking down tool use by project phase suggests a strong task-specificity to which policy tools
become used in any brownfield project where the pull of phase-specific project tasks plays a
prominent role in the selection and use of policy tools in brownfield projects (Table 3-3).
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Table 3-3: Phases of Brownfield Remediation and redevelopment and Tools Likely Applied
Phase

Stage
Site Identification
and Assembly

Remediation

Redevelopment
(Overlap)
Remediation

Initial Site
Assessment –
Phase I
Investigation
Detailed Site
Assessment –
Phase II
Investigation
Remedial
Assessment
Economic
Assessment and
Planning
Project
Development and
Financing
Cleanup Planning
and Execution

Tools Likely Applied
Direct Action, QuasiGovernmental
Agencies, Citizen
Participation
Grants, Contracts

Primary Tool Types
Community-Based,
Legislative/Regulatory

Grants, Contracts, Tax
Credits

Agreement-Based,
Economic and Fiscal

Strategic Plans, Citizen
Participation

Community-Based,
Legislative/Regulatory

Loans, Contracts, Tax
Credits

Agreement-Based,
Economic and Fiscal

Liability Release,
Contracts, Technical
Assistance
Contracts

Community-Based,
Legislative/Regulatory

Redevelopment Redevelopment of
Site
Adapted from Dennison (1998, pp. 142-147)

Agreement-Based,
Economic and Fiscal

Agreement-Based

The following proposition emerges from this integration of policy tool and brownfield
theories:
3. Policy tool use in brownfield projects will vary by project phase. Planning phases
will emphasize community-based information and legislative/regulatory tools and
create network structures with highly directive qualities while implementation phases
will emphasize agreement-based and economic and fiscal tools, creating network
structures with highly redistributive properties.
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This proposition infers that these selection patterns subsequently shape the links between
project actors by prescribing the nature of actor relationships. However, as the next section
reviews, tool use and the subsequent impacts on network structures and actor behaviors also
occur through strategic management behaviors.
Network Management. Network management research examines individual-level
strategic behaviors that target the decision-making processes of network partners as well as react
to the uncertainties multi-actor processes generate (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; Mandell 1990;
McGuire 2002; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2008). One branch of
this research focuses on collaborative management and the skills associated with negotiation
partner commitment (Agranoff 2005, 2006; Cooper, Bryer, and Meek 2006; Koontz and Thomas
2006; Leach 2006; McGuire 2006). McGuire (2002) identifies four skill sets fundamental to
collaborative management; activation, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing that roughly
correlate with the network’s evolutionary stage (McGuire 2002). Activation entails identifying
and selecting network actors. Framing seeks mutual agreement on the problem to be addressed,
the roles to be filled, and the rules that should govern those roles. Mobilizing involves creating
incentives for and negotiating with network actors. Synthesizing creates a favorable network
management environment by facilitating trust and social capital. Together, these skills enable
managers to shape network actor behaviors when hierarchal authority is not an option. Using
this framework, McGuire predicts that, in networks characterized by shared goals and clear
operating objectives such as infrastructure projects, network management strategies flow from
activation to mobilizing to framing to synthesizing to produce outcomes (McGuire 2002).
A second branch of network management research examines how managers react to the
substantive, strategic, and institutional uncertainties associated with multiple organizations
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interacting to address a common problem (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Substantive uncertainty
derives from both a lack of information about the problem as well as divergent problem
perceptions. Strategic uncertainty happens when network actors lack understanding of each
other’s goals. Institutional uncertainty stems from the fact that network actors bring their own
rules and norms from both their own organizational and network memberships (Koppenjan and
Klijn 2004). Effective network management in response to these uncertainties varies in relation
to their relative mix. For example, a public manager operating under substantive uncertainties
will likely initiate a variety of information seeking and sharing behaviors. Conversely, a public
manager facing high levels of institutional uncertainties will likely try to negotiate a common set
of rules and norms with network partners. Given the likelihood that all three uncertainties exist
at various levels throughout the network lifespan suggests that, not only does effective
management require multiple strategies simultaneously, it also requires high levels of
collaboration and coordination within the network (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).
Whether strategically seeking collaboration or reacting to network uncertainties, effective
network management practice falls into one of two categories. First, network managers may
focus upon the interpersonal relationships between network actors, appealing to the
psychological need for reciprocity by taking steps to generate trust and build social capital
(Jeffries and Reed 2000; Jones and George 1998; Berardo 2008). Second, network managers
may shape the rules and norms governing behaviors in the network informally by regulating
information and formally by adopting specific tools that alter the institutional environment
(Oliver 1991; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).
Managing Relationships. The primary mechanism through which network managers
shape interpersonal relationships is the generation and sustenance of trust (Fernandez 1991;
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Edelenbos and Klijn 2006; Mehra et al. 2006). Management behaviors most associated with
building trust include reciprocity, interest-based negotiation, and information transparency
(Oliver 1990; Weber and Khademian 2008; Ansell and Gash 2008; Waugh and Streib 2006;
Droege, Anderson, and Bowler 2003; McGuire 2002). Trust facilitates ongoing exchanges of
information and resources throughout the life span of the network and provides greater
opportunity for actors to achieve goal congruence (Edelenbos and Klijn 2007). As a mechanism,
trust is problematic to measure but research consistently indicates that perceived trust in a
relationship and perceived trustworthiness of a network partner is associated with greater
cooperation even when different interests exist (Lambright, Mischen, and Laramee 2009;
Edelenbos and Klijn 2007). Levels of trust across networks increases with network density,
frequency of interactions, and relates to the perceived trustworthiness of actors occupying key
network positions (Berardo 2008; Milward et al. 2010).
Management with Institutions. The second set of network management behaviors
involves identifying and manipulating the rules and norms that shape behaviors within a network
(Klijn and Teisman 2003; Marchington and Vincent 2004; Lodge and Wegrich 2005; Feiock
2008). Also termed “game management”, this approach entails self-interested actors establishing
rules of exchange with other actors with whom they have overlapping interests (Ostrom 1990;
Klijn and Koppenjan 2004). Actors manage their games by changing the rules of the network to
alter the behavioral patterns of others towards their own goals (Fung 2006; Skelcher, Mathur,
and Smith 2005). Institutional management skills include controlling network membership,
adjusting the rules shaping how members engage and make decisions, imposing deadlines,
crafting transparency, and altering the network’s environment to create a perception that the
network creates advantage to the actor (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn, and
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Koppenjan 1997; Ansell and Gash 2008). Controlling the generation and dissemination of
information underlies institutional management (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Kumar and van Dissel
1996) as information needs change with changing task complexities (Nonaka 1994). Network
managers take advantage of these information needs by controlling information flows, shaping
the understanding of appropriate decision making rules, and directing decision-making processes
(Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Byström and Järvelin 1995; Bressers and O’Toole 2005).
Network managers manage relationships and institutions interchangeably (Marchington
and Vincent 2004; Willem and Buelens 2007). Much of the reciprocity required for trust
building occurs when network partners agree upon a new rule or complete a successful
information exchange. Likewise, some rules or norms will refuse adjustment unless sufficient
social capital exists between actors. While managing relationships and managing institutions
may occur independently, network process models should reflect the integrated use of both.
Table 3-4 summarizes the primary network management behaviors captured in the literature,
categorized by whether they are institutional or relationship-oriented.
Table 3-4: Network Management Strategies
Strategy Type

Behaviors
Negotiation

Relationship
Trust development
Persuasion
Coercion
Accommodation
Arranging
Institutional
Framing
(adapted from Agranoff and McGuire 2003)

Measure
Making offers and counteroffers in search of
mutually agreeable allocation
Risk sharing
Social interaction outside of partnership
Offering incentives to encourage participation
Leveraging authority to direct behavior
Requesting or granting regulatory relief
Seek/provide third party to mediate differences
Seek financial resources
Establish contract
Seek/provide information regarding brownfield
property characteristics
Seek/provide information and technical
assistance
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Capacities for Network Management. Effective network management is often discussed
in terms of its potential, or the organizational and individual capacities required beyond
behavioral skill (Moulton and Wise 2010). At the organizational level, capacity refers to the
human, financial, infrastructure, and external resources maintained by the organization
(Christensen and Gazley 2008; Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003). Resources within these
four dimensions provide the means for organizations and their members to perform network
management tasks. Organizational size, monetary resources, structure, and management culture
all impact the organization’s potential to perform (Table 3-5). Organizations lacking sufficient
structures for information exchange (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Provan and Milward 1995)
and deficient of leadership that encourages and promotes boundary spanning behaviors
(Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003) will therefore exhibit low capacities for supporting
network management.
Table 3-5: Dimensions of Organizational Capacity and Key Parameters of Each Dimension
Dimensions
Human Resources
Infrastructure
Financial
External

Parameters
individual motivation, knowledge base,
experience, personnel quality and quantity,
leadership/management qualities
organizational culture, size and structure,
production system
revenues, assets, financial management system
relationships, trust, contract management,
information

Derived from Christensen and Gazley (2008)
At the individual level, management capacity refers to the knowledge and abilities of
individuals to achieve organizational goals (Van Slyke and Alexander 2006; Crosby and Bryson
2005; Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham 2003; Agranoff and McGuire 1999; Brown and Potoski
2003). After key knowledge and skill areas include managing human resource systems
(Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham 2000), financial resources (Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham
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2003), and contracts (Brown and Potoski 2003). Without training and experience in these areas,
individual managers lack capacity for practicing effective network management.
Public Management, Networks, and Policy Tools. Integrating theories of public
management, networks, and policy tools requires an ability to capture many simultaneously
moving parts. Managers with the authority to introduce a policy tool to a network have the
opportunity to introduce the rules that accompany those policy tools but also experience
constraints. As Bressers and O’Toole (2005) note, “although the managerial function can be
exercised by actors within networks, and although this function can help shape what happens,
managers themselves cannot be considered definitive shapers of what transpires when
instruments are implemented in networks.” (141). Managers utilizing policy tools in network
management strategies must consider the impacts the tools will have upon their own actions as
well.
One example of this phenomenon particularly germane to the brownfield arena is the use
of contracts in building public-private partnerships (Koppenjan and Enserink 2009; Sagalyn
2007; Wettenhall 2003). In these relationships, formal contracts address transaction cost
concerns of private partners while minimizing government concerns of service delivery. At the
same time, the process of contract negotiation and its resulting implementation may build trust
and improve actor relations (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Jeffries and Reed 2000; Van
Slyke 2009). However, while well-written contracts effectively transfer risks, they also
introduce new uncertainties regarding whether or not the contracted partner will behave as
prescribed in the contract. Therefore, contracts also require relationship management to address
potential principal-agent problems (Hodge 2004; Klijn and Teisman 2003; Fischbacher and
Beaumont 2003). Despite the additional management required to ensure contract performance,
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contracts facilitate the public-private actor service provision relationship more efficiently and
effectively than other policy tools such as grants or tax incentives (Agranoff and McGuire 2003).
Two frameworks in the policy tool literature attempt to capture this integration of
theories to prescribe public management strategies in networked, policy tool heavy situations. In
the first, the potential for public managers to successfully move network actor behaviors in the
desired direction depends upon available resources, degrees of actor conflicts, the relative
ambiguity of network goals, network resource constraints, and the complexity of network
compositions (Howlett 2005; Matland 1995). Public managers facing high levels of resource
constraints and large numbers of project actors tend to rely upon economic and fiscal tools to
leverage the resource dependencies faced by network partners. As network actor numbers
decrease, managers more frequently select regulatory tools to compel behaviors and, as resource
constraints decrease, public managers increase use of information tools to appeal to the pursuit of
mutual goals (Figure 3-1).
Figure 3-1: Potential for Network Management Effectiveness When Using Policy Tools

(Howlett 2005; Matland 1995)
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In the second framework, when management potential is high, policy tool strategies work
best when network managers are the tool implementers, have sufficient information about the
problem, and maintain power over their policy tool targets (O'Toole Jr. 2004; Bressers and
O'Toole Jr. 1998). These three core circumstances shape the interactions between network actors
hereby shaping how decisions occur and norms develop. All other variables are secondary,
impacting outcomes by altering one or more of these core circumstances. This “contextual
interaction” model also predicts positive outcomes when network actors mutually agree upon the
problem, are motivated to address it, and share an understanding of the resources available
(Bressers and O’Toole 2005; Bressers, Klok, and O'Toole Jr. 2000; Bressers 2004).
Applying these frameworks and related public management theories to brownfield
projects suggests expectations regarding certain patterns of public management behaviors under
particularly circumstances. Under the relatively short time spans and goal specificities of
brownfield projects, public managers steering project processes face pressures to produce
outcomes quickly. The theories and frameworks discussed in this chapter suggest that the best
means to achieve this is by consolidating influence over other network actors through the
strategic selection and use of policy tools. Therefore:
4. Public managers effectively steering brownfield projects from highly central network
positions will focus management behaviors on the selection and application of policy
tools to manage network actor behaviors. Public managers operating in organizations
with high levels of resource capacities will achieve this more successfully than those
operating in organizations with lower capacities.
However, policy tools also create new uncertainties within which network actors must operate.
Network management research suggests that public managers utilizing policy tool strategies
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overcome new uncertainties by generating trust between network actors through information and
resource exchanges (Rethemeyer 2007). The ability to do so increases when the public manager
enjoys previous positive relationships with project actors and receives sufficient support from
their home agency and government. Therefore:
5. As uncertainties increase, public managers effectively steering brownfield projects
from highly central network positions will increase their use of relationship
management strategies relative to policy tool strategies.
Together, the propositions presented in this review posit that, in brownfield projects,
network composition and network centrality will change according to the expert information
orientation of each project phase (remediation vs. redevelopment) as well as the implementation
and planning orientation of each phase. At the same time, public managers operating out of
highly central network positions will increase their emphasis on trust-based relationship
strategies as uncertainties increase. Project success will hinge upon the stability of network
actors across project phases and on the capacities for public managers to obtain sufficient
information regarding those actors in order to select policy tools that maintain their
commitments.
The next chapter in this dissertation lays out the research design and methodological and
analytical approaches to collecting and analyzing data in response to these propositions.
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CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Introduction. Applying a network lens to brownfield remediation and redevelopment
projects prompted two research questions in this dissertation. First, in what ways do brownfield
projects function as public management networks? Second, to what extent do network
management behaviors by city-level public managers impact project outcomes? Utilizing the
propositions developed in the previous chapter as guidelines, this chapter describes how a
comparative case research design combined with case study and social network analysis
methodologies best addressed these questions. The chapter begins by discussing the research
design and the steps taken to identify project level cases. The next section details the methods of
data collection and the final section discusses the analytical strategies applied to these data.
Research Design. The goals of a study determine the best research design. For example,
developing concepts, testing theory, describing processes, predicting outcomes, and determining
causality all suggest different approaches. Because the primary goal of this study was to
understand the mechanisms and processes that link management practices to project outcomes, a
comparative case approach was selected (Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Bennett and Elman 2006).
Case selection utilized a “most similar” case selection strategy (Seawright and Gerring
2008), selecting cases that varied on both the dependent (project success) and explanatory
(network management capacity9) variables of interest in order to discern the effects of public
management amongst all other impacts. Because this strategy relied upon careful matching of

9

Operationalizing “network management behaviors” posed several measurement problems.
Therefore, “network management capacity” was used to capture the potential for network
management behaviors. It is important to note that “management capacity” is not meant as a
substitute for “management behavior” but rather as an intermediate predictor for the range of
possible behaviors.
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additional explanatory variables, case selection utilized highly specific decision rules to narrowly
define a small population of cases that shared multiple similarities. Despite constraining the
ability to generalize findings to a broader population of brownfield properties, these decision
rules generated the highest degree of case matching, increasing the likelihood that analysis
captured explanatory effects that otherwise would have been missed (Collier and Mahoney
1996)10.
Variables Important to Case Selection. Applying this logic of inference to case
selection provided a schematic for specifying the desired cases. In Table 4-1, Y1 refers to the
dependent variable of brownfield project success, X1 refers to the explanatory variable of
network management capacity, and X2 captures all additional explanatory variables from the
model that could theoretically impact values of Y1. The result is four cases varying along
capacity and success dimensions.

10

It is important to distinguish between this use of the logic of inference and statistical theory as
it applies to the potential problem of selection bias when selecting cases based upon the
dependent variable. When applying statistical theory to large-N studies, selecting cases on the
dependent variable truncates the data, underestimating the parameters. The effect can be
opposite for small-N comparative studies where selection bias is not as much of a concern
(Collier and Mahoney 1996). In small-N comparative studies, the goal is not to estimate average
effects of causal variables but to articulate the details of causal relationships across a few,
carefully selected cases. What subsequently matters in case selection is not so much where in
the universe of cases the case studies exist but that there is a strong theoretical rationale for the
cases selected. The outcome of such research is subsequently not a set of generalizable
statements relating to brownfield projects as a case population, but rather a set of propositions
informing future study of the broader case population.
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Table 4-1: Most Similar Case Matching Scenario
Variables
Case
X1 (Capacities)
X2 (Context)
Y1 (Success)
1
+
+
+
2
+
3
+
+
4
+
+
Derived from Seawright and Gerring (2008). X1 refers to variables of theoretical interest, X2
refers to vector of additional explanatory variables, Y refers to the outcome, and (+/-) specifies
variable score if coded dichotomously.
The ambiguity of defining project “success” posed several conceptual challenges.
Therefore, taking cues from the brownfield literature suggesting that success measures derive
primarily from locally held qualitative perceptions (Bacot and O'Dell 2006; Wedding and
Crawford-Brown 2007; Ganser 2008), this study utilized an online survey, a series of stakeholder
interviews, and project-level data collected from the New York State Remediation Database to
develop an aggregated success measure. This measure is described in greater detail later in this
chapter.
Variables in the X2 vector derived from the brownfield project and network management
research literatures and included measures of the project resource environment, relative property
market strengths, municipal policy tool use experiences, political support, and degree of
intergovernmental ties. Table 4-2 summarizes the case selection variables.
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Table 4-2: Case Selection Variables
Outcomes to Vary in Case Selection (Y)
Project-level remediation and redevelopment success
Causal Explanation to Vary in Case Selection (X1)
Network management capacity (municipal-level)
Additional Explanatory Variables to Match in Case Selection (X2)
Municipal-Level Variables
Potential public sector resource
Community development plan
environment
presence
Potential private sector resource
County level involvement in
environment
brownfield redevelopment
Real estate market strength
Federal (EPA) involvement in
brownfield redevelopment
Municipal experience with stateDegree of project initiation by
level policy tools
municipality
Project-Level Variables
Property marketability
Familiarity of city officials with
policy tools
Political support
Project end use
Data Sources for Case Selection. Case selection involved a range of online, survey, and
interview sources. Online databases accessed included ones from the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), the
New York State Office of the State Comptroller, the New York State Department of Labor, and
the New York Department of State (NYDOS) as well as various websites for New York
municipalities. Data from these sources provided information about municipal economic
indicators and the municipal use of federal and state policy tools for specific properties located at
the municipal level. In addition, case selection data were collected through an online survey
targeting 368 individuals and agencies in the State of New York likely involved with brownfield
processes and telephone interviews with key actors.
Selecting Cases for Variation in Managerial Capacity. Selecting cases that varied by
managerial capacity but matched along other causal variables required a theoretically driven
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decision process starting at the broadest definition of brownfield projects and ending at the
specific municipality level. Table 4-3 lists the steps taken in this process with each step
described in detail below.
Table 4-3: Case Selection Process – Narrowing Down the Scope of Cases
Selection Pool Level
1) All brownfield properties
2) All brownfields in the state of New
York
3) All brownfields in NY
municipalities with sufficient and
recent brownfield cleanup
experience.
4) All brownfields in cities in state of
New York
5) All brownfields in economically
depressed New York State cities
with municipality-initiated
brownfield experience.
6) All brownfields in cities that match
along similar resource characteristics
and industrial histories but vary by
management capacities.
7) All brownfields in Buffalo and
Rochester, NY, with housing as the
designated end use

Variable Matched to Narrow Pool
All brownfields in this pool have access to
the same set of state policy programs
All brownfields in this pool are from similar
management experience contexts
All brownfields in this pool are from the
same set of governance contexts
All brownfields in this pool are from similar
market and management contexts
All brownfields in this pool are from cities
with similar industrial and resource
environments that also vary by management
capacities

All brownfield properties. The broad definition of “brownfield” opened up the universe
of cases to any piece of land thought to contain soil and water contamination. However, the
interest in examining municipality-led brownfield projects led to the elimination of properties
contaminated at such a high level that federal and state actors assume project management
responsibilities.
All brownfield properties in the state of New York (NY). Brownfield project outcomes
vary based upon the mix of policy tools selected by project actors (DeSousa 2005; Alberini et al.
2005). Cases were limited to the state of New York to ensure that project managers across
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individual cases operated at the same state-level policy context. New York proved to be a
particularly rich state for brownfield projects due to its strong industrial past, the predominance
of older industrial communities, and the likelihood that these municipalities have experience
brownfield remediation and redevelopment processes11.
All brownfields in NY municipalities with sufficient and recent brownfield cleanup
experience. Starting with a sampling frame that included all common “administrative units” in
the State of New York (counties, cities, towns, villages), the pool narrowed to include those
administrative units within which brownfield remediation and redevelopment had occurred.
Preliminary case selection interview and survey data confirmed that nearly all successful
brownfield projects utilized state and federal financial programs. Therefore, municipalities were
selected based upon their presence in the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (NYSDEC) Remediation Database. This database includes all New York
brownfield projects applied to and accepted in a state policy program. At the same time,
municipalities were dropped if their most recent active project in this database were older than
five years. This ensured interview data collected for each case would be within a reasonable
scope of personal memory and organizational records collections (Yan and Gray 1994). As
mentioned in Chapter Two, New York’s Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP) incentivized private
sector project investment from 1994 to 2003, when the current Brownfield Cleanup Program
(BCP) took its place. Therefore, all municipalities whose projects were only listed in the VCP
were eliminated. Finally, administrative units with less than four projects listed in the database
dropped out as well based upon the assumption that a municipality with less than four known

11

http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pubs/st_res_prog_report.htm (accessed May 6, 2009)

66
brownfield properties did not have sufficient brownfield management experience for the
purposes of this study.
All brownfields in New York cities. The selection pool was next narrowed down to all
cities listed in the Remediation Database. This decision was made based upon the fact that cities
in New York contain a larger concentration of properties listed in the database compared to the
other municipalities (Table 4-4). In addition, cities differ from towns, villages, and counties in
that they have the highest degree of taxation power and are highly autonomous regarding
planning, environmental services, and economic development. If local-level policy tools exist
for brownfield remediation and redevelopment, they would most likely occur at the city level.
Table 4-4: Known Brownfield Projects by New York Administrative Unit
Administrative Total Number of
Brownfield Properties in DEC Remediation
Unit (AU)
AUs in New York
Database Associated with that AU
State
County
62
Approximately 45*
City
62
453
Town
932
207
Village
553
186
*
While several counties have received EPA cleanup grants and are part of the NY Brownfield
Opportunities Area Program, it is not evident how many properties listed in the VCP, BCP, and
ERP programs are county administered.
All brownfields in economically depressed New York State cities with sufficient numbers
of projects initiated by the city. The interest in understanding public management strategies in
weakly marketable brownfield properties led to a focus on “municipality-initiated” projects.
Interview data collected during case selection defined these projects as those where the
municipality holds title to the land at the start of project processes, and the resource and legal
liabilities that accompany this ownership compel public officials to engage with external partners
in order to implement project processes.
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Brownfield theory suggests that properties with higher marketability tend to be private
sector-led while those with lower marketability rely upon public sector initiation (McCarthy
2002). In the Remediation Database, brownfield properties accepted into the New York State
Environmental Restoration Program (ERP) were, by law, municipality-led but properties in the
BCP may or may not involve municipality involvement, based upon the project’s level of
marketability. Therefore, state remediation data were matched with data about real estate market
and economic conditions across New York cities to determine which cities likely contained high
numbers of low marketability projects.
First, data from the Brookings Institution (Furdell and Wolman 2006) on the relative
market strength of unique (not part of a larger metropolitan area12) U.S. cities with populations
over 50,000 were collected to identify cities with weak market conditions. New York cities
appearing in the bottom third of economic rankings included Syracuse, Albany, Schenectady,
Utica, Binghamton, Buffalo, and Rochester. Pairing these data with information regarding
enrollment in the ERP created a pool of twenty-six weak market cities with sufficient brownfield
experience and high probabilities that the municipality initiated these brownfield projects (Table
4-5).

12

Cities that were part of larger metropolitan areas were excluded to control for the market
effects of being proximate to a larger, economically stronger real estate market.
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Table 4-5: Pool Of Weakly Marketable Cities With Sufficient Brownfield Project Experience
Total
Properties
36
31
26
15
14
12
11
11

Total
City
ERP VCP BCP
City
Properties ERP VCP BCP
Rochester*
6
15
15
Beacon
7
1
3
3
Buffalo*
8
10
13
Fulton
7
3
4
0
Yonkers
6
9
11 Binghamton*
6
0
2
4
Syracuse*
4
4
7
Elmira
6
3
3
0
Poughkeepsie
5
2
7
Geneva
6
3
3
0
Rome
9
3
0
Lockport
6
5
0
1
Albany*
7
3
1
Newburgh
6
4
2
0
Lackawanna
2
1
8
Troy
6
2
4
0
New
Schenectady*
11
7
2
2
Rochelle
5
1
3
1
Watertown
9
2
7
0
Peekskill
5
1
3
1
Niagara Falls
8
2
2
4
Gloversville
4
3
1
0
Utica*
8
6
2
0
Ogdensburg
4
1
3
0
Amsterdam
7
4
2
1
Watervliet
4
1
3
0
* Also listed as a weak market city by Brookings (2004)
All brownfields in cities that match along similar resource characteristics and industrial
histories but vary by management capacities. The next step in case selection required data
collection for variables in the X1 and X2 vectors. The contextual variables of X2 were measured
with data about per capita municipal expenditures, presence of economic development and
planning departments, presence of community and industrial development agencies, and the
number of brownfield-related grants obtained from both state and federal governments. Data
were then collected for “network management capacity”, capturing the number of Full Time
Equivalency (FTE) employees assigned to brownfield project work, their degrees of expertise,
and per capita city revenues. Table 4-6 presents variable measures.
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Table 4-6: Case Selection Variables for Case Selection - City Level
City Selection Parameter
X2 Variables (to be matched)
Potential public sector resource environment
Potential private sector resource environment
Real estate market strength
Management experience with state-level policy tools
Community development plan presence
County level involvement in brownfield
redevelopment.
Federal (EPA) involvement in brownfield
redevelopment
Degree of project initiation by municipality
X1 Variables (to vary)
Network management capacity – Personnel Capacity
Network management capacity – Expert Capacity
Network management capacity – Resource Capacity

Measure Used
Market value of taxable property, 2006
Presence of business councils and
development associations. (Gordon,
1997)
Brookings Weak Market City data
Total number of brownfield projects
entered into NYDEC Remediation
Database, by program, 1994-2008
Presence of city strategic plan
Designation of state Brownfield
Opportunity Area
EPA grants given to county
Designation of state Brownfield
Opportunity Area
Number of EPA grants given to city
Proportion of properties in ERP vs. VCP
and BCP combined
Number of FTE personnel committed to
brownfield projects and average time on
job
Degree of environmental expertise
Per capita city revenue

Comparing each city for similarities between X2 variables and variation in the X1 variable
revealed that the cities of Buffalo and Rochester presented the best match. Of all cities within
the case selection pool at this stage of the process, Buffalo and Rochester exhibited similar
property tax bases, population sizes, city government expenditures, degree of experience with
NYSDEC brownfield programs, proportion of municipally-led brownfield cleanups, and
strategic plan presences while varying in terms of in-house brownfield expertise and per capita
city revenue. While the cities did not match exactly in terms of EPA brownfield grants, city
populations, and total land area, the measures for the other parameters were closer than all other
possible pairings of cities in the selection pool. Table 4-7 shows a side-by-side comparison of
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these data. Subsequent data collected through interviews and historical research confirm
differences in residential end-use brownfield management capacities of these cities.
Table 4-7: Matching the Cities of Buffalo and Rochester
Parameter
Number of
FTE
Brownfield
Managers
(2008)
Average tenure
of FTE
brownfield
managers
(2008)
Total DEC
Brownfields
(2011)
ERP
properties
VCP
properties
BCP
properties
A Class
(cleanup
incomplete)
C Class
(cleanup
complete)
Percentage
ERP
Brownfield
Opportunity
Areas (2011)
EPA
Brownfield
Grants (2011)
Presence of
City Strategic

Buffalo Rochester Parameter
Primary City
Agency
Managing
Brownfield
0.5
2.5
Projects (2011)

3 years

8 years

31

36

8

6

10

15

13

15

24

27

7

9

0.26

0.17

1

1

3

8

yes

yes

Development
Associations
(2011)
DEC Region
City Population
(2000)
City Taxable
Property
Market Value
(2006)
City Property
Taxes Collected
(2006)
City Total
Expenses
(2006)
Per Capita
Expenditures
(2006)
City Land Area
(sq mi) (2006)
County
County EPA
Grant and DEC
BOA
Experience
County
Population

Buffalo

Rochester

Office of
Strategic
Planning

Division of Env
Quality

yes

yes

9

8

292,648

219,773

$5,495,591,958

$5,057,647,759

$86,403,221

$52,226,210

$450,376,958

$452,757,523

$1,539/person

$2,060/person

40.6

35.8

Erie

Monroe

none

DEC BOA

950,265

735,343
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Plan

(2000)

County Taxable
Property
Market Value
multiple
1
(2006)
$38,102,215,587
$33,528,442,883
Total Expenses
County (2006)
1,241,002,509
1,398,136,090
Data derived from the websites for the New York State Environmental Site Remediation
Database, New York State Department of State, and the Local Government Information pages of
New York State Government

QuasiGovernment
Agencies

Industrial Pasts of Rochester and Buffalo, NY. The City of Rochester, like many upstate
New York communities in the early 19th century, had its economic origins in mill processing,
utilizing the energy of the Genesee River on which it sits. The city of blossomed as an industrial
center immediately after the 1825 completion of the Erie Canal. This transportation route
linking the Great Lakes to the Atlantic Coast enabled the city to transform from the Flour City to
the Flower City, exporting not only milled grains but also fruits and flowers.
During the Civil War, Rochester became an important provider of supplies, receiving a
boost to its growing manufacturing sector. In 1881, Rochester’s most famous industrialist,
George Eastman, began what soon became known as Eastman-Kodak and was quickly becoming
the world’s largest producer of film. By 1950, taking advantage of the post-war boom in
demand for chemicals, Rochester had firmly established itself as an industrial center with such
companies as Bausch and Lomb and Xerox basing their production facilities there. Additional
industry included numerous offshoots of the petroleum and steel industries (Buttino and Hare
1984; McKelvey 1984).
By the 1970s, after several cycles of economic contraction affecting both regional and
national markets, many of these companies downsized or left the city, leaving behind a legacy of
polluted properties. Several key environmental cases during this era raised civic awareness of
these environmental problems but inadequate public policy and declining financial resources
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made it difficult for the city to address them. In 2007, the Brookings Institution classified
Rochester as a “weak market” community in their economic survey of older industrial cities in
the United States (Vey 2007).
Similarly, Buffalo, NY has gone through extremes of economic boom and bust. Rising at
the same time as Rochester due to the opening of the Erie Canal, Buffalo served as the major
port and railroad city of western New York, becoming the eighth largest city in the country by
the early 20th century. Situated at the edge of the Great Lakes, Buffalo was the most important
crossroads for raw materials and goods to be transferred between the east coast and the everexpanding frontier to the west, eventually becoming home to some of the largest steel mills and
manufacturing facilities in the nation by the 1940s. Part of this prominence has been attributed
to both local government and the press embracing industry and being very flexible to attract
major employers such as Lackawanna Iron and Steel (Goldman 2007). Because of the industry
boom during this time period, Buffalo became a mecca for the unemployed and the industries
themselves built acres of “company housing” right next to manufacturing facilities to house
them. These arrangements led to much of the contamination of these neighborhoods. However,
by 1982 most of the major auto manufacturing facilities and steel mills were no longer in
operation and the city was left with not only large tracts of formerly industrial land, but also
vacant neighborhoods left by fleeing former employees prompting several interview respondents
in this study to declare that Buffalo “is essentially one giant brownfield.”
Network Management Capacities in Rochester and Buffalo, NY. From the abolitionist
debates of the Civil War era through the 21st century, Rochester maintained a high level of civic
engagement and focus on local governance (McKelvey 1984). Like many mid-sized cities in the
industrial northeastern United States, conflict over economic disparities and race relations reared
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its head in the 1960s and 1970s leading to a surge in neighborhood organizing and place-based
mediation practice. By the 1980s, Rochester was recognized as having some of the best
organized neighborhoods in the country (Buttino and Hare 1984), with neighborhood groups
gaining significant voice in city planning processes. This voice was institutionalized in city
government through a series of neighborhood-based offices that enabled citizens to have
influence on city planning decisions. On the governance side, Rochester fielded a councilmanager government through the early 1970s when a group of civic leaders began exploring a
move to a strong mayor system. Opposition groups were wary of consolidating power into an
executive but in 1985, the citizens voted to change the charter to return to a strong mayor. Up
through 2010, only three mayors have served under this system. Several individuals interviewed
for this study linked this fact to the sense that Rochester city government operates under fewer
political influences than comparable regional cities.
Conversely, Buffalo was a town driven by the industrialists who brought it its
employment and wealth. City politics reflected this exclusivity by operating as a “machine
town” where political decisions often matched the desires of the factory owners (Goldman 2007).
Perceptions of individuals interviewed for this study indicate that this political culture of
patronage and opaque political maneuvering carried forward to the present day. As industry
declined and the concentration of urban poor increased into the 1960s, Buffalo experienced a
series of race and class conflicts. However, unlike Rochester, these conflicts did not necessarily
lead to a closer intertwining of neighborhoods and city government. Instead, the increasing
flight of city residents continued to decrease the resource capacity of city government. Buffalo
operated under this fiscal stress for many years until 2003 when the New York state legislature
passed the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority Act. This Act established an accountability board
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to oversee the fiscal responsibilities of the city. Since 2001, the city has experienced a 30%
decrease in city personnel13 and continues to be reliant on funding from state and federal
government to remain in operation.
These historical factors contributed to different government capacities between Buffalo
and Rochester for complex project management in the present day. Data collection and analysis
for this project subsequently revealed further capacity differences specific to brownfield projects
that are discussed in Appendix B.
Selecting Cases: Variation in the Project-Level Outcome Variable (Y1). At this point
in the case selection process, projects remaining in the selection pool within Rochester and
Buffalo were narrowed to those with market-rate residential end uses. Selecting this common
end use ensured both common sets of actors and policy tools across projects as well as a narrow
variance in property marketability. In addition, while market-rate housing represent a minority of
brownfield end uses, they are more likely to be municipality-led in pursuing urban planning
goals (Page and Berger 2005).
Final case selection required variation in project outcomes and, therefore, the
development of a New York-specific measure for project success that incorporated numerous
project outcomes measured through a series of social, economic, and environmental indicators
weighted by stakeholder preferences (Wedding and Crawford-Brown 2007; DeSousa 2005;
Bacot and O'Dell 2006). To achieve this, a purposive sample of 368 email addresses were
compiled for individuals and organizations likely engaged with brownfield redevelopment
activity in the State of New York. These addresses included local, state, and federal government
13

http://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/Home/Mayor/Archive_Press_Releases/Leadership/2007Archives/Ju
ne2007/BFSA VoteToLiftCityEmployeeWageFreeze
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officials, New York-based private developers and lenders, real estate professionals, directors of
environmental advocacy nonprofit organizations, environmental lawyers, and environmental
engineers (Dair and Williams 2006). The survey asked participants to identify brownfield
redevelopment projects they perceived as both successful and unsuccessful, why they thought so,
the criteria they applied, and the type of agency or organization that they represented (Appendix
A). The survey also asked participants to forward the survey link to colleagues they felt would
have the ability to answer the questions. Due to this approach, the total number of actual survey
recipients is unknown.
Survey design required that survey respondents answered each question for survey
completion. Therefore, respondents without project-specific knowledge could not complete the
survey. Respondents were sent the survey invitation twice and, after removing incomplete
responses, a total of 28 fully completed surveys remained (Table 4-8). While this was a low
response rate (8%), the purpose of the survey was to develop a measure for brownfield “success”
in a New York context comparable to the ones described in the brownfield literature.
Table 4-8: Survey respondents
Agency Type
# of Respondents
TOTAL
28
County Government
6
Brownfield-specialized Private Developer
4
NY Dept. of Environmental Conservation
4
Economic Development Agency – Local Gov’t
4
Planning Agency – Local Gov’t
3
Community Development Agency – Local Gov’t.
2
Consulting Firm
1
Economic Development Agency – Federal Gov’t
1
Law Firm
1
Citizens-focused Nonprofit Organization
1
University
1
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The survey asked respondents to first list as many success criteria as possible and then to
rank the top five criteria in order of importance. For example, twenty respondents listed “the
property is strategically located”, with five respondents ranking it as the most important criteria
for success, three as second most, two as third and fourth, and one as fifth. Assigning a value of
“5” for “most important” and “1” for the fifth most important, a score was calculated against
which to compare different criteria. Table 4-9 lists the top six success criteria identified by at
least half of the respondents as important.
Table 4-9: Success Criteria
Criteria
The project adequately remediated existing
environmental contaminations.
The project impacts on community
revitalization are area-wide.
The property is strategically located.
The project resulted in higher property
values for itself and neighboring
properties.
The project is/was supported by local
elected officials.
The level of citizen support for the project
is/was high.

Count Percent of Respondents

Scored
Importance

24

88.89%

58

21
20

77.78%
74.07%

34
48

19

70.37%

31

18

66.67%

28

14

51.85%

25

These data suggested that perceived success of brownfield remediation and
redevelopment projects entails the following three criteria in order of importance:
1) Existing contaminations were addressed;
2) The project was strategically located to maximize impacts; and,
3) The project had high political support from elected officials and citizens.
To confirm success perceptions, respondents were also asked to identify “unsuccessful”
projects. Table 4-10 provides survey results regarding how respondents applied “unsuccessful”
criteria.
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Table 4-10: Non-success Criteria
Option
Existing environmental contaminations
were not adequately remediated.
The time between assessment and
cleanup is/was inefficient.
The time between cleanup and reuse
is/was inefficient.
The total cleanup costs are/were over
budget.
The project did not result in higher
property values for itself and neighboring
properties.

Count Percent of respondents Scored Importance
8

61.54%

23

8

61.54%

15

8

61.54%

9

7

53.85%

14

7

53.85%

7

These data suggested that stakeholders apply the following three criteria, in order of
importance, when identifying brownfield projects as “unsuccessful”:
1) Existing contaminations were not addressed;
2) The time and resource efficiencies of the project were low; and,
3) The project was not strategically located for maximum community impact.
Comparing these findings to the literature indicates reasonable validity (Table 4-11).
Table 4-11: Outcome Indicators and Brownfield Project Success (alphabetical)
Indicator
Area-wide impacts

Definition for “Success”
Positive social, economic, and environmental impacts on broader
community
Degree of citizen support for the project
Real costs for remediating property to levels appropriate for end use
Real costs for constructing end use on remediated property
Perceived satisfaction of levels of public and private financial support
Perceived importance of property as economic development
Number of Full Time Employees hired for the project
Perceived satisfaction with end use
Degree of elected official support at multiple levels of government
Real positive change in adjacent property values

Citizen support
Cleanup costs
Development costs
Funding
Impact of location
New job creation
Planned end use
Political support
Property value
impacts
Return on investment Real income generated per cost over predetermined time period
Use of time
Perceived efficiency of time between start and end of project
Derived from Wedding and Crawford-Brown 2007; DeSousa 2005; Bacot and O'Dell 2006.
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These survey data were combined to produce five variables that, together, formed the
success measure used for case selection (Table 4-12). Data were collected for each variable from
project documents, interviews with city environmental engineers in Rochester and Buffalo, and
the principal brownfield engineers at the state level in the Buffalo and Rochester regions.
Projects were ranked within each city based upon their outcome measure scores, producing four
project-level cases (Table 4-13).
Table 4-12: Operationalizing the Dependent Variable: Brownfield Project Success
Outcome
Measures
Time to
completion
(TIME)
Cleanup costs
(COST)
Implementation
processes
(PROCESS)
Contamination
abatement
(CLEAN)
Area-wide
impact
(IMPACT)

Operationalization as
Success
Stakeholder satisfaction with
time from initial site
investigation to development
or present
Actual cleanup costs per acre
Stakeholder satisfaction with
implementation processes
Certificate of Completion or
approved remediation
Reported increase in values of
neighboring properties

Ranking Scales
High satisfaction
Low satisfaction

Mechanisms of
Data Collection
Phone interviews,
actual time
measured

Most expensive
Least expensive
High satisfaction
Low satisfaction

Phone interviews,
actual costs
Phone interviews

CoC obtained
CoC not
obtained
High % increase
Low % increase

NYS DEC
records
Phone interviews

In Rochester, two discrete market-rate residential end use projects satisfied the case
selection criteria while in Buffalo, the case satisfying selection criteria for low success shared the
same property with the best case for high success. This is due to an initial attempt at addressing
the property failing in the eyes of key stakeholders but a subsequent attempt succeeding. Despite
the path dependency from Phase 1 to Phase 2 of this property and the shared environmental
characteristics, sufficient network actor turnover between the phases created two different
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management scenarios that could be treated as unique projects for this dissertation. Therefore,
for analysis purposes, Buffalo Phase 1 and Phase 2 were treated as two separate cases.
Table 4-13: Comparison of Selected Cases
Variable
City
Relative success rank
CLEAN
TIME
CLEANUP COST
PROCESS
SATISFACTION
IMPACT
Property ownership during
remediation
Phase of redevelopment

Brownfield property size
Proposed end use

Buffalo Phase
1
Buffalo
Low Success
incomplete

Buffalo Phase
2
Buffalo
High success
complete

2002-2003
2006-2009
$1.2 million
low
high
none
high
City of Buffalo City of Buffalo
Cleanup
Cleanup
complete,
complete,
redevelopment redevelopment
complete
near complete
4 acres
Mixed Market-Rate
Residential/Affordable Housing

Rochester B

Rochester A

Rochester
Low success
partially
complete
2003-present
$605,000
low

Rochester
High success
complete

none
City of
Rochester
Cleanup
complete,
redevelopment
stalled
1 acre
Market-Rate
Residential

high
City of
Rochester
Cleanup
complete,
redevelopmen
t complete
6.85 acres
Market-Rate
Residential

1996-2004
$4.05 million
high

Data Collection. Following best practices for comparative case analysis (King and
Powell 2008), interviews, follow-up surveys, public records obtained through Freedom of
Information Law (FOIL) requests, and media reports from newspapers, blogs, and professional
journals provided data for each case.
Semi-structured interviews served multiple data collection roles including filling gaps in
historical timelines, finding omitted variables, and uncovering explanatory processes (George
and Bennett 2005). Interview participants were selected based upon their real and perceived
centralities to project processes and were identified through project documents as well as through
a snowball sampling technique (Provan and Milward 1995; Imperial 2005). Each contact was
approached by both telephone and email over a period of several weeks. Contacts were removed

80
from the list if they did not consent to an interview or if no reply was received after five
attempts. Interview subjects for each case ultimately included elected officials, city public
managers, private developers, investors, state regulators, and citizens (Table 4-14).
Table 4-14: Project Actors Interviewed By Case
Actor Category
elected officials
planning managers
city environmental managers
state environmental regulators
community activists
lenders
developers
county health manager
state health manager
environmental and engineering consultant

Rochester A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Rochester B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Buffalo 1 and 2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Interview questions emerged from the theoretical frameworks used to develop the study
propositions (Appendix A). Process-oriented questions included open-ended statements like
“describe when you became involved with this project and why” while questions about key
moments assessed actor motivations, perceived balances of power between actors, and general
awareness of the project environment (Bressers, Klok, and O'Toole Jr. 2000). Network questions
measured social ties, strategic management behaviors, and institutional forces guiding behaviors
(Provan and Milward 1995). A municipal brownfield manager and a brownfield consultant
outside the study reviewed the interview protocol and their suggestions were incorporated into
the final version.
Interviews occurred in-person or over the phone when in-person interviews were not
feasible. Interview subjects were asked for consent (Appendix A) and, upon consent, were read
questions directly from the protocol. Clarifying questions were asked only if the interview
subject was not clear in their answer. All interviews were conducted in accordance with the
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Institutional Review Board of Syracuse University regarding the treatment of human subjects to
minimize risk to respondents. Interviews were transcribed both by this researcher using the
Transcriva software package as well as by a contracted transcriber.
While interview data were used to assess communication networks at the case level, an
online survey targeting members of project networks collected more precise data measuring
these ties. This survey asked respondents to identify the project phases in which they
participated, the individuals and organizations with whom they interacted during those phases,
the frequency of those interactions, and the types of information exchanged (Appendix A). The
survey software sent three invitations for recipients to participate over the course of four weeks.
If a recipient did not respond, three phone calls were made to offer to collect the information by
hand. If a recipient still did not respond, they were dropped from the survey list.
For both project stories and network data, documents such as emails, contracts, media
reports, and meeting minutes filled in missing data gaps. Public records were obtained through
FOIL requests from municipal agencies involved with each project. Permissions were also
obtained from private project actors to access a variety of project-specific internal documents
such as photographs, project summaries, and internal communications. In addition, newspaper
articles, blog entries, meeting minutes and agency reports were collected to round out
triangulation efforts. These data were utilized to confirm, or refute, the findings generated by
interview data, a particularly important task for addressing the limitations of retrospective data
(Golden 1992). Table 4-15 summarizes data collected for each case.
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Table 4-15: Data Collection by Case
Collection Method
Interviews

Buffalo Phase 1 and 2
Rochester A
Rochester B
21 individuals
14 individuals
13 individuals
26 interviews
15 interviews
14 interviews
Follow-Up Network
28 invitations
17 invitations
23 invitations
Surveys
8 responses
8 responses
8 responses
City Government
RFPs, contracts, fax communication, email communication, phone
Project Documents
communication, citizen surveys, environmental reports, design
narratives, financial reports, budgets
~ 1000 pages
~ 3000 pages
~ 750 pages
City Council Minutes
6 years
5 years
5 years
Private Documents
Annual reports, newsletters, design mark-ups, blueprints, evaluations
Organizational
Websites for each key government agency, private contractor,
Websites
consultants, and citizens groups, when accessible
Newspaper Accounts
~30 articles
~30 articles
~10 articles
Academic/Professional Master’s Thesis, prior
none
none
Journals
research on Buffalo urban
policy
Other Government
Sources: USEPA, NYSDEC, NYSDOH
Documents
Types: annual reports, project summaries, budgets
~600 pages
Blogs
Buffalo Rising
none
none
Fix Buffalo
Buffalo Pundit
Data Analysis. The ability to assert causal processes during case analysis requires careful
accounting of evidence to enable capture of alternative explanations (Bennett 2008). Therefore,
several analytical techniques were applied. First, project contexts were constructed out of
interview and document data to establish a backdrop upon which to explain what happened and
why (Yin 2003). The broader resource, market and political backgrounds of each case
(Appendix B) as well as the key events leading to project outcomes (Chapter 5) were described
using evidence from both primary (survey, interview) and secondary data (past research,
journalism, texts).
Second, process tracing techniques were used to produce in-case analyses explaining how
project outcomes came to be. Process tracing is often used to both build and test theories about
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phenomena containing multiple interaction effects, such as explaining management outcomes of
project networks (Bennett and Elman 2006). Key decisions and actions within the broader
project contexts were identified within the general brownfield project phase framework
articulated in Chapter 2. Anchoring case narratives around these phases provided structure in
which multiple within-case observations could be made without clouding the analysis (George
and Bennett 2005). Interview respondents central to each case then reviewed the case stories to
verify accuracy.
Third, the interview and document data were coded using the TAMS Analyzer qualitative
software package to capture institutional management strategies utilizing policy tools across
project phases. Data were first coded for the key decision phase described and then for the
policy tools used in each phase (Table 4-16). Once these codes were in place, data were recoded
to capture management behaviors associated with the use of each policy tool.
Table 4-16: Codebook for Policy Tools and Project Phases
Code
Type

Policy
Tools

Project
Phases

Code Category

Code Sub-Category

Liability Relief Regulation
Tax Credits
Deregulation
Grants
Strategic Plan
Revolving
Direct Action
Local, State, and
Loans
Federal levels
Economic
Permit
Zones
Contracts
Technical Assistance
Quasi-Governmental Corporations
Property Assembly
Design
Economic Assessment
Construction Planning
Environmental
Assessment
Construction
Remediation Planning
Sales
Remediation
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The retrospective nature of the data prevented measurement of actual management
behaviors enabled in direct observation. Therefore, data surrounding mentions of policy tools
were examined for cues indicating management intent behind tool selection as well as
perceptions of behavioral impacts resulting from tool use. Interview data were also scanned for
descriptions of interpersonal interactions matching the institutional and relationship management
behaviors found in Table 4-18 below.
Table 4-17: Management Behaviors
Strategy Type
Relationship

Behaviors
Negotiation
Trust development

Institutional

Persuasion
Coercion
Accommodation
Arranging
Framing

Measure
Making offers and counteroffers in search of
mutually agreeable allocation
Risk sharing
Social interaction outside of partnership
Offering incentives to encourage participation
Leveraging authority to direct behavior
Requesting or granting regulatory relief
Seek/provide third party to mediate differences
Seek financial resources
Establish contract
Seek/provide information regarding brownfield
property characteristics
Seek/provide information and technical assistance

(adapted from Agranoff and McGuire 2003)
Finally, social network structures within each project were measured by applying social
network analysis (SNA) techniques to the data (Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979; Milward
and Provan 1998). These techniques used relational information between individual and
organizational actors to define structural properties of each project network over time,
particularly as they related to information exchanges (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Sociometric
matrices indicating who exchanged information with whom were constructed using data from
interviews, the post-interview survey, and documents. If respondents reported a single dyadic
information exchange with an individual or organization within the network during a particular
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project phase, the exchange was assigned the value of 1. Otherwise, the cell linking the two
actors was assigned a 0. Additional exchanges indicated in interview and document data were
then added to the matrices to fill in gaps created by survey non-responses. Links were
considered binary, symmetric, non-directional, and non-weighted, allowing for only basic
description of network structures utilizing the SNA software AGNA.
First, the data were coded by project phase to count active relationships between actors
within each phase as well as to provide a measure for the network relationships across the entire
project. Because of the focus of this research on local government actors, actor types were
broken down between sectors and then between different government agencies and offices.
Individual-level network actors were categorized by primary expert area, regardless of sector
affiliation. Primary expert areas pertained to the tasks implied by specific job titles and agency
missions affiliated with each actor, verified by interview and document data.
Actor-level centrality measures identified which actors were most central to both the
whole network as well as during each network phase. A common way to conceive of this
involvement is to examine an actor’s “betweenness”, or the extent to which an actor lies between
all other actors based upon their geodesics, or the shortest path between the actor and all other
actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994). The Bavelas-Leavitt (BL) Centrality index as calculated by
AGNA suited this purpose (Bavelas 1947; Wasserman and Faust 1994; van der Aalst and Song
2004). This Index measures the ratio of the sum of geodesic distances for all nodes by the sum
of geodesic distances to the node in question. The shorter the distances between the node and all
other nodes, the index score increases. Subsequent analysis of public management behaviors
within the network focused upon public managers exhibiting high BL Centrality Index scores.
For example, if a municipal-level manager exhibited high centrality compared to all other
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network actors, it is likely that that manager had the best structural position from which to
influence the behavior of other network actors and should be the initial focus of analysis.
AGNA also used the BL Centrality Index scores for each project and project phase to
generate a measure for group-level centrality called the Freeman Centrality Index. This index
summed the differences between the largest value for single actor centrality and the rest of the
actor centralities and divided it by the maximum theoretically possible sum for that sized
network. This produced a score between 0 and 1 for each network. A score of 0 indicated a
network where all actors have the same centrality and 1 indicated a network where all shortest
paths lead to the same actor; the higher the score, the closer the network was to a perfectly
central network (Faust and Wasserman 1992). However, this index assumes that only one
network exists within a matrix. More than one unique network will skew this measure above 1,
requiring separate measures for unique networks operating within the same arena. One
advantage to using the Freeman Centrality Index measure was that the standardization of scores
in the index across networks enabled cross-case comparisons between networks of different
sizes. Therefore, actors not active in a particular phase of a project could be removed from the
network data for that phase without removing the ability to compare phase centralities.
Network density was measured in AGNA by dividing the total number of edges, or
unique links between actors, by the total number of possible edges for that network. This
produced an index between 0 and 1 where low values indicated fewer links and higher values
indicated more comprehensive connections within the network (Pryke 2005; Wasserman and
Faust 1994). Because isolate actors were removed, density index values measured the density of
active network participants only.
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Together, these four analytical strategies enabled a rich description of the critical factors
impacting project outcomes and the relative influence of public management behaviors within
project networks on these outcomes.
Threats to Research Validity. The primary limitation of comparative case analysis
using qualitative data and a small number of cases is the ability to generalize findings to a
broader population of cases. However, as explained at the start of this chapter, research designs
spring directly from research goals and, with the aim of this study to trace causal processes and
identifying the mechanisms enabling these processes, small-N comparative case analysis
remained the best research design (Gerring 2004; Kaarbo and Beasley 1999; Dion 1998).
A challenge to this design, however, was the ability to adequately capture rival
explanations in the data collection. This ability first relied upon sufficient knowledge at the start
of the study of what potential rival explanations might be and then later upon the ability to
collect sufficient data to fully capture the extent to which these explanations occurred. The
potential for omitted variable bias increased the more key data sources were missed. While the
data triangulation, interview selection, and respondent verification methods addressed this
limitation to the greatest extent possible, data gathered for the Buffalo Phase One project
constrained findings for that case.
A second challenge specific to this study was the use of retrospective interview data in
constructing story narratives. As more time passes after events occur, the ability of individuals
to accurately depict events diminishes (Bernard et al. 1984). To address this, this study selected
projects with active processes within five years of the study dates, implemented the same semistructured interview protocol with exhaustive lists of interview subjects, and verified interview
data with multiple secondary data sources.
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A third challenge pertained to the data used for social network analysis. Social network
data from interviews relied upon recall and the abilities of interviewees to remember their
primary partners when making key decisions. The network survey did not elicit a full set of
respondents, limiting its ability to verify exchanges of information and resources between those
actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979). Document data,
while filling in many of the gaps left by interview and survey sources, may also be biased
towards relationships requiring formal documentation and away from the informal exchanges
that may have been central to decision making processes. Despite these limitations, the
extensive triangulation of these three sources enabled the best possible saturation of network data
(Dyer and Nobeoka 2000). Subsequent analysis proceeded cautiously, recognizing where data
gaps existed.
Presenting Findings. Through careful case selection and data collection, the research
design for this study enabled the construction of a dataset sufficient for analyzing the extent to
which public managers influenced brownfield remediation and redevelopment project outcomes.
By tracing processes in a set of comparative case studies and conducting social network analysis,
the research propositions regarding the use of institutional management strategies were
examined. Despite careful matching of case-level data, findings reveal four complex brownfield
remediation and redevelopment projects with four distinct stories. The next three chapters
present these findings, carefully producing an analysis addressing the theoretical propositions.
Starting with the Assembly phase (Table 4-19), Chapters Five, Six and Seven alternate between
examining the critical factors shaping key decisions and identifying the prevailing patterns of
network structures, policy tool use, and network management behaviors surrounding these
decisions. The end of each case story then aggregates phase-specific critical factors to the project
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level in order to illustrate the link between these factors and the multiple outcome measures
utilized to assess relative project success. Chapter Eight continues the analysis by examining
these findings across the case stories to determine the extent to which public managers operating
towards the center of brownfield project networks impacted partner behaviors and, subsequently,
project outcomes through the strategic selection and use of policy tools.
Table 4-18: Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Framework
Phase

Cleanup

Redevelopment

Stage
Site Identification
Initial Site Assessment – Phase I
Investigation
Detailed Site Assessment – Phase II
Investigation
Remedial Assessment
Economic Assessment and Planning

Decision-Making Path
1. Assembly
2. Environmental
assessment
3. Remediation
planning

Project Development and Financing

5. Redevelopment
planning
6. End use design
7. Remediation
process

(Overlap)
Cleanup Planning and Execution
Cleanup
Redevelopment

Redevelopment of Site

4. Economic
assessment

8. Construction
process
9. End use sales
Bold font indicates phases around which the case narratives are organized.

90
CHAPTER FIVE ROCHESTER HIGH SUCCESS: RIDING A POLITICAL WAVE
Introduction. The first project examined in this research was the high success case in
the high capacity city, Rochester, NY. As the case story revealed, this project achieved its
success through a combination of strong political support, timely policy tool availability,
thorough remediation, and effective institutional and relationship management on behalf of key
public managers operating towards the center of project networks. This chapter lays the
foundation for identifying how these critical factors influenced one another to enable the
emergence of successful outcomes. Each section of the chapter describes how the interaction of
key factors occurred at the phase level before culminating with a general discussion of critical
factors at the project level.
Background. Rochester Project A (RPA) is a market-rate single-family home residential
development that occurred between 1996 and 2004 and is characterized by high levels of citizen
engagement and large amounts of money spent on remediation and redevelopment. The property
assembled for RPA lies in the southeast quadrant of the city of Rochester at the boundary
between an established, stable neighborhood and one experiencing more of the challenges
associated with lower-income, transient areas. Demographically, the neighborhood around RPA
had been predominantly working class Caucasian families with, at the start of the project, low
levels of organized neighborhood association activity.
The property itself originally hosted two active construction companies, one providing
general contracting services and the other performing asphalt services for road and infrastructure
construction. These two commercial properties had been grandfathered into what eventually
became a single-family home urban neighborhood. This unusual integration of commercial and
residential persisted largely because, at the time that RPA began, the city had an ongoing policy
of not foreclosing or otherwise acquiring environmental properties that might pose undue
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liability and financial risk for the city. Therefore, as long as political pressure remained low,
there was little incentive for the city to invest time and money into property acquisition.
Property Assembly and Economic Assessment. Starting in the early 1990s, individual
neighbors living adjacent to what eventually became RPA began complaining to city officials
about strange odors, late night digging activity, and suspicious looking run off originating from
the contractor yards sitting in their midst.
You'd be sitting here and next thing you know a stick of dynamite would go off or
somebody would be out back at 2 or 3 in the morning and you'd see a backhoe start up
and they are digging and burying and hiding stuff and illegally bringing trucks in from
main street down through the street that was there and dump in the middle of the night. –
RPA Neighbor, 2008
While neighbors logged complaints with the City, the County Health Department, and the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), they felt that nothing
significant was being done about this public nuisance. Sensing that part of the problem was their
lack of organization, the neighbors formed a neighborhood group (given the pseudonym
“BANG” here) to coordinate complaints. This effort to organize caused city council to recognize
the neighbors as a substantial political force. The council president, who also represented their
district, met with key public managers in the environmental quality and community development
departments to see what could be done. However, despite this growing political momentum to
address the nuisance, there was not a strong precedent for direct city action. While the potential
liability risks played a role in this informal policy, the greater barrier was a lack of funding for
potential remediation costs.
At around the time that the political pressure from the neighborhood on city council
increased, the lead manager at the city’s Division of Environmental Services (DES) heard from
NYSDEC headquarters that a new policy program was in the works in New York State to aid
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municipality-led remediation of contaminated properties. Termed the Environmental Restoration
Program (ERP) under the 1996 New York Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act, the program
contained a set of policy tools for use by municipalities specific to brownfield properties with the
most attractive tool being state reimbursement grants for up to 75% of total remediation costs. In
addition, upon completing remediation to the satisfaction of the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), any future property owners would receive
indemnification from the state for future issues pertaining to its past contamination. Recognizing
that this program would likely be approved, the DES manager proposed that the city move
forward on property acquisition in anticipation that the money for remediation reimbursement
would be there. With increasing political pressure from the community and likely financial
assistance from the state, city council gave the green light and the city real estate, housing, and
DES offices made room on their agendas for addressing the nuisance properties and city council
approved that property acquisition activity commence.
As a first step, with approval from city council, the city real estate office acquired the
nuisance property through a combination of tax foreclosure and direct purchase, compelling the
owners to sell the property at market rate while the city paid for their move to a site in a more
industrial area. Then, when surveyors contracted by the city reported back to the real estate
office that additional property segments might be needed for a usable final product, the city
purchased an entire property from the second contractor who owned a smaller, adjacent piece of
land in addition to slices of properties from surrounding residential neighbors. The sum effect of
this assembly approach provided enough space for potential development that might include
building a new street with adequate access for emergency vehicles. However, city officials at
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this point did not have a clear end use in mind because the initial motivation was to address a
neighborhood nuisance, not to fulfill broader community or economic development goals.
RPA Assembly and Economic Assessment: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use,
and Public Management. Network data for this first phase reveal that the DES manager occupied
the most central space of the project network (Table 5-1). Initially, it was this individual who
reported on the up and coming funding source for remediation. Once the project was given the
go-ahead, and with support by his department commissioner, this manager assumed the role of
liaison with BANG, pouring many hours into communicating what was happening at City Hall
regarding the acquisition process, even when it involved information that may have been outside
of the environmental arena. It is important to note that, despite not exhibiting as high a
centrality, the director of the city real estate office performed much of the negotiation with
property owners and facilitated property acquisition procedures. These tasks did not require that
he occupy a central network position due to delegation of authority to him by city council to
work directly with the property owners.
Table 5-1: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Assembly
Economic Assessment

1
Citizen
Sr. Env Mngr

2
Sr. Env Mngr
City Council

3
City Council
Citizen

The policy tools exhibiting influence on project processes during these phases were
largely legislative/regulatory by nature and were primarily used to facilitate the real estate
transactions away from the center of the project network (Table 5-2). For example, the real
estate and housing development managers applied the direct actions of condemnation and
purchase to the nuisance property owners. While purchasing required some negotiation, the
ability to use condemnation and threaten eminent domain as a potential action forced compliance
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by the owners. Additional use of direct action included the use of money from a bond sale by
city council to pay for land and the leveraging of zoning laws by community development
managers to aggregate the properties under city ownership.
While not directly implementing any specific tool, the senior DES manager was able to
leverage the potential for the state ERP fiscal tools to convince political leadership to commence
property assembly processes, and to convene key actors within city government. The impact of
this anticipation impact indicates that policy tools influence actor behaviors prior to their actual
implementation and, in the case of policy tools as threats (i.e. eminent domain), may be used to
compel behaviors of network actors.
Table 5-2: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Assembly
Economic Assessment

Leg/Reg
3
0

Agreement
1
0

Econ/Fisc
1
0

Information
0
0

TOTAL
5
0

During property assembly, public management activity largely occurred through the
efforts made by the environmental and real estate managers to accomplish two very different
tasks. The DES manager, through his central network position, focused on building positive
relationships between city council and neighborhood residents to address immediate conflicts
and lay the groundwork for a longer term working relationship. The real estate and housing
managers on the other hand primarily targeted property owners over the short term using several
direct action tools as authorized by city council. As a result, the DES manager found himself
utilizing high levels of relationship building strategies through a large amount of information
exchange with multiple city and citizen actors while the real estate manager achieved his task
through the routine use of legislative and regulatory policy tools made available to him by city
council to target a specific subset of property owners.
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Environmental Assessment and Remediation Planning. By acquiring the properties,
the city committed to lead remediation processes so the DES manager retained a private
engineering and environmental consulting group to conduct an initial Phase I assessment prior to
purchase and, once the properties legally belonged to the city, a more comprehensive Phase II
assessment. The manager selected the firm from a pool of consultants pre-approved for
assessment work on behalf of the city. The contract ultimately drawn up with the consultant was
done so in accordance to pre-established contract management rules at the city.
The Phase I investigation involved a visual inspection of both buildings and open space
for pipe vents or other indication that underground contaminations might exist. After witnessing
various instances of poorly stored pesticides, a buried truck, and other chemicals, the consulting
firm sunk a series of boring holes, monitoring wells, and test pits to provide data for the Phase II
assessment. The Phase II assessment revealed that:
The site contained construction and demolition debris, municipal solid waste, drums and
smaller containers, scrap metal, and mercury, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH)
and pesticide-contaminated soils that needed to be removed. In addition, two separate
petroleum-contaminated soil/groundwater plumes, originating from the two sets of
underground storage tanks, extended onto the neighboring residential properties.”
(Consulting Firm Report, 2002, p.3)
At this point in the RPA project, a conversation tool place between the area homebuilders
association and the mayor’s office that had an impact on remediation planning as it pertained to
potential land uses. During the previous few years, leaders at the regional homebuilders
association had been talking with the city’s deputy mayor regarding possibilities to construct
new market-rate housing within the city of Rochester, the absence of which the mayor believed
drove much of the suburban sprawl around the city. While the mayor’s office frequently sought
homebuilder association commitment to building city housing, association members could not
find sufficient property sizes that would allow for projects within their desired profit margins.
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However, when the RPA property appeared on the city’s policy agenda, interest spiked within
the homebuilders association and an association executive became involved with the effort to
find funding for property remediation, working through the mayor’s office to connect with the
DES manager. Simultaneously, the DES manager and the association executive worked with
state-level officials to stress the importance of the RPA project receiving entry into the ERP.
These strategies worked and RPA earned the first entry into the new ERP, garnering
approval from the central office of the NYSDEC in Albany as well as significant political
attention from the Governor. With this green light, the consulting firm hired to perform the
assessments put together a set of possible remediation strategies and submitted them to the
NYSDEC for approval. In accordance with the new ERP requirements, the NYSDEC consulted
with the state and county health departments and received citizen input to produce a record of
decision formally designating their preferred plan.
After receiving the project bids produced by the consulting firm, the DES manager
realized the 75% ERP cleanup cost commitment would be problematic for the city. So, city
council, the mayor’s office, and the environmental commissioner made an appeal to officials at
the NYSDEC that ultimately led to a change to a more manageable 90%/10% split. Even so,
10% of overall remediation costs were quite large but the central role of the city council
president in this project enabled smooth passage of each spending vote that council encountered.
RPA Environmental Assessment and Remediation Planning: Network Characteristics,
Policy Tool Use, and Public Management. With the strong environmental nature of these phases,
the senior environmental manager maintained his position as the most network-centric public
manager. He worked closely with city council in pursuing the ERP funding as well as continued
to work with the citizen’s group in keeping them up to date on how the contamination would be
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addressed. He also found himself working more closely with the consulting firm to generate the
environmental information required for this communication as well as for state and county
regulators whose remediation plan approval was necessitated by the ERP (Table 5-3). While the
conversation with the homebuilders proved to be significant in setting the standards of
remediation goals, this conversation occurred primarily between political leaders and the
homebuilders, not at the center of total project processes.
Table 5-3: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Environmental Assessment
Remediation Plan

1
Sr. Env Mngr
City Council

2
City Council
Sr. Env Mngr

3
Consult1
Citizen

The number of policy tools mentioned as impacting decisions during environmental
assessment and remediation planning decreased relative to the previous project phase and
derived primarily from the fiscal and information tools made available from the NYSDEC by the
ERP program (Table 5-4). These tools included ones that the city could apply to incentivize the
behaviors of others as well as tools to which they had to respond as the tool target. Tools city
managers could apply included technical assistance and the promise of the remediation
reimbursements and liability releases. Tools to which city managers had to respond included
NYSDEC regulations regarding the assessment and remediation planning processes. These
regulations were the basis of many of the relationships between the city’s DES, the consulting
firm, the County Health Department and the NYSDEC. An additional policy tool playing a
prominent role during these phases was the use of a contract by the DES manager to steer
behaviors of the consulting firm through information gathering and remediation planning tasks.
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Table 5-4: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Environmental Assessment
Remediation Plan

Leg/Reg
1
1

Agreement
0
0

Econ/Fisc
1
1

Information
1
1

TOTAL
3
3

As the most central public manager to project processes, the DES manager applied both
institutional and relationship management strategies. Institutional strategies utilizing contracts
directed the behaviors of the consulting firm while relationship strategies using reciprocity and
transparency built trust with BANG. By asking the consultant to participate in BANG meetings
early in the process, the DES manager successfully wove these strategies together to create
strong ties between employees of the firm and BANG members.
The DES manager continued to operate at the center of the project network during these
phases and utilized a contract and the ERP grant to implement the environmental assessment and
develop the remediation plan. In addition, the DES manager continued his information
dissemination behaviors with BANG leaders and neighborhood residents. On the other hand, the
mayor’s office led the political negotiations with the homebuilders association and handed the
ensuing relationship to the DES manager and his colleagues for follow up coordination.
Construction Planning and Design. As project processes approached the formal
designation of property end use, conflict arose within the neighborhood. Because of where the
neighborhood lay, factions of two adjacent neighborhoods who felt they had a stake in the
property attended early BANG meetings to assert their opinions regarding what should be built
on the property. BANG leaders quickly realized that these factions only clouded the
conversation, causing combative meetings in which city officials likely missed hearing the
values of the most proximate neighbors. Therefore, BANG leaders decided to exclude outside
groups and rebuild their own capacities for engagement from within. They formalized their
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group and made numerous door-to-door visits to build neighborhood trust and commitment. As
a result, a core group of members began attending meetings regularly.
The city council president, DES manager, and engineering consultant spent a great deal
of time with BANG members from this point forward, meeting frequently at their community
library to provide updates and to hear concerns. Aware that city council, the mayor’s office, and
the homebuilders association wanted suburban style single-family homes, the environmental
manager took great care to elicit ideas from BANG to minimize dissatisfaction with the city-led
process. The BANG leader described the process:
Every individual brought back . . what they wanted to see in that property and then we
sat here and we took all of the solutions and came up with common denominators and out
of all of that, we as a neighborhood went back to the city and said "we have five
proposals that as a neighborhood we will accept". And the city came back and said "well
we have four proposals that we'll accept if you guys decide to agree upon them" and what
(RPA) ended up being was a combination of the two most popular ones for us as a
neighborhood and one of the most popular ones for the city as a compromise for all of us
and it was amazing. – BANG leader, 2008
Initially, the neighbors generated many ideas for end use including a public park, but city council
was not interested in spending a large amount of money for something that would subsequently
require additional resources to maintain. Through careful facilitation on behalf of both BANG
leaders and the environmental manager as well as information generated from a city-led taximpact analysis, neighbors agreed on market-rate homes as long as they fit to a design standard
approved by the neighborhood.
After end use selection, conversations at the neighborhood meetings turned towards
design standards for the new homes. Treading a balance between what they believed would sell
and meeting the interests of the neighbors, the city DES and community development managers
brokered design solutions that, while not perfect for any single party, enabled the project to move
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forward with minimal friction. It was at this point that city managers earned the trust and
support of the once angry neighbors.
When (the city) says "well we are going to supply you as an architect as a neighborhood
group" and that architect represents you and we have your own architects and at first we
were like "yeah, right, well that's a sort of squirrelly group" but she did . . she took our
drawings and she did what we needed her to do and did it as our representation and
represented us correctly and as we wanted to be represented. – BANG leader, 2008
The houses themselves reflected what project stakeholders felt were the best of both urban and
suburban home designs. While the houses appeared suburban in their use of materials and
distance from the sidewalk, they also exhibited the pitched roofs, front porches and hidden
garages found in the city.
With design ideas in hand, the city’s community development project manager assigned
to construction processes negotiated with the regional homebuilders association to obtain their
commitment, meeting more times than was normal for city projects, until mutual trust existed. In
these negotiations, the city, through city council, ultimately agreed to remediate the property,
obtain liability releases, produce design standards and build the new street and landscaping.
Homebuilders, in turn, committed to building demo homes, sponsoring a marketing home show,
and constructing houses for each buyer. Buyers would finance homes with individual mortgages
while homebuilders would front the construction costs. In addition, per the requirements of the
county health department, builders agreed to halt construction with discovery of any new
contaminations. These agreements met multiple interests. City officials were eager to draw new
homeowners into the city while homebuilders were attracted to the prospect of a small profit
combined with positive public relations to be found by cutting a ribbon on what was once city
blight rather than unveiling a new development on what was once farmland.
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RPA Construction Planning and Design: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and
Public Management. Despite increased involvement of the homebuilders association and the new
community development project manager, the relative centrality of project actors did not shift
during these phases (Table 5-5). The DES manager maintained his highly central position with
the BANG leader, indicating the extent to which, regardless of task orientations of each phase,
communication between city government and the neighbors remained prominent throughout the
project. The consulting firm liaison became more important during construction planning as
specifics about the remediation schedule, land surveys, and street layouts had to be
communicated to the homebuilders, the city community development staff, the neighbors, and
the subcontractors. While his role working with the homebuilders intensified, the community
development manager primarily communicated his efforts to his supervisor, city council and the
DES manager who, in turn, broadcast that information to the broader network as needed.
Table 5-5: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Construction Plan
Design

1
Sr. Env Mngr
Sr. Env Mngr

2
Consult2
Citizen

3
Citizen
City Council

Formal tool use in construction planning centered on actions taken by the community
development manager to secure construction financing and develop contracts with homebuilders
(Table 5-6). This manager worked with city council and the zoning board to access bond
funding for street development, to rezone and survey the property to create construction plans,
and to purchase remaining slices of adjacent properties that would enable street construction in
accordance with city and county codes. In addition, this manager established contracts with the
homeowners association and the engineering consulting firm regarding who will do what in the
construction of new homes. The homebuilders contract formalized agreements developed
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through careful discussion while the engineering contract derived from a formal template
previously applied to other construction projects.
For the DES manager, facilitating end use design selection, however, did not entail the
use of any formal policy tools. Instead, the DES manager continued his role of information
gatherer and disseminator through various meetings and memos and actors reached agreement
through trust-building behaviors such as interest-based negotiation and practicing reciprocity.
To augment this, this manager initiated a regular meeting between key city officials involved
with this project for the purpose of exchanging information and anticipating process problems.
Table 5-6: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Construction Plan
Design

Leg/Reg
4
0

Agreement
2
0

Econ/Fisc
1
0

Information
0
0

TOTAL
7
0

Remediation. As construction planning and design unfolded, the DES manager, his staff
members, and the consultant implemented the remediation plan. As evidenced by the large
amount of remediation paperwork exchanged between the consultant, the city of Rochester, the
county and state health departments, and the NYSDEC the ERP subjected the city to a rulebound process under high scrutiny, enhanced by its status as the “first ERP project”. However,
the ERP was so new that residential end use standards had not yet been developed. Therefore,
the county health department liaison acted outside his normal responsibilities for brownfield
remediation and established intermediate residential standards until the NYSDEC rule-making
process caught up. At the same time, the members of the city legal office navigated the evolving
ERP language to ensure appropriate compliance. Commenting upon the difficulties of
implementing the first ERP project, the NYSDEC point person for RPA stated “the fact that the
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city was very capable and had very capable staff dealing with procurement requirements for
contracting helped immensely.”
Remediation processes ultimately involved:
. . .vector control for wildlife; site clearing; excavation, sorting screening and disposal of
26,000 tons of non-reusable construction and demolition debris, contaminated soils and
asbestos-containing materials; excavation and staging of petroleum impacted soils; and
removal and disposal of 300,000 gallons of impacted water. Salvageable materials such
as scrap steel were sorted out and recycled. Concrete was crushed and re-used on site as
backfill. (Consulting Firm Report, 2002, p. 3)
In order to verify the achievement of remediation goals, the consultant obtained 525 samples
from across the property at 24-foot intervals and dug test pits where future basements might be.
In addition, they installed oxygen injection systems to treat petroleum-contaminated plumes
present in the soils, an innovative approach at the time.
Actors frequently on site during remediation processes included the private consultant,
multiple DES employees, the NYSDEC project manager, and the county health department
liaison. These latter two actors held the authority to set and monitor target levels of
contamination. These roles were important because ERP reimbursements and legal
indemnifications were contingent on the approvals of these two individuals.
Throughout remediation, the DES manager and the consultant maintained frequent
communication exchanges with other project actors, particularly the neighbors and the city
council president. In turn, BANG leaders served as proxies for the DES program manager,
educating other neighbors about the unfolding of events and any new information. One leader
ended up with a full set of remediation files in her basement equal to that sent by the DES to the
NYSDEC. Members of the city real estate office were also very active during remediation to
assist with obtaining access permissions for neighboring private properties for environmental
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testing and machinery access. This entailed lots of knocking on doors and phone calling to
explain in detail the purpose of the request and to allow citizens to modify access requirements.
In the end, every neighbor approached granted permissions and remediation occurred
successfully.
RPA Remediation: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public Management.
Consistent with the preceding project phases, the DES manager again maintained his central
position during remediation, particularly because the primary tasks of this phase addressed the
politically contentious issue of the environmental contamination (Table 5-7). The greatest
intensity of communication between this manager, the consultant, and BANG occurred during
this phase as evidenced by the quantity of shared paperwork. The state-level political focus of
remediation processes drew the city council president closer to the center of the network as well
as she hosted site visits by the governor while continuing her communication with neighbors.
Table 5-7: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Remediation

1
Sr. Env Mngr

2
City Council

3
Citizen

The prominent policy tools activated during this phase were contracts, the city
regulations governing contracts, and technical assistance from the state and county. Contracts
dominated actor relationships primarily because the consultant used multiple sub-contracts for
tasks like debris hauling, soil dewatering, fencing, and site surveying. Table 5-8 represents these
contracts as a single contract between the city and the main consulting firm because the
consultant managed the subcontracts after the city approved them. The remaining tools derived
from the ERP including state and county regulations that shaped the extent of remediation,
technical assistance that enhanced information transfers and grant money for process
reimbursements. It is important to note that the promise of liability indemnification increased
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commitment of the homebuilders at this point despite the fact that the NYSDEC did not
formalize this indemnification until after remediation was complete.
Table 5-8: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Remediation

Leg/Reg
2

Agreement
1

Econ/Fisc
1

Information
1

TOTAL
5

In a shift from previous phases, public management behaviors by the DES manager
during this phase were largely institutional and centered upon contract management, ensuring
that the consultant and the sub-contractors fulfilled their responsibilities. Accompanying these
strategies was an increased application of information dissemination in response to regulatory
requirements. For example, because city council had to approve transfers of large amounts of
money, the DES manager needed to communicate remediation progress to them in detail.
Other public managers at the state and county levels were also key to the implementation
of remediation activities such as the NYSDEC liaison negotiating with his superiors to allow for
the county health liaison to establish intermediary regulations to allow remediation to proceed.
However, centrality remained with the DES manager as his role in project coordination
increased.
Construction and Sales. As remediation completed, construction process began to
unfold. These processes included the solicitation, review and selection of proposals from
homebuilders, sale of subdivided land to homebuilders, construction of the roadway, linking
home sites with utilities, and planning a suburban-style home show exhibiting model homes. The
city community development manager worked with the engineering consultant to coordinate the
efforts of homebuilders to keep the project on a schedule satisfactory to both the neighbors as
well as to city council. However, construction of the streetscape faced multiple delays. First,
miscalculations by one of the sub-contractors led the city project manager to request more
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funding and time to replace a drainage pipe under the roadway. Second, the project timeline ran
into the winter season in which rain and snow prevented work from proceeding.
As stated in their contract with the city, the homebuilder association and the participating
builders led RPA home construction and sales processes. Individual builders became engaged,
not through a standard request for proposal process, but rather as a result of targeted recruitment
by the homebuilder association on behalf of the city. Working with one of his member/board
members, an association executive framed the project to builders as an innovation that would
provide positive publicity for the suburban homebuilding industry as well as a service to the city.
Many of the builders involved expressed that these values contributed to their commitment but
that the minimization of financial risk still played a prominent role.
To ensure that the return on investment existed prior to the actual investment, builders
constructed a set of model homes on the site for a home show event. In this show, the city
charged visitors a limited fee to preview homes and to make initial bids. Despite being pushed
back on the calendar due to the delays mentioned above, the home show drew an unprecedented
10,000 visitors over eight days and the lots sold quickly.
Having multiple homebuilders construct houses as opposed to one single developer also
added to the distribution of financial risks across multiple actors. During sales, the city sold lots
to individual builders and the individual builders sold to the property owner. The DES manager
provided the final site assessments to homebuyers to ensure transparency regarding
environmental processes, but the thoroughness of remediation minimized any environmental
concerns.
The successful sales created the immediate economic impact on the surrounding
neighborhood. Total assessed value of the new homes in 2009 was $4,227,000 with the average
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assessed value at $176,125. This led to a significant jump in tax revenues for the city. Property
assessments in the surrounding neighborhood went from $155,133,700 to $197,620,700 for a
27% increase (Private Consultant Report, 2009). While some of these increases derived from the
high quality design of the new houses, most were the result of property improvement on the
fringe of a larger, stable city neighborhood.
RPA Construction and Sales: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public
Management. The onset of coordinating a range of city offices, subcontractors, and the
homebuilders association brought the community development project manager into a more
central position of the project network during home construction and sales (Table 5-9). Yet, the
DES manager continued to be the most central actor due to his ongoing role as a central
communicator between key political actors as well as a new role of facilitating existing
relationship for the community development manager.
Table 5-9: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Construction
Sales

1
Sr. Env Mngr
Sr. Env Mngr

2
Comm Dev Mngr
Citizen

3
City Council
Comm Dev Mngr

Policy tools shaping construction and sales emphasized regulation and formal agreements
(Table 5-10). City law required permits on behalf of builders and contractors and the ERP
agreement required builders to report any new concerns. In addition, the city passed the ERP
liability release to builders, following through on a strong incentive used to engage the builders
in the first place. All policy tools during these phases reflected standard best practices of city-led
construction management and public management behaviors were largely institutional, targeting
contractors and sub-contractors involved with construction, marketing, and sales.
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Table 5-10: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Construction
Sales

Leg/Reg
3
0

Agreement
1
1

Econ/Fisc
0
1

Information TOTAL
0
4
0
2

Dominant public management behaviors centered on the information exchanges and
permit coordination required for the builders to initiate and complete home construction. The
DES manager reverted back to his relationship management behaviors while the community
development took on the institutional management of homebuilders and subcontractors using
policy tools as the construction coordinator.
Explaining Project Outcomes. In RPA, several contextual factors shaped the five
outcome measures used in case selection (Table 5-11), including the political influence of the
neighborhood group on city council, the timely creation of the New York state ERP brownfield
program, the stability of the real estate market, and the preexisting relationship between the
mayor’s office and the area homebuilders association regarding the construction of market-rate
homes in the city. Accounting for these factors, critical moments emerging in the public
management process included the identification of the ERP program as a means for achieving
remediation successes, the high degree of information sharing facilitated by the DES manager to
political stakeholders across all project phases, and the use of policy tools to coordinate property
acquisition, remediation, and construction processes by the real estate, DES, and community
development managers respectively. The use of policy tools in this manner conformed to
expectations, particularly during both remediation and redevelopment implementation phases
while the relationship management strategies applied by the DES manager served to smooth
political relationships, making it easier to subsequently obtain external resources.
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Table 5-11: RPA Project Success
Outcome Measures
Time to completion (TIME)
Cleanup costs (COST)
Implementation processes
(PROCESS)
Contamination abatement (CLEAN)
Area-wide impact (IMPACT)

RPA Outcomes
1996 – 2004
$4.05 million
High satisfaction levels across multiple project actors
Earned Certificate of Completion from NYSDEC ERP
1254% increase in assessed values of property
27% increase in assessed values of neighboring homes

For example, project prioritization occurred when news of the ERP and the voices of the
property neighbors converged, lowering the financial and liability risks to the city for property
engagement and jumping RPA to the top of the city council agenda. Therefore, the ability of the
DES manager to identify and then quickly communicate the prospect of the ERP policy tool
package to citizens and city council proved to be the spark for allocating initial resources
towards early project phases. This decision to apply to the ERP resulted in acceptance into the
program and enabled the broader project network to move past remediation concerns and
consider property end use. However, the success of the relationships relied upon the fact that the
individuals participating in them maintained their roles throughout the projects. The city council
president in whose district RPA lay attributed project success to not only to these relationships:
. . but also the continuity of them because this was such a long project and we know that
these kinds of projects take so long to finally accomplish that without the continuity of . .
the political continuity as well as the appointed staff, I don't know if it would have
happened. – City Council President, 2008
Non-city actors also noted the extent to which the city listened to their concerns and adapted
their processes in order to address them. The homebuilders association executive involved with
RPA reported that, traditionally:
In the City of Rochester you go from department to department to department. You had to
get an electrical permit, then you had to get a plumbing permit, then you had to get zoning
and you had to go through all these different permits. . and the city was so good about
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communicating information down to each and every one of those levels that it made the job
all that much easier. – Home Builders Association Executive, 2008
Utilizing multiple meetings, the city and the homebuilders developed an agreement unique to this
project, enabling what the city’s community development manager described as a “a paradigm
shift for the builders to say well ‘gee I'll have to look at myself a little differently. Maybe I will
go into the city and build a home.’"
Once these commitments were made between the city and BANG, the city and the
NYSDEC, and the city and the homebuilders association, policy tools played a much more
instrumental role in coordinating project tasks. Contracts with the consulting firm and their
various subcontractors spelled out implementation tasks for each firm, city council authorized a
series of fiscal tools to pay for up front project costs, and a range of standard permits required by
the city for new home construction and city ordinances shaping who to hire and how for
subcontract work impacted time, cost, and process satisfaction measures.
It is tempting to explain RPA success purely as a result of timing. Several project
stakeholders pointed to a coming together of multiple factors to create a perfect implementation
scenario.
This project is probably a once in a life type of deal. Everything fell together at once.
Timing wise, partnership wise, funding wise, all the way through, everything just meshed
together. – Homebuilder Association Executive, 2008
However, sufficient evidence exists pointing to the role relationship management strategies
played in selecting and producing policy tools that solidified sufficient commitment for
successful project outcomes.
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CHAPTER SIX
LOW SUCCESS IN ROCHESTER: MANAGING INCREASING
UNCERTAINTIES
Introduction. Moving next to the low success project in the city of Rochester, data
reveal a different style of market-rate housing constrained by a different set of environmental,
political, and market-based forces than RPA. In this project, a complicated off-site
contamination scenario, a lack of neighborhood-based political push, and rapidly diminishing
lending and real estate markets all challenged public management efforts to achieve positive
project outcomes. Similar to the previous chapter, this one begins with a brief background of
how the project occurred in the broader flow of city housing efforts before stepping through key
decisions made within each project phase. The concluding section summarizes the extent to
which public management activities influenced project outcomes within these contexts.
Background. Rochester Project B (RPB) was a city-led brownfield project targeting new
downtown home-ownership that did not achieved full redevelopment. Initiated in 2003, the RBP
property lies within the boundaries of downtown Rochester on the city’s east side, bordered to
the west by a mix of new condominium rental residential and light commercial buildings
constructed on another former brownfield, to the north and east by historic commercial buildings
and a few single family homes, and to the south by a downtown highway. The entire property
sits a few blocks from a major university performing arts center and several popular restaurants.
Prior to property acquisition, the RPB land hosted a variety of industrial, commercial, and
residential uses including auto body shops, a dry cleaning business, and an electrical contracting
company.
The impetus for RPB project originated from a broader strategic plan to introduce owneroccupancy in the downtown Rochester area. An early portion of this area-wide plan involved
converting the brownfield property located to the west of RPB into rental housing. This property
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formerly hosted an auto dealership and was immediately adjacent to both a growing
entertainment district and one of the city’s downtown university campuses, leading city officials
and their private developer partner to believe in the property’s potential. The city therefore
remediated the property through the NYSDEC ERP and developers constructed condominiums,
successfully renting all units by 2000.
Property Assembly and Economic Assessment. The success of the rental
redevelopment led two senior managers in the city’s real estate and development services office
to see a stepping-stone for the city to promote downtown home ownership and decided to seek
permission to push development momentum onto adjacent properties just to the north and east.
Holding a design charette for the neighborhood surrounding the RPB properties to present their
ideas for owner-occupancy and to obtain feedback. The low numbers of residents and related
levels of political activity within this neighborhood resulted in minimal feedback so the city
managers proceeded to promote their own ideas for higher density town home units on this site
to city council. Despite the lack of citizen involvement city council members agreed with the
opportunity to capture redevelopment momentum and gave a green light to proceed with
property acquisition for RPB, once initial environmental information had been obtained.
Working with an environmental manager from DES and a consulting firm hired from
firms on retainer, the two community development managers acquired the necessary parcels by
utilizing a land-banking approach, purchasing lots from existing owners with money authorized
by city council and foreclosing on others where owners were behind in payments. Two lots
arrived through a donation when the property owner agreed that the tax write off was worth more
than the market value of the property. After acquiring seven distinct parcels, the managers
worked to rezone the properties, creating a continuous lot suitable for development. The city
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managers then retained private contractors to demolish all existing structures and prepare the site
for environmental review.
At this point, the managers examined a second lot bordering the first located to the south
that hosted a viable electrical contractor, motor repair, and warehouse business. Initially, the
business owner did not consider selling, but as the city moved forward with demolition on the
other properties, the business owner changed his mind and the real estate manager received city
council permission to move forward with a purchase. After acquiring this final property, the city
owned a development footprint covering an entire city block.
RPB Assembly and Economic Assessment: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use,
and Public Management. Despite the important roles filled by the real estate and housing
managers initiating project processes and implementing property assembly transactions, network
data indicate that a member of the city’s DES (working under the more senior DES manager
prevalent in RPA), his environmental consultant, and the city legal office operated at the center
of the project network during this first phase (Table 6-1). This occurred primarily because of city
council’s need to understand the environmental conditions of the property before authorizing
resources for purchase. Therefore, the DES manager and his contractor worked as
communication hubs between city council, the city lawyer, and the community development
managers. The community development managers primarily communicated with property
owners and city council to fulfill acquisition responsibilities, necessitating their temporary
position at the center of the project network during economic assessment where the total network
size was small.
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Table 6-1: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
1
Consultant
Comm Dev Mngr 1

Assembly
Economic Assessment

2
Env Manager
Comm Dev Mngr 2

3
City Lawyer
Mayor

Public management during these phases centered on institutional management
approaches where network actors acted in response to a set of policy tools. The tools utilized
during these initial phases focused upon property acquisition and enabled such actions as direct
purchase, foreclosure, and the adjustment of zoning (Table 6-2). In receiving permission to
implement these tools from city council, the community development managers followed
standard transactional procedures. In addition, the DES manager implemented a contract to
establish a formal agreement with the consulting firm.
Table 6-2: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Assembly
Economic
Assessment

Leg/Reg
3
0

Agreement
2
0

Econ/Fisc
0
0

Information TOTAL
1
6
0

0

Environmental Assessment and Remediation Planning. Once the city formally
acquired the properties, the consulting firm and the DES manager commenced with the Phase I
and Phase II assessments. The Phase I assessment revealed several petroleum underground
storage tanks on the northern properties and a petroleum plume in groundwater in the southern
property. With this initial information painting a seemingly manageable picture, the community
development managers then asked the DES manager to find a way to sufficiently remediate for
residential end use in as little as time as possible. This meant taking a different approach than
the strategy of submitting the property in RPA. The senior environmental project manager
described the situation:
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Ok, here are our choices - chase ERP funds, wait a year before you know or before you
have a work plan. The Brownfield Cleanup Program, 3-6 month application process.
Petroleum spills, I can get a work plan approved in 6 weeks. Well, you know, even
though the discussion is more involved than that, the response is that "we don't want to
wait" . . . we want to get this out to developers. - Senior Environmental Manager, 2008
With the decision to pursue redevelopment expediency and with the determination that
the property contamination was largely petroleum in nature, the environmental managers
submitted the property to the state Petroleum Spills Program. The Petroleum Spills Program
process involved state review of the proposed remediation plans, state environmental and health
oversight of remediation processes, and, if the NYSDEC felt compliance occurred, a letter of no
further action that would provide evidence for potential investors and developers that the city had
remediated the property to the greatest extent possible. While utilizing the Petroleum Spills
Program meant relatively fast approval of the remediation plan, it did not come with the promise
of state-level liability protections associated with the ERP. In addition, the Petroleum Spills
Program treated the properties not as one contiguous cleanup but as a set of spills discovered on
different parts of the property, raising the risk that remediation processes might reveal problems
not previously revealed. Finally, the Petroleum Spills Program did not offer remediation
funding. Therefore, the environmental and community development managers had to seek city
council approval to secure additional funds for remediation. These funds ultimately came from
an EPA brownfield remediation grant as well as internal city sources.
Interested in minimizing costs incurred by time delays, the community development
managers immediately sought proposals for a condominium complex from the private
development community, requiring in the initial request for proposals (RFP) that developers
assume responsibility for remediation. After being selected as the winner by a team of city
managers across economic development, community development, environmental quality and
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zoning divisions, the initial developer tried to renegotiate this remediation requirement as well as
acquire indemnification. The RFP review team stood firm and the developer subsequently
backed away from the project, providing a setback for project momentum. Recognizing the
barriers to finding a willing developer created by the remediation requirement, community
development officials removed that requirement and approached the DES managers to discuss
options for city-led remediation. According to one of the community development managers:
We did get a proposal. We actually got one that we liked but they wanted us to
indemnify the site and they backed out. We made it very clear in the RFP that we would
not indemnify the site and they backed out of the deal. We then decided that we had to
resolve the groundwater issue ourselves. – Community Development Manager, 2008
From the developer perspective:
The basic premise is that don't buy anything unless the seller cleans the land. Don't take
on that risk. Number two, if there's any future issues with the closure report, get an
indemnity from somewhere or other for the seller. I think those are two critical points.
Otherwise, I don't see any reason to take the risk. There's plenty of other projects to do. –
Developer, 2008
However, as the Phase II assessment unfolded, it became evident that the contamination
picture was more complex than originally thought. In addition to contamination derived from
surface use, the RPB property also experienced off-site pollution migrating through the
groundwater into the northeastern portion of RPB. This discovery not only complicated how the
environmental management team conceived of possible remediation strategies, it also began to
shape how the community development managers conceived of end use design. Under county
and state health codes, residential end uses required near complete removal or containment of
contaminations. However, in the case of RPB, complete remediation was not feasible as long as
the offsite contamination source continued to exist.
RPB Environmental Assessment and Remediation Planning: Network Characteristics,
Policy Tool Use, and Public Management. A flurry of construction planning activity occurred
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during the environmental assessment phase, brought on by the interest of the community
development managers in finding a developer willing to take on the costs of remediation.
Simultaneously moving forward in both these areas raised the risk of decisions being made
without complete information exchanged between environmental and community development
managers. However, the inclusion of the DES manager on the RFP selection committee
decreased the probability that such communication gaps would not occur. Subsequently, the
project actors most central to assessment and remediation planning included the senior
environmental manager and his staff member as well as the consultant they retained to perform
assessment work (Table 6-3). This arrangement suggests that environmental assessment and
remediation of RPB did not require extensive interaction with individuals outside the
environmental expert domain and supports interview and document data suggesting that the
focus of these phases was on completing environmental due diligence in the most efficient
manner possible.
Table 6-3: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Environmental Assessment
Remediation Plan

1
Env Mngr
Env Mngr

2
Sr. Env Mngr
Consultant

3
Consultant
Sr. Env Mngr

A small number of policy tools both shaped and were shaped by management behaviors
during these phases (Table 6-4). First, the DES manager contracted out assessment processes to
the consulting firm, utilizing a standard contract template frequently used for this purpose.
Second, entering the property into the state Petroleum Spills Program subjugated the
environmental manager and the consulting firm to a set of regulations that required
communication with state and local health departments and the NYSDEC in order to receive
approval for the remediation plan. At the same time, the Petroleum Spills Program authorized
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the NYSDEC to provide technical support regarding appropriate remediation processes. Third,
the potential EPA remediation funding motivated the environmental managers to allocate staff
time towards submitting an EPA proposal during the remediation planning phase. Finally,
although it was not successful, the community development managers conducted a proposal
solicitation and review process that utilized existing city regulations for how proposals were to
be developed. While never formalized, these managers also tried, and failed, to negotiate a
contract with the selected developer.
Table 6-4: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Environmental
Assessment
Remediation Plan

Leg/Reg
0
2

Agreement
1
0

Econ/Fisc
0
1

Information TOTAL
0
1

1
4

Dominant public management behaviors during these phases were split between the
environmental and community development managers. The environmental managers focused
upon managing the consulting firm contract while the community development managers
focused their management behaviors on negotiating with both the selected developer regarding
remediation responsibilities as well as with colleagues inside city hall to pursue the more
expedient Petroleum Spills Program as the remediation tool program. The focus on remediation
required the environmental manager to communicate to a broader number of network partners
while the community development managers limited primary communication to the initial
developer.
Remediation. Remediation processes ultimately occurred over two phases. City council
approved funds for remediating the first acquired properties while an EPA grant paid for the
remediation of the former electrical contractor’s property. City council had to agree to enter into
the grant agreement with the EPA, but no one questioned the decision to do so given the
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consensus around the potential benefits of new downtown residential development. However, the
EPA grant did impose a transaction cost by requiring that the city submit a formal RFP for a
consulting engineer as opposed to selecting one from a pre-approved list. The city
environmental management team ultimately rehired the firm that performed assessment work,
enabling continuity of strong information flows between the city, the NYSDEC, and the county
and state health departments. Remediation processes proceeded smoothly until, while digging
test pits, the consulting firm and their subcontractors discovered an additional underground
storage tank and a hydraulic lift not identified during the Phase I and Phase II assessments that
required removal. Addressing these items ultimately required extra time and money.
Ultimately, the southern portion of the property was dewatered and spills were addressed.
Overall, the environmental consultant and their subcontractors removed 12,000 gallons of
groundwater and 1,250 tons of impacted soils from the southern portion and 2,000 tons of soils
plus seven underground tanks and pumps from the northern portion. Then, they buried 700
pounds of oxygen release compounds across both portions to aid in ongoing decomposition of
residual petroleum products. Finally, the consultant sunk a series of permanent test wells to
facilitate ongoing assessment of environmental conditions (Private Consultant Report, 2004).
However, the off site contamination impacting the northern property could not be accessed
After completing these processes, the city received a closure report from the county
health department that they could present to development partners as evidence of “best remedial
effort.” In addition, the city received two “no further action” letters from the NYSDEC
indicating that due remediation diligence occurred. The NYSDEC project manager assigned to
the project noted that city environmental managers and their consultant took far less time to
achieve the no further action letter than most spill projects.
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RPB Remediation: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public Management.
Similar to assessment and remediation planning, environmental experts remained most central to
the project network during the RPB remediation phase (Table 6-5). Implementing the Petroleum
Spills Program and issues associated with the offsite contamination generated greater scrutiny by
the county health manager, bringing this official closer to the center of the project network.
Involvement of the community development managers decreased during remediation as they
waited to see if there were to be design controls on potential development due to unresolved
contamination.
Table 6-5: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Remediation

1
Env Mngr

2
County Health Mngr

3
Sr. Env Mngr

Key policy tools implemented included the NYSDEC Petroleum Spills Program, the EPA
grant, and the consulting firm contract as well as direct funding mechanisms approved by city
council (Table 6-6). While the environmental managers selected the Petroleum Spills Program,
the policy tools accompanying that program largely targeted the city itself, requiring specific
involvement of county and state agencies. As a means to an end, completing remediation
processes under the Petroleum Spills Program made the letters of no further action from the
NYSDEC available to the city for use in negotiating with potential developers. In addition,
given the environmental complexities of the property, technical support from the NYSDEC and
the county health department provided through the Petroleum Spills Program proved important
to the development of the next development RFP.
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Table 6-6: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Remediation

Leg/Reg
3

Agreement
1

Econ/Fisc
2

Information TOTAL
1
7

Public management behaviors on behalf of the DES managers primarily focused upon
coordinating remediation processes, both by directing the consulting firm how to proceed as well
as by complying with regulatory processes brought on by the EPA grant and the NYSDEC spill
program. In addition, the environmental manager continued to practice information sharing
behaviors on a voluntary basis as new information arose during remediation in order for the
project to enter the redevelopment phases. He described:
When an RFPis sent out, we (DES) usually have some input into the actual scope of the
RFP and we want to make sure in the RFP that we identify the existing environmental
and somewhat more recently, subsurface geotechnical conditions that exist on the site so
that the developers understand some of the project limitations and redevelopment issues
that may face them so that we don't get back an unrealistic proposal or a proposal which
does not take into account the environmental and the geotechnical issues. –
Environmental Manager, 2008
Once this information solidified and the community development managers understood the
design requirements, they moved forward in designing the second RFP process.
Construction Planning and Design. The ongoing environmental concern of offsite
contamination compelled the county health department and, subsequently, the NYSDEC to
require that any residential development on the site have the means to ventilate underneath units
to prevent volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from entering living spaces. The community
development managers therefore inserted the requirement for these controls into the RFP. While
this additional requirement had the potential of scaring off potential proposals, the environmental
and community development teams’ effort at communicating both the remedial steps taken by
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the city as well as the vetting of the design standard by the health department and the NYSDEC
built trust with a few developers, including the one who ultimately won the second RFP round.
There was a lot of due diligence going on at my behalf to make certain that I'm
comfortable . . . Everyone felt very strongly that, again, as I've said a number of times, it's
probably the best site in the city, or the county. It's been cleaned up so well – the
corrective action plan, the future for potential remedies for potential infiltration. With all
of those comforts, we felt good. – Rochester Developer
At this point in project processes, a significant turnover of personnel occurred within city
hall. Citizens elected a new mayor and, as this new administration came in, a number of longterm community development managers, including the community development managers who
initiated this project, retired. At the same time, the new mayoral administration redesigned city
development services, laying the groundwork to merge the community development department
with the economic development department. In doing so, the city replaced the retiring managers
with two new managers more closely identified with the economic development arena.
Simultaneously, the region began to feel the impact of a nationwide downturn in development
lending incurred by the global financial crisis that incurred more risk averse behaviors by lending
institutions and, subsequently, private firms relying upon lending institution resources for new
project development.
During these changes, the selected developer sought to streamline the development
contract regarding the city’s preference for higher density town homes and city rules about
utilizing union labor. With single-family homes, builders could build a model home and then
sell individual lots as buyers appeared. Town homes, however, required simultaneous
construction as each unit shares walls, water, sewer and electric infrastructures. Therefore, with
the town home designation of RPB, the winning developer could not build a showcase unit to
market to potential buyers therefore limiting his ability to comply with his lenders who required
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that 50% of the units be pre-sold in order to qualify for construction loans. As the city wouldn’t
budge regarding the town home designation, largely due to the environmental restrictions,
lenders pulled away from the project. At the same time, union labor requirements, despite being
the norm for city projects, hindered the developer from cutting potential construction costs.
The developer therefore proposed a unique idea for project financing. Attempting to cut
risks, he convened the new city economic development project manager and union
representatives and proposed that the unions invest their pension funds into the project given that
the developer could pre-sell 60% of the proposed units. The city was on board right away:
RPB involves negotiation with a collection of unions who are interested in financing this
project in exchange for union contracts to do the work. The city has incentive to do this
because of finding financing in tough times and that it hits economic development
objectives of creating stable, high paying jobs in the city. The developer and the
Department of Economic Development came up with this idea. – Economic
Development Manager
However, the ongoing environmental concerns from the off-site pollution and the
potential liabilities they carried slowed these negotiation processes. In an attempt to prevent a
second failed RFP process, the city environmental management team, the economic development
manager, city council, and city lawyers innovated several new policy tools to help sway the
unions and the developers. First, the city put together a limited liability policy tool that released
the developer and the unions from liability as long as specific barriers and environmental
controls placed on the property were not broken through or damaged. Second, the city agreed to
pay for the costs of the vapor venting systems necessitated for the town home design by the
environmental situation. Third, the city linked RPB to a pre-existing city-level tax abatement
program put in place through a partnership with the county industrial development agency that
incentivized downtown residential owner-occupancy. Finally, the city developed an insurance
policy tool designed to protect homebuyers from property devaluation linked to ongoing
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contamination. City council felt comfortable approving these city-based tools based upon the
trust established between the city DEQ and the state NYSDEC regarding the extent of completed
remediation. However, the developer felt that these new tools added more time to the legal side
of contract development.
Despite the availability of policy tools designed to address ongoing project concerns,
construction processes never commenced due to the inability for the developer and the unions to
agree upon the details of project financing and the subsequent reprioritization of projects within
the developer’s portfolio away from RPB as Rochester market characteristics continued to
evolve in the deepening financial crises.
RPB Design and Construction Plan: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and
Public Management. The fact that the environmental characteristics of the RPB property
complicated the design parameters for future residential units required that the environmental
and community development managers exhibit high levels of communication during these
phases. However, the turnover in the community development managers also meant that
institutional memory of the project remained within the DES managers. Network centrality data
for the design and construction planning phases support these findings, showing how the senior
environmental manager stepped in during construction planning to support the communication
efforts of the economic development manager new to the project (Table 6-7). In addition,
network data reflect the leadership role played by the developer himself as he proposed the idea
to tap union pension funds for construction loans.
Table 6-7: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Design
Construction Plan

1
Env Mngr
Sr. Env Mngr

2
Sr. Env Mngr
Developer

3
Comm Dev Mngr 1
Econ Dev Mngr
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The primary policy tools influencing design processes were the design control regulations
required within the letter of no further action provided by the NYSDEC to the city. As noted
previously, this requirement was a consequence of the city seeking remediation expediency at the
cost of remediation completeness. Then, in the construction planning phase, the city innovated
multiple financial and liability tools of their own to address union and developer concern over
these design controls and the lack of indemnification from the NYSDEC (Table 6-8).
Table 6-8: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Design
Construction Plan

Leg/Reg
1
4

Agreement
0
1

Econ/Fisc
0
3

Information TOTAL
1
2
0
8

The uses of these tools at this stage were much less about implementing a preset plan, as
in RPA, but about securing commitment and appealing to the relationship values of reciprocity in
the developer. For this reason, a significant shift in project framing on behalf of the city
occurred during these phases when the community development managers retired and the
economic development manager took their place. Moving from the original idea that RPB was
about creating market-rate housing opportunity to a new frame that painted the project as being
about job creation, and using the newly innovated policy tools as leverage, this manager
negotiated with union representatives and the developer for eighteen months. However, the time
delay, increasing lending and real estate market instabilities, and other opportunities motivated
the developer to prioritize other projects over RPB and project processes ground to a halt. For
their part, the environmental managers played a back up role to the economic development
manager in this negotiation despite the ongoing centrality of the senior environmental manager,
suggesting that network centrality for communication purposes does not always signify network
leadership in key negotiations.
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Explaining Project Outcomes. The lower success of RPB (Table 6-9) compared to RPA
largely stems from a set of external factors that created a project context in which key decisions
made by city actors led to certain project failures. These external factors included the off site
contamination problem that led to restrictive project design requirements by state and county
environmental and health officials, the rapidly changing real estate and lending markets towards
the end of the study time period that influenced the developer and the unions to back out of the
project, and the personnel turnover within the project management team incurred by a new
mayoral administration that interrupted project negotiations. Together, these factors introduced
high levels of uncertainty after project processes had already commenced that proved too
difficult for the key public managers to overcome.
Table 6-9: RPB Project Success
Outcome Measures
Time to completion (TIME)
Cleanup costs (COST)
Implementation processes
(PROCESS)
Contamination abatement (CLEAN)
Area-wide impact (IMPACT)

RPB Outcomes
2003 – present
$605,000
High satisfaction with environmental processes,
low satisfaction with redevelopment processes
Earned no further action letter through NYSDEC
petroleum spills. Adopted institutional controls
preventing contamination problems.
Site ready for construction. No resulting
property value impact.

A key decision laying the groundwork for RPB susceptibility to these contextual factors
was the decision by the community development managers to value development speed over
remediation completeness. This subsequently led to selection of the NYSDEC Petroleum Spills
Program as the regulatory program for obtaining state and county redevelopment permissions.
While this gamble may have worked in a stable market with a property amenable to complete
remediation, the environmental and financial uncertainties cropping up throughout project
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processes required project managers to continually react and adapt. One consequence of
selecting the Petroleum Spills Program was that the city was not reimbursed by the state for
remediation activity nor did the city obtain liability releases that they could pass on to
developers. Therefore, the environmental manager had to search for additional remediation
funding options and, in construction planning, the community development and, later, economic
development managers had to work with city council and city lawyers to devise a city-based
indemnification tool.
The increasing uncertainty surrounding RPB also led to a shift in the strategic orientation
of public management behaviors over time. Initially, the community development managers
strategically gained city council approvals to apply property acquisition policy tools for building
the property footprint. However, as uncertainties grew, public management behaviors became
more reactive, ultimately shifting the power to move the project from the city to the private
developer.
Across RPB phases, the key public managers largely relied upon institutional approaches
to network management when trying to shape behaviors of non-city actors, particularly as
uncertainties increased. With contracts, design controls, tax incentives, insurance products, and
liability waivers, the community and economic development managers worked to steer unions
and developer towards project completion. However, these institutional management efforts
occurred in conjunction with an effort to appeal to reciprocity values through relationship
management strategies with the idea being that the efforts made by the city to address developer
concerns would create a willingness on behalf of the developer to make comparable efforts to
move the project forward.

It is important to note that these management behaviors came not
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from the most central public manager but from the managers most directly connected with the
developers and unions.
A key absence in the critical factors shaping project outcomes was strong political
impetus in the form of a project champion or citizen advocacy. While city council was
compliant in approving financing for RPB, there was little additional involvement. The council
member whose district includes RPB noted “it is my district, too, and they knew that I would be
supportive but I didn't quite have the human cry of neighbors.”
Despite a flurry of management strategies integrating institutional and relationship
management strategies, public managers were unable to compel construction processes to begin
and RPB failed to achieve redevelopment success.
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CHAPTER SEVEN GROWING SUCCESS FROM FAILURE IN BUFFALO
Introduction. Shifting to the low management capacity city in the case selection, this
chapter describes the context in which the Buffalo projects Phases One and Two (BP1 and BP2)
occurred and the extent to which interactions between project networks, policy tools, and public
management explain the low success of BP1 and the high success of BP2. While there is much
overlap between these two phases and evidence that BP1 greatly influenced BP2 processes, the
two phases exhibited sufficient differences in network actor composition and construction
planning, end use design, construction implementation and sales processes to merit separate
descriptions of each project’s network structures, policy tools, and management practices.
However, the strong path dependency of BP2 on decisions made during BP1 requires that both
projects be discussed together.
Background. The BP1 and BP2 projects are a pair of mixed market-rate single-family
home residential developments characterized by their embeddedness within a larger federal
housing initiative, a backdrop of previous brownfield-to-residential stumbles, and low city
resource capacities brought on by years of declining tax bases and increasing service demands.
These two projects occurred one after the other on the same property located in the southeast
portion of the city, an area that had experienced a great deal of deterioration and resident flight
since the 1950s. Multiple mayoral administrations had targeted most of this area with state and
federal assistance to try to revitalize the once active neighborhoods and, in 1990, the city applied
for and received federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds to build affordable
housing developments within this blighted region.
Between 1990 and the start of BP1, the city had initiated a few experiments acting as a
developer for market-rate residential projects within other parts of the city. On one of them,
investigators discovered that contaminated soils still remained even after housing units were sold

130
and homeowners had moved in. In addition to this public relations nightmare, the city faced a
series of lawsuits from the homeowners. This project, and the proximity of Buffalo to the
infamous Love Canal neighborhood, created much skepticism for city-led residential
development as evidenced by writings found in local blogs and the independent media.
Property Assembly and Economic Assessment – BP1. Because of these broader efforts
targeting this neighborhood, property assembly for BP1 occurred indirectly in 1997 through the
acceptance of the broader neighborhood into HUD’s Home Ownership Zone program (HOZ), a
HUD demonstration program initiated in 1996 to expand homeownership in blighted
neighborhoods within a subset of struggling U.S. cities. City community development and
planning officials applied to this program at the urging of the city’s mayor and a local private
developer with national-level ties to HUD officials. Both the mayor and developer believed that
the city would greatly benefit from an infusion of federal dollars targeting the renewal of
downtown housing. City public managers working in the housing and real estate offices of the
permits and inspection services department provided the data collection and grant writing work,
but it was the developer and mayor who championed the HOZ application resulting in its
acceptance. The HOZ program ultimately provided the City of Buffalo a $3.5 million grant and
a $7.7 million dollar loan to develop 344 units of new homeownership housing in a 70 square
block area east of downtown.
As was the norm in Buffalo, the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency (BURA) administered
these funds14. However, as the HOZ program unfolded, it became quickly apparent to HUD

14

Traditionally, the city of Buffalo utilized several quasi-governmental organizations such as
BURA to accomplish economic and community development goals because of their legal
abilities to receive and spend grant dollars more efficiently than a traditional government agency.
The state legislature authorized BURA in 1966 and created a governance board consisting of the
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officials that BURA was not on track to build the number of income-qualified homes originally
promised. One problem was that the city was using HOZ funds to pay for basic administrative
functions for which traditional income sources were not available. This drew down the funds
available for homebuilding activity and relationships between HUD officials and city community
development managers subsequently soured as the city simultaneously tried to renegotiate its
HOZ contract while jumpstarting housing construction efforts. One parcel within the HOZ was a
property owned by the city formally hosting a forge and, later, a soda bottling facility that had
been torn down, leaving a sizable vacant lot with questionable environmental histories. With
pressure to fulfill their HOZ obligations, housing officials in the city’s Office of Strategic
Planning (OSP) prioritized this property for new home construction and an environmental
manager assigned to the project retained a private consulting firm to prepare a broad Phase I
environmental assessment.
BP1 Property Assembly and Economic Assessment: Network Characteristics, Policy
Tool Use, and Public Management. Network data reveal that, during property assembly, a
communication gap existed between community development and environmental actors during
project (Figure 7-1).15 As depicted in Figure 7-1, one group of city real estate and housing
officials (MT, DA, BasS, MaT, PD, QL) interacted with the local HUD manager and related
private development partners while in the second group, the NYSDEC regional manager linked

mayor and a mix of city council, city lawyers, and city commissioners. Organizationally, BURA
operates as a separate financial entity from the city. However, BURA staff technically work
within the bureaucratic structure of city hall.
15
Interview data show engagement of a slightly broader array of city actors during these early
phases. A discrepancy between interview and network data is likely due to interview subjects
discussing engagement in a particular phase but not mentioning interaction with specific actors.
Based upon the methods of analysis used, these individuals appear in data coded by phase but
not in network data.
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together one of his staff members, the state health official assigned to the Buffalo region, and the
environmental lawyer at the city (LD, DM, NS, OC) for discussion of the property’s
environmental aspects. The centrality of the private developer and state environmental officials
within these two sub-groups indicates the extent to which non-city actors played highly central
roles early on in project evolution.
Figure 7-1: Property Acquisition Phase Sub-Networks

Much of the policy tool influence at this stage in the project derived from the HOZ
program that provided grants and loans towards general property acquisition in which BP1
acquisition occurred (Table 7-1). Utilizing these tools, the city, through actions taken by the
OSP, acquired many properties through foreclosure and then land banked them in anticipation of
future development. By using HUD fiscal tools for this purpose, the city agreed to be subject to
HUD regulations regarding paperwork and process that accompanied the tools.
Table 7-1: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase One
Assembly
Economic Assessment

Leg/Reg
4
0

Agreement
0
0

Econ/Fisc
2
1

Information TOTAL
0
6
0
1
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Public management behaviors at this point of the project were limited to managers
operating within the two sub-networks. In one group, the real estate and housing officials
negotiated with the developer and the HUD manager to enroll the neighborhood into the HOZ
program. In the other, the environmental manager worked with the NYSDEC managers and,
initiated Phase I assessments through a private consultant. There is no evidence in the interview
or document data that these two groups had any extensive information exchanges at this point.
Environmental Assessment, Remediation Planning, Construction Planning, and
Construction – BP1. Because the OSP director and the developer targeted the broader
neighborhood for housing development, Phase I assessments occurred across all properties in the
zone, funded by a 1995 EPA assessment grant that the environmental manager renewed with
approval from city council. The Phase I investigation indicated that legitimate environmental
concerns existed for the area, prompting the environmental manager to keep the private
consultant on board to perform a more detailed Phase II assessment for the section of the
neighborhood being targeted for BP1. However, in a manner detrimental to BP1 outcomes,
construction processes proceeded before Phase II assessments could reveal the extent of existing
contamination.
So they did Phase One environmental and when it got onto Phase Two . . . we started to
construct and build model houses. Then somebody decided they would do a Phase Two,
we were already into construction. – Buffalo Environmental Manager, 2009
While Phase I assessment processes unfolded, the OSP housing manager assigned to manage the
project proceeded to form a construction contract with the firm owned by the developer who
initiated the HOZ proposal and collaborated with the city real estate manager to market the
developer’s suburban style homes to potential buyers. Once they identified sufficient numbers of
income-qualified homeowners interested in the project, the housing manager gave the green light

134
for construction to begin without seeking out or waiting for the Phase II assessment results16. At
this point in time, turnover occurred in OSP leadership.
After the builder completed three houses, the environmental manager received the Phase
II results and alerted the BURA lawyer who then raised concerns with the newly appointed OSP
director that if houses were sold, new lawsuits could arise against the city regarding a lack of due
environmental diligence when constructing housing units. This assessment, submitted to the
NYSDEC office in Buffalo per standard operating procedures, revealed elevated heavy metal
contamination throughout the property down to bedrock, four feet below the surface. While the
NYSDEC project manager, the city environmental manager, and lawyers for both the city and
the construction company met to discuss this realization. The new OSP director immediately
made the decision to halt all processes until the consulting firm could perform a more thorough
assessment. Ultimately, these data revealed the extent of contamination and the developer, not
willing to wait for remediation processes to unfold, left the project. At the same time, the
housing manager whose decision-making led to premature construction left city employment.
The environmental manager’s account of that time period indicates the nature of communication
and conflict between his team and that of the housing project manager’s:
I went down to the housing manager and I said that you have to stop work. You can't
allow it to go forward. We've got an environmental concern here and I don't know why
you've let these people go ahead as it is. Out of my department, I had no authority over
that. It was not my ballywick to tell this man how he should do his work although he was
aware that there were environmental concerns on the property before he gave his
contractor the go ahead. – Buffalo Environmental Manager, 2009

16

This housing manager could not be located for this study, so it is unknown as to the motivation
behind these decisions. However, several interview respondents speculated political pressures
on this individual to implement the contracts in addition to poor communication occurring
between city officials.
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After seeing Phase II completed, the city environmental manager submitted a full
assessment of the property prepared by the consultant to the state health department and the
NYSDEC. When regional manager of the state health department determined that new
construction would not be able to proceed without soil remediation, the OSP director decided to
restart the project and instructed the city environmental manager to apply for NYSDEC
Environmental Restoration Program (ERP) remediation funding. It was during this wait for
acceptance into the ERP that a new administration entered city hall, effectively ending BP1 and
starting the processes for BP2.
BP1: Environmental Assessment, Remediation Planning, Construction Planning, and
Construction Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public Management. Interview and
document data indicate that the timing between environmental assessment and construction
occurred in a manner inconsistent with the brownfield process framework presented in Chapter
Two of this paper, largely as a result of the lack of communication between environmental and
redevelopment actors. Environmental actors at the city and state levels primarily communicated
with one another during the assessment and remediation phases while construction planning and
construction implementation networks consisted of city housing officials and the private
developer.
Policy tool data for BP1 exhibit the lack of adequate assessment and remediation
performed before construction planning and implementation occurred (Table 7-2). The
assessment phase incorporated grant dollars from the EPA but by not allowing sufficient time
Phase II assessment processes, it was not possible to move very far with securing additional tools
during remediation planning (shaded row in table). Policy tool use in construction planning and
implementation phases arose from both the promise of HUD grants and loans as well as their
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actual implementation. For example, the builder moved forward in construction, anticipating
that HUD loans and funds were guaranteed for prospective homebuyers.
Table 7-2: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Environmental Assessment
Remediation Plan
Construction Plan
Design
Remediation
Construction
Sales

Leg/Reg
1
0
2
1
0
2
0

Agreement
0
1
1
0
0
1
0

Econ/Fisc
1
1
4
1
0
2
4

Information TOTAL
0
2
0
2
0
7
0
2
0
0
0
5
0
4

The large turnover of city officials between BP1 and data collection activities for this study
in addition to the lack of BP1-specific documents at the City of Buffalo archives limited data
available to assess public management for this project. However, interview data with remaining
project actors and journalism accounts of the time period indicate that no single public manager
within the city dominated management activity during BP1 and, perhaps more significantly, noncity actors such as the NYSDEC manager and the developer appeared to steer several project
phases themselves. Those city officials that were active included the environmental manager,
the environmental lawyer, the housing manager and, to a lesser extent, the lead engineer for
public works and the city council member in whose district BP fell. However, the ties between
these actors did not cross expert area boundaries, a phenomena extending to interactions with
non-city actors as well. The public management behaviors captured in the data indicate that city
officials active in BP1 either focused on coordinating partners to implement tasks, such as the
environmental manager working with his consultant, or responding to directives from project
decision makers.
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It is important to highlight how decreasing resources for effective project management and
the constant cycling of both personnel as well as positions at city hall contributed to the poor
public management performance in BP1. For example, the environmental manager assigned to
the project eventually performed all environmental work for both OSP and as a member of
BURA. He described:
When I started here, there was a small environmental department with a supervisor, myself,
and environmental planner, secretarial help and another man that would attend or staff the
city's environmental management commission. I'm the only person left. – Buffalo
Environmental Manager, 2009
Due to this ongoing loss of support staff, he limited his involvement to environmental
assessment unless instructed by city council themselves to proceed with formal remediation
processes. In addition, political pressures to show progress in complying with HUD construction
requirements contributed to these communication problems by compelling construction action
over thorough environmental information diffusion.
Environmental Assessment, Remediation Planning and Remediation – BP2. After
the OSP director halted construction processes, a time lapse occurred between active property
processes while the original builder, their subcontractors and the city worked out contractual
disputes and the ERP funding application moved through NYSDEC channels. Once these
disputes were mostly resolved, the OSP director approved further assessment processes,
initiating what this research identifies as the BP2 project. The initial steps for BP2 entailed
completion of the Phase II assessment and the planning and implementing of remediation
strategies through the ERP.
In the initial ERP application, the environmental manager proposed leaving two of the
houses and simply remediating the soil around them. However, weather damage and looting as
well as evolving design ideas made this impractical to the OSP director. Therefore, he asked the

138
environmental manager to amend the ERP application to include full remediation of the site after
eliminating the existing structures and approached city council for a bond issuance to pay for
demolition and remediation costs.
The NYSDEC and the state health department ultimately approved a remediation plan for
the property that required the removal of all soils on the site four feet down to the bedrock and
the filling in of certified clean soils from an off-site source. The environmental manager rehired
the consulting firm that had performed the BP1 assessment work to implement this plan through
a set of subcontractors. When the firm completed these actions, the NYSDEC did not actually
issue a Certificate of Completion (COC) because the remedy effectively removed all
contamination, deeming a COC unnecessary. However, the state did provide the city full
liability release they could pass on to developers.
BP2: Environmental Assessment, Remediation Planning and Remediation Network
Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public Management. Network data reflect the transition in
personnel as well as management focus that occurred between BP1 and BP2. The city
environmental manager moved to a highly central role after the OSP director and mayor
recognized the near miss of building homes on contaminated land again and focused their
attention on remediation (Table 7-3). The environmental manager maintained this most central
position throughout the rest of the environmental phases but the high centralities of the NYSDEC
managers during this portion of BP2 affirms interview and document data that show the city
manager received much technical support and attention from the NYSDEC. While this high
degree of involvement by state officials stemmed from motivations and abilities on behalf of the
lead NYSDEC manager, it also indicates the extent to which the NYSDEC regional office helped
the environmental manager to compensate for diminished capacities within city hall.
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Table 7-3: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Environmental Assessment
Remediation Plan
Remediation

1
Env Mngr
Env Mngr
Env Mngr

2
Sr State Env Mngr
Sr State Env Mngr
Sr State Env Mngr

3
State Health Mngr
OSP director
State Env Mngr

The OSP director and the environmental manager selected a range of policy tools to
achieve full remediation of the BP property (Table 7-4). The EPA grant provided assessment
funding, the ERP provided a reimbursement grant and a liability release as well as imposed
regulations impacting remediation processes, city council provided bond dollars to fill in expense
gaps and approved contracts with the environmental consulting firm and their subcontractors,
and the NYSDEC and state health department provided technical support. Each of these tools
provided the necessary resources but also incurred additional layers of responsibilities on behalf
of city managers regarding paperwork, project performance, and other regulatory requirements.
Table 7-4: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Leg/Reg
Environmental
Assessment
2
Remediation
Plan
3
Remediation
5

Agreement

Econ/Fisc

Information TOTAL

1

1

0

4

1
1

1
3

1
1

6
10

The OSP director had the greatest impact during this phase by directing OSP and BURA
staff members to restart the environmental phases of the project and appealing to city council for
additional funding approvals. However, it was the coordinating behaviors of the environmental
manager that caused the EPA and ERP policy tools to impact the project and management
process. These two tool packages both empowered and constrained the environmental manager
to link to federal and state environmental and health officials in order to access the funding and
technical support provided through them. City lawyers supported these efforts by settling
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lingering conflicts related to BP1 and enabling processes to move forward. From the start,
public management of BP2 occurred at two levels; top-down directing by the OSP director and
centralized coordination by the project manager.
Construction Planning and Design – BP2. When the new OSP director arrived at the
city, he brought with him a set of new ideas on how the city should organize and implement
planning and development activities. Because one of his first tasks involved halting the
construction of BP1, addressing this property jumped to the top of his agenda. Public pressures
to complete the HOZ obligations and eliminate the bad publicity of the abandoned houses further
compelled this prioritization, even though it was not, according to members of the community
development community, a high priority vacant property relative to all others. Nevertheless, the
OSP director assigned a new project manager from within his housing staff to coordinate city
efforts for BP2, despite the fact that this manager had not worked on such a project before. He
did have experience within the OSP prior to BP2 conducting design and construction of infill
housing but had not yet worked on a project the scale of BP. While several project actors viewed
this housing manager’s work as very positive, they recognized that his own experience combined
with general city capacity challenges constrained his efforts.
In adopting BP2 as his “pet project”, the OSP director took a sharp turn away from the
original design ideas generated for BP1. He strongly believed that the growing interest in
downtown living by suburban residents made market-rate homes feasible for the BP2 property.
Therefore, he instructed the housing manager to create a New Urbanism17 design for the
development to appeal to traditionally suburban homebuyers. This shift away from the BP1
17

A design genre for urban areas involving placing houses close together and against the
sidewalk as in traditional urban design, but with home features such as carports, front lawns, and
small porches found in suburban style homes.
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design increased construction costs, making the need to sell homes at market rate in order to for
the city to recoup costs more imperative. However, a fully market-rate neighborhood was not in
compliance with the HUD HOZ program, hereby exempting the project from HOZ dollars and
potentially complicating the already stretched relationship with HUD. Yet, the OSP director
received approval from the mayor who desired a high profile project in the city to promote his
revitalization credentials to political stakeholders. However, in order to build market-rate
homes, the project required a different source of home ownership loans.
Initially, the OSP director had formed an agreement with a local nonprofit community
lending organization to supply these loans. However, he dropped that lender when it appeared
that Fannie Mae could provide a better deal. When, in the construction phase, home construction
costs went above budget, the OSP director returned to the nonprofit lender and made an appeal
for a quick infusion of capital to cover the overrun. The lender recognized the immediacy of
need and followed through, but expressed dissatisfaction for having to “bail out” the city in this
matter, particularly in response to the OSP director’s directive management approach.
To be blunt about it, the (BP2) project was a specific plan that (the OSP director) wanted done.
Period. End of story. He wanted to bring a neighborhood market-rate product into the city. Period!
And there was not going to be anyone that was going to tell him to the contrary. How it got done,
how it got financed, were all our issues, but it was his desire to do this project. – Buffalo
Community Development Corporation Executive, 2009
These shifts in sources of loans subsequently shifted financial responsibilities from city council
to the BURA board and the Department of Budget, providing the OSP director with more control
over the project through his position on the BURA board.
Moving forward, the housing manager rehired the engineering consulting firm that
participated in the construction processes for BP1 to manage the same process for BP2, but only
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after working through the OSP director and his agency lawyer to resolve lingering and
negotiating pro bono work. The city public works engineer observed:
They were trying to blame (the consultant) for some of the mistakes, and (the consultant)
bent over backwards, like I said. They did a lot of pro bono work. They should have been
kissing their ass to pay them, get it done and get out of there. But people like (the new
housing manager), he hadn't been around contracts, and he got a new lawyer there, and
they're all like “Oh, my God”...they got in trouble before with this testing, so they were
being extremely careful about what they were doing, but (the consultant) ended up paying
the price for that. – Buffalo City Engineer, 2009
Ultimately, the consulting firm absorbed past costs, and site preparation began.
During pre-construction processes, the housing manager acted as the designated project
manager but the private consulting firm ended up working for the City Engineer whose public
works department held much of the actual responsibility for preparing the site for home
construction. This difference between the planned and actual management arrangement reflected
the uniqueness of this project for the city. Typically for housing projects community
development corporations normally held project management responsibilities within the HOZ
program, not city managers. The fact that the new mayor and the OSP director believed the city
needed a “win” partly influenced the decision to manage the project in-house, but the perception
in the community development corporation community was that the city had to be the primary
developer for liability reasons. The nonprofit lender observed:
One of the big reasons, I think, is that (BP2) was done on a tract of land that was
brownfield, and that because of the City running into problems with environmental issues
on housing projects in the past, I think that they pretty much knew that nobody was going
to come in there and develop housing on that lot. – Community Development
Corporation Executive, 2009
BP2: Construction Planning and Design Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and
Public Management. Network data indicate unified project networks during BP2’s design and
construction planning phases with the new housing manager and OSP director playing highly
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central roles (Table 7-5). The high centrality of the environmental manager during the design
phase suggests greater communication across expert domains than what had occurred during
BP1. However, the fact that zero lingering pollutants remained on the property after remediation
minimizes the importance of this finding because the property did not require continued
involvement of environmental actors18. Despite the high centrality of the community
development project manager during these phases, total network composition continued to
evolve as the OSP director pulled in new partners, such as the community lender, to shore up
project financing.
Table 7-5: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
Construction Plan
Design

1
Comm Dev Mngr
Comm Dev Mngr

2
OSP director
Env Mngr

3
Community Lender
OSP director

Policy tool use during design and construction planning phases spanned multiple tool
types (Table 7-6) as the OSP director and his project manager engaged with several different
network partners, particularly regarding financing for home construction. The OSP director
convinced city council to approve a bond sale and supplemented money from this sale with
assistance from the community lender. In addition, the project manager used a contract to
formalize a work agreement between the city and the consulting firm, but only after significant
negotiation between city lawyers and the consulting firm regarding disputes from BP1.

18

The high centrality of the environmental manager in the design phase contradicts interview
data suggesting that design decisions were primarily between the OSP director and his staff.
Closer examination of the data reveals a discrepancy between how the environmental manager
completed his network survey and how respondents he reported interacting with completed
theirs. Future research utilizing social network analysis should include multiple means of
confirming network ties (Vehovar et al. 2008). Further review of data for this study indicated
that these discrepancies in data were limited to the BP2 design phase.
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Table 7-6: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Construction
Plan
Design

Leg/Reg
3
2

Agreement
1
0

Econ/Fisc
4
2

Information TOTAL
0
0

8
4

Public management continued to occur at two levels with the OSP director leading
negotiations for many of the policy tools while the project manager coordinated the resulting
agreements. Together, they leveraged the formal agreements formed with project partners and
the symbolic significance of building homes in a blighted neighborhood to compel continued
participation by these partners even when circumstance led partners to question the balance of
costs to project benefits.
Construction and Sales – BP2. Once construction plans were in place, the OSP director
delegated responsibility for project construction and sales to the housing manager and abruptly
left the city for another job. In the wake of this departure, the housing manager struggled
through multiple challenges and network partners felt pressured by political leaders to contribute
more than they had intended for the project to achieve redevelopment success.
The first challenge involved project funding. The decision to adopt a mostly New
Urbanist approach meant placing houses close together, against the sidewalk, but with
affectations found in suburban style homes. This increased the cost burden on the city for site
preparation, particular with the more intricate design and the construction of a unique serpentine
street planned to run between the houses. These factors required the housing manager to plead
with his counterparts in the public works, water, and sewer offices to ensure appropriate
infrastructures. Originally, the OSP director, with support from the mayor and approval from
city council, expected separate departments to fund their own portion of the work out of
departmental budgets.
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Basically the mayor told me, get this done. Drop everything, it was a big deal with them
and (the OSP director) to make this thing turn out positive. Like I said, when it came
through as part of the capital budget, we were like, “Well, we didn't approve that on our
request”. “Well, we did, you're building it, so get to work”. – Buffalo Public Works
Engineer, 2009
However, the design called for work above and beyond what these budgets would allow and,
despite not being the designated project manager, the city engineer in public works filled in the
leadership vacuum and spent time convincing city council to issue another set of bonds to
supplement his budget for the project. Similarly, the community development organization
providing loans stepped up in the absence of the OSP director to steer the financial processes for
the project director.
On the construction side, miscommunication between the company contracted to provide
blasting services for basements and the consulting firm led to the basements being blasted too
deep. The city had to pay for reconfiguration of the foundations and finger pointing occurred
between the city public works department, the blasting company, and the engineering consulting
firm. The need to blast the bedrock in the first place caused one public works employee to state,
“if you were a private developer, you wouldn’t have picked this site for housing” (Interview,
2008).
The project also faced initial challenges regarding housing sales. As early as when the
OSP director first drafted home designs, the housing manager played the role of real estate agent,
setting up a home design show for prospective buyers and advertising the homes in local real
estate publications. As interest grew and sales responsibilities ballooned, the mayor assigned his
marketing director to assist. However, the responsibilities were still too much for the limited
capacities of the city and the marketing director successfully argued for funding from the
mayor’s office to contract a real estate consultant to take over real estate duties full time.
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Ultimately, the development included twenty market-rate houses and four subsidized
homes that sold at prices agreeable to the builder but not sufficient to cover costs to the city.
Market-rate homebuyers received a tax rebate under a state program where full property tax rates
were gradually phased in over ten years and the city itself underwrote second mortgages for
homebuyers. While deemed a success by the mayor’s office, the OSP, and the neighborhood, the
city newspaper and multiple local blogs questioned the overall expenditure of city money
towards construction given the reality of declining property tax values19.
BP2: Construction and Sales Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public
Management. The construction and sales phases of BP2 were marked by a big push initially by
the OSP director and then by his project manager to engage both city and community partners to
complete the project. In order to do so the housing manager to work closely with the private
firms contracted to manage construction and sales processes especially after the OSP director
left. Centrality data confirm the central positions each of these actors played at this point in the
project (Table 7-7).
Table 7-7: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values
1

2

Construction

Comm Dev Mngr

OSP director

Sales

Comm Dev Mngr

City Mrkting Director

3
Private Engineering
Consultant
Private Real Estate
Consultant

The city implemented a range of policy tools securing during construction planning in
their push to complete construction processes and sell the homes, particularly those enabling
direct city action. Where city capacities fell short, agreements were developed for others to take
19

Schulman, Susan. "Housing upgrades — at any cost." The Buffalo Daily News, August 21,
2010. http://www.buffalonews.com/city/special-reports/article37726.ece.
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direct action (Table 7-8). During construction, city council approved bond money for
constructing the streetscape and second mortgages for homebuyers while the OSP director
incentivized sales through an existing city grant program providing home buying dollars for
certain service-sector professionals moving into the neighborhood. Then, the OSP director
established contracts with the community lender to obtain their lending tools and the project
manager contracted with a real estate professional to simplify the workload for the project
manager. The sales phase entailed implementing these lending tools and, when the work became
too much for the housing manager, forming a contract with a real estate consultant to take over
sales tasks.
Table 7-8: Policy Tool Types by Phase
Phase
Construction
Sales

Leg/Reg
4
2

Agreement
3
1

Econ/Fisc
3
4

Information TOTAL
0
10
0
7

The departure of the OSP director in the middle of these phases incurred a shift in public
management responsibilities for city actors. At the tail end of this tenure, much of the public
management behavior on behalf of the OSP director involved using his political power to compel
and coerce project partners both inside and outside city hall, to implement construction
regardless of cost while the project manager coordinated the resulting agreements. After the
OSP director departed, the housing manager had to find ways to fill the vacuum left by this
project champion and did so by securing support from the mayor’s marketing director. Together,
they completed the project by contracting out sales responsibilities and continuing to motivate
partners by appealing to their desire to help the neighborhood and an interest in maintaining
positive relationships with the city.
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Explaining Project Outcomes. BP1 and BP2 exhibited two tiers of project outcomes
with the results of BP1 rating lower than those of BP2 (Table 7-9). The primary critical factor
causing low success in BP1 was a lack of project network cohesion that led to
miscommunication of environmental information to redevelopment actors. As a result,
construction occurred before remediation, causing project leaders to cease activities and
ultimately tear down already built houses. BP2, on the other hand, experienced full remediation
and successful sales of New Urbanist-style homes. The ability of the OSP director to identify
and access a range of policy tools relevant to project implementation and to champion the project
with his political power to secure partner commitment proved to be the primary factor leading to
these outcomes. However, even best efforts at coordinating project networks by the city project
manager towards successful outcomes encountered challenges incurred by low management
capacities.
Table 7-9: BP Project Success – Phases One and Two
Outcome Measures
Time to completion
(TIME)
Cleanup costs (COST)
Implementation processes
(PROCESS)
Contamination abatement
(CLEAN)
Area-wide impact
(IMPACT)

BP1 Outcomes
2002-2003
(incomplete)

BP2 Outcomes
2006-2009

$1.2 million
Low satisfaction levels Community partners expressed
across multiple project overextension of commitments
actors
No abatement occurred Complete abatement occurred
No immediate impact

Average house sale $203,000 but
houses sold for less than
construction costs. No
information on proximate impacts
due to lack of real market.
Increase in neighborhood pride.

One impact of these low capacities stemmed from not enough staff inside the city to
cover project management responsibilities. As the city struggled with an entrenched fiscal crisis
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spanning decades, city personnel dwindled causing those remaining to wear multiple hats even
when those hats were outside of their personal professional trainings. For example:
Prior to the housing division I was in the design and construction division as supervisor
of construction, and prior to that position I was still in the same division of design and
construction as a project manager; and now, as of November of last year, I was promoted
to BURA Architect under the Department of Public Works and Streets. – City Project
Manager, 2009
This practice of shuffling staff between offices hampered the abilities for city actors to
coordinate their own resources around project tasks, therefore impacting their abilities to engage
in network management in the broader project context. This shuffling and reorganization also
occurred at the organizational level. The same manager described,
Because OSP is the Office of Strategic Planning . . . and although I'm still with BURA,
I'm now working under the Department of Public Works. Departments change, BURA
stays the consistent agency, and then the divisions may change. – City Housing Manager,
2009
Evidence for this organizational reshuffling exists within the city’s annual financial
report to the state fiscal authority oversight board. Between BP1 and BP2, offices relevant to
housing redevelopment shifted from the mayor’s executive department to the economic
development department. Yet, zoning and environmental affairs remained within the strategic
planning office. One state office official involved with the project confirmed the impacts created
by these changes in organizational design. “I think some of the frustrating things about working
with the city of Buffalo is that there are so many different authorities and agencies that you never
have one-stop shopping.” (Interview, 2009). As a result, multiple phases required that non-city
actors play a central role in project processes.
Notably absent from BP1 and BP2 project networks were citizens and neighbors.
Interview data and site visits revealed low levels of organized neighborhood activity centered on
this project, primarily due to the large number of additional vacant properties in the area and the
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general acceptance by all that the project would bring positive benefits when completed. As a
result, the entire project experienced minimal bottom-up, neighborhood-based political influence.
Evidence also exists indicating a historical lack of support for environmental processes
within city development projects. This culture derived from the anticipation that discovery of
environmental concerns meant additional cost expenditures and delay in project processes. The
senior environmental manager for the city described the culture in saying “I'll be the first to
admit that there have been times in my career because I have feared for my job because I've been
the messenger of bad news.” (Interview, 2009)
The challenges posed by these organizational capacities exacerbated the public
management missteps of BP1. Network data for BP1 indicate that environmental actors
remained largely in the environmental phases and community development actors remained
largely in the design and construction phases, creating a critical information vacuum between
actors. These findings illustrate the importance of maintaining whole-network ties that link
actors from divergent expert orientations and provide clear evidence that structural gaps in the
project network, particularly between environmental and community development actors, lead to
communication breakdowns and poor public management decision making, regardless of the
policy tools selected and implemented in the project.
The reversal of success with BP2 experienced by the city indicates that these gaps may be
overcome through assertive behaviors on behalf of a project champion possessing sufficient
political authority to compel partner commitments with the assistance of carefully selected policy
tools. Essentially, the OSP director who arrived at the city towards the end of BP1 served as a
project champion, using his authority to direct to action city departments whose resources he
needed and leveraging his position as a BURA board member and confidant of the mayor to
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direct community partners to engage in what he framed as a development opportunity crucial for
that part of the city. The ongoing fallout in the news media and the blogging world of the
brownfield-turned-housing project prior to BP1 that ended in litigation produced strong
incentives for mayor and, subsequently, the OSP director create a winnig project. He therefore
pressured the public works department and the private engineering consultant to build the
subdivision as quickly as possible. A member of the project management team remembers the
new mayor’s interest in erasing BP1 and creating a success story.
Not to bring politics into it but when we were campaigning, we were going to an event
and the mayor said we've gotta get this going because there were these sad little Tyvek
houses . . . three houses that were sitting there he goes ‘we gotta get (BP2) going.’ – City
Marketing Manager, 2009
Having support from the mayor’s office and BURA as well as the backing of city council
enhanced the OSP director’s ability to champion project processes to city staff and push them
along more forcibly than they might have otherwise.
After the OSP director left the city, follow-up implementation by his housing manager
relied upon increased density of project network ties and the abilities of the housing project
manager to maintain these ties by appealing to partners’ senses of obligation and commitment
articulated in the formal agreements binding them to the project. Ultimately, both city and noncity network actors committed time and resources above and beyond what they normally would
have. For example, the community lender brought in to fill financing gaps during construction
processes spent more time on this project than on any other previous city-led project. In
addition, the consulting engineer spanning BP1 and BP2 provided some services pro bono. The
role these particular actors played caused the community lender state “I think the uniqueness of
(BP2) was the expertise on the outside and the lack of expertise on the inside” (Interview, 2009).
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Between the political authority and persuasive management efforts of the OSP director,
the resulting formal agreements with a range of internal and external actors, the availability of
key policy tools funding remediation, and the persistent coordination activity of the project
manager, BP2 achieved successes where BP1 had failed.
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CHAPTER EIGHT NETWORKS, POLICY TOOLS, AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN
BROWNFIELD PROJECT SUCCESS
Introduction. The previous three chapters identify the critical factors that shaped
outcomes for the individual cases explored in this study. Evidence exists in each story that the
paths to brownfield project outcomes entail multiple combinations of network structures, policy
tools, and public management strategies contingent upon the broader political, economic, social
and environmental contexts in which the project exists. However, examining the cases as
individual stories alone does not fully address the research questions presented at the onset of
this study, particularly regarding the extent to which network characteristics and specific public
management behaviors within these networks, particularly those involving the selection and use
of policy tools link to positive project outcomes. This chapter strives to answer these questions
by presenting a cross-case analysis comparing network, policy tool, and public management
patterns as they link to the varying project outcomes that were fundamental to case selection.
In general, this analysis validates several aspects of the propositions. First, changes in
network characteristics and policy tool use over the course of each project linked closely, as
expected, to changes in task and expert information orientation albeit in slightly different ways.
Second, evidence exists supporting the proposition that overall network centrality and stability
correlate with project success. However, the relationship between public managers operating
towards the center of project networks, the policy tools activated to steer project actor behaviors,
and the selection of public management strategies did not conform to expectations. Political
power and its presence in the public management network emerged as the key factor influencing
how these project components interacted to influence outcomes. In addition, findings show that,
while capacity for network management at the city level shapes management strategies, neither
sufficient capacity nor a lack of it predicts the ability to achieve success.
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This chapter begins by examining patterns of network characteristics at both the full
project and within-phase levels. The next section presents patterns of policy tools aggregated
across all projects to identify correlations between tool use and the task orientation of project
phases. Integrating the findings from these two analyses sets up the final section that describes
patterns regarding the impact of public management behaviors by network-centric actors on the
various project outcomes.
Network Structures and Project Outcomes. Network data for each entire project
exhibit differences between successful and unsuccessful projects in measures of overall network
centralities, the most central actors, and total actor numbers (Table 8-1).
Table 8-1: Total Network Statistics, By Case
Network Statistics
Primary Freeman
Actors
Centrality
RPA (High) 56

0.599

Most Central Actors
Density
0.109

BP2 (High)

40

0.530

0.145

RPB (Low)

27

0.493

0.179

BP1 (Low)

27

0.443

0.128

First
Second
City Senior
Environmental
Manager
Citizen Leader
City OSP
Director
City Senior
Environmental
Manager
Environmental
Consultant

City Housing
Manager
City
Environmental
Manager
City OSP
Deputy Director

Third
City Housing
Manager
City
Environmental
Manager
Environmental
Consultant
Community
Lender

These findings affirm previous research that found higher overall network centralities and
relatively low project densities correlated to more positive network performances (Provan and
Milward 1995; Provan, Huang, and Milward 2009).20 In the RPA case, the high network

20

Recognizing the possibility for endogeneity between the number of phases completed for a
project and centrality scores due to greater opportunity for relationships to form, network
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centrality enabled the efficient communication between political actors, citizens, private partners,
environmental regulators, and community development managers that characterized the public
management context of that project. Interview data indicate that the number of direct ties
between the senior environmental manager and all other individuals in the project network
greatly enhanced information exchange and expediting project processes. As stated by the city
council president, “(The senior environmental manager) was terrific. He would always keep
people up to date on what was happening” (Interview, 2008). The high overall centrality of the
BP2 project network also enabled communication facilitation by the OSP Director and then,
when he left his position, the city housing office project manager. In this case, however, the ties
were less about information exchange and reciprocity as much as it was about directing project
partners internal to the city, framing the project as a “win” for the community to non-city project
partners, and negotiating with financial gatekeepers for resource allocations addressing last
minute resource needs.
Data about the relationship between the number of primary actors involved with project
networks and degrees of project success appears to indicate a pattern, but a closer look warns
against drawing immediate conclusions. The low number of actors for RPB and BP1 primarily
reflect that these projects did not achieve full phase implementation, thus limiting the total

statistics for RPA were calculated up through the remediation phase to compare with the number
of phases completed for RPB. The Freeman Centrality Score and density increased to 0.696 and
0.131 respectively, suggesting that the construction and sales phases actually incurred less
centralized behaviors across the entire project, likely due to the centralized coordination required
by construction activity and the resulting decrease in cohesion of the whole project network
when total relationships between all actors were included. The top two most central actors
remained the same, but the third highest centrality belonged to the environmental consultant.
Because these differences went in the opposite direction than expected, the measures in Table 1
were left as is, reflecting the total number of actors engaged in each project at any point in time
and their resulting relationships.
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number of individuals engaged in project processes. However, RPA, the most successful project
of the group, included more numbers of primary actors21 than the other high success project,
BP2. This largely stemmed from the greater involvement of citizens and higher numbers of
building contractors engaged through RPA’s unique redevelopment plan that included multiple
builders rather than a single firm. Despite research indicating that greater numbers of network
members impose an additional transaction cost for network managers in disseminating
information and coordinating actions (Provan and Milward 1991, 1995), the larger numbers in
RPA did not appear to curtail project successes. Exploration of the impact of network size should
be addressed in future brownfield research.
Examining centrality data across phases provides a different picture regarding the
relationship between network stability and project outcomes. While project centrality measures
at the whole project level for RPA are greater than BP2 and RPB (Table 8-1), measurements by
phase reflect the opposite (Table 8-2). However, these data speak more to the role of network
stability in facilitating project outcomes than to the role of network centrality. For example,
interview data suggest that the higher centralities for each individual phase in BP2 and RPB
resulted from the need for highly centric actors to transmit information directly to members new
to the project. In BP2, the OSP Director practiced highly directive behaviors by working directly
with project actors to compel their cooperation. His housing manager described the process of
bringing in new partners:
It was aggressive. It was aggressive, but we moved forward and we got to this point
where we are today. It was aggressive, and that was another maybe obstacle that we had
to get folks to buy in, is they didn't want to do this by when? At first, there was

21

Primary actors do not include individuals or organizations subcontracted by first-level
contracting agencies.
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resistance, but they were all at the table and we were trying to tell them, we've gotta get
this done. – Buffalo Housing Manager, 2009
Table 8-2: Freeman Centrality Measures by Project Across Each Phase
BP2
RPB
BP122
Assembly
N/A
0.533 1.766
insufficient
EconAssess23 0.683 information 0.000 insufficient information
EnvAssess
0.675 0.964
0.803 6.251
CleanPlan
0.696 0.714
0.894 1.008*
ConstPlan
0.662 0.866
0.580 1.817
Design
0.645 0.807
0.615 1.124*
Cleanup
0.585 0.934
0.861 0.639
Const
0.587 0.742
N/A
0.790
Sales
0.854 0.670
N/A
N/A
* Networks characterized by low actor numbers and high degrees of centrality.
Bold font indicates phases in which more than one distinct network occurred.
N/A refers to project phases not reached or achieved during a prior project.
RPA
0.708

Further complicating network stability effects, both BP2 and RPB experienced turnover in
terms of who operated from highly central project positions (Table 8-3). In RPB, project
managers formerly central to project processes left the entire project part way through due to a
new mayoral administration and resulting staff retirements. This complicated the ability of the
environmental managers handling the environmental complexities of the property to adequately
support the economic development manager operating at the center of the network during
redevelopment phases. The senior environmental manager described these effects:

22

BP1 exhibited the lowest overall centrality and the most disparate centralities across phases of
the cases due to the structurally separate sub-networks that formed during project processes. As a
result, it is difficult to compare BP1 network statistics to the other projects.
23

Across cases, including RPA, project participants did not express and document data did not
indicate direct discussion of the economic implications of the intended project. These
discussions, as in the case of RPB and the Buffalo projects had occurred prior to property
assembly activities. Economic assessment in RPA occurred “after the fact” due to the need for
city political leaders to respond to increasing citizen activism.
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The administration changed . . . and the director of real estate and the director of technical
services which is sort of a combination of getting things demolished and organizing sites,
um, both of those people changed and the Departments of Economic Development and
Community Development, the commissioners changed . . . So there might have been some
continuity issues there. – Rochester Senior Environmental Manager, 2009
Table 8-3: Number of Phases Individual Actors Occupied Network-Centric Positions
RPA (9 total phases)
# Phases
in Top 3
Senior Environmental
9
Manager

BP2 (7 total phases)
RPB (7 total phases)
Actor
# Phases Actor
# Phases
in Top 3
in Top 3
Environmental
4
Senior
5
Manager
Environmental
Manager
Citizen Leader
7
Community
4
Environmental
5
Development
Manager
Manager
City Council
7
OSP Director
4
Engineering
3
President
Consultant
Community
2
Senior State
3
Community
2
Development
Environmental
Development
Manager
Manager
Manager 1
Engineering
2
Six different
1
Five different actors
1
Consultant
actors
* BP1 exhibits multiple sub-networks for the phases completed, preventing generation of wholenetwork centrality data for each phase. Therefore, BP1 does not appear in this table.
Actor

An additional pattern that emerged in both the interview and network data, particularly
for RPA, was that strong network relationships across all project phases mattered not only
between the city and non-city actors, but also between actors within the city itself (Table 8-4).
Hearkening back to the community development manager involved with RPA and the start of
RPB who described the projects as “two octopuses making love”, these observations strongly
support the idea that cities must have their “ducks in a row” internally in order to effectively
form resource exchange relationships with external partners (Agranoff and McGuire 2001,
2003). The data in Table 8-4, however, indicates that high centrality within city actors alone is
not sufficient for successful project outcomes, as indicated by the lower centrality for BP2 than
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for RPB. The following section on public management strategies within these networks
addresses this discrepancy.
Table 8-4: City-Only Network Statistics
Actors

Freeman Centrality

Density

Most Central Actor
Senior Environmental
RPA
20
0.713
0.226
Manager
Environmental
RPB
17
0.513
0.235
Manager
OSP
Director
BP2
17
0.471
0.265
N/A
N/A
BP1
7
N/A*
* Network data for BP1 indicates separate sub-networks for city actors.
Finally, examining network characteristics across project phases provides support for the
proposition that the task-orientation of a project phase influences general network membership
within a specific phase. Environmental experts dominated environmental assessment,
remediation planning, and remediation phases and community and economic development actors
were more prevalent in economic assessment, construction planning, construction, and sales
phases (Figure 8-3). These patterns amplify the public management finding that communicating
cross-disciplinary information between phases, particularly when key network actors leave the
project, is important. In BP1, complete separation between these phase-specific actors incurred
project failure. In RPB, the departure of the community development managers and their
comprehensive knowledge of the environmental characteristics of the property hampered
subsequent efforts on behalf of the city.
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Figure 8-1
Actor Expertise by Phase - Aggregated Across All Projects
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Policy Tools and Project Outcomes. Across the cases, patterns of policy tool use also
changed over project phases, but not in the anticipated manner. Propositions stated that planning
phases would emphasize information, legislative, and regulatory tools while implementation
phases would feature use of agreement-based, economic, and fiscal tools. However, the data
from this study show that the projects did not incorporate as many information tools as
anticipated and that legislative, regulatory, economic and fiscal tool use spanned planning and
implementation phases, particularly if the task-orientation focused on property assembly and
redevelopment. Figure 8-2 presents an aggregation of tool types across all projects for each
project phase24.

24

Each case exhibited similar proportions of tools used for each phase, making it feasible to sum
total tools used across all projects. It is also important to remember that the numbers for
legislative tools include direct actions taken by city decision makers to accomplish tasks for
property acquisition processes.
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Figure 8-2
Policy Tool Use by Phase - Aggregated Across All Phases
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One explanation for these findings is that it is during implementation phases that public
managers had the greatest need for asserting authority over non-governmental partners in order
to achieve desired outcomes (Bressers and O’Toole 2005; Bressers and O'Toole Jr. 1998). In
addition, resource needs increased in implementation phases and the number of total actors
required to complete implementation tasks rose. This is congruent with previous work indicating
that resource dependencies facilitate tool usage (Howlett 2005). For example, the RPA and BP2,
agreements between the home builders, the cities, mortgage lenders, and future homeowners
required multiple layers of tools to ensure that new home and site preparation construction
complied with preexisting codes and rules and addressed potential liabilities of lenders and
buyers alike.
A closer examination of tool data reveals that, while most policy tools enabled the city to
shape relationships with project partners, some policy tools put cities in the role of the policy
target as well. Regulatory tools imposed by county, state, and federal actors that shaped city
behaviors accompanied some of the tools selected by project leaders. Prominent amongst these
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tools were paperwork requirements, permits, and environmental regulations regarding pollution
levels allowed for residential end use on the properties.
While the ratios of tool types used varied across individual projects, some similarities
existed for projects within the same management contexts (Figure 8-3). For example, the
Rochester projects emphasized legislative/regulatory tools and direct action over other tool types
but the Buffalo projects emphasized economic/fiscal tools. These patterns across projects within
the same management context likely resulted from decision makers selecting tool types with
which they have familiarity through previous experience (Peters 2002). However, closer
examination indicates that, while projects within the same city showed similar uses of tool types,
specific tool use varied to a greater extent based upon specific project characteristics. For
example, RPA project leaders selected the NYSDEC ERP tool package to reimburse what they
anticipated to be significant remediation costs while RPB project leaders selected the NYSDEC
Petroleum Spills Program to enable a quick turn around for remediation to take advantage of
property momentum.
Figure 8-3
Policy Tool Use by Tool Categories
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It is important to consider two data characteristics when interpreting these findings. First,
it is likely that these data underestimate the prevalence of agreement-based tools (contracts),
particularly within remediation, construction, and sales phases. However, many of these
contracts were used to delineate relationships between the private consultants retained by each
city to oversee implementation phases and the sub-contractors these consultants secured.
Research data excluded these sub-contractors because the relationships were not considered
central to core project planning and implementation processes. A second consideration is the
manner by which the influence of a tool on decision-making was measured in a particular phase.
For example, in BP2 and RPA, the anticipation of remediation funding through the ERP shaped
property assembly and remediation planning phases even though the process of utilizing that
funding did not occur until the remediation phases. Therefore, the funding mechanism of the
ERP was counted as being part of each of these phases.
Data across each project support existing policy tool theories that link the extent to which
policy tools become used in networked situations to the desired outcomes attached to specific
tasks (Blair 2002; Bressers and O’Toole 2005; Salamon 2002; Peters 2002). However, the types
of tools used conformed more to presumed managerial preferences and network partner interests.
Public Management Behaviors and Project Outcomes. Capturing public management
behaviors proved to be more difficult than measuring network structures and policy tool use due
to the retrospective nature of the data collected for this study. However, analysis of the available
data reveals management patterns across projects and project phases that tie network structures
and policy tool use to a fourth factor; that of political power and influence. Together, these
factors help contextualize the extent to which management influenced project outcomes.
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Recalling the typology of network management strategies summarized in Chapter 3
(Table 8-5), interview data reveal different public management strategies implemented by key
public managers across each project (Table 8-6).
Table 8-5: Network Management Strategies
Strategy Type

Behaviors
Negotiation

Relationship
Trust development
Persuasion
Coercion
Accommodation
Institutional

Arranging

Framing

Measure
Making offers and counteroffers in search
of mutually agreeable allocation
Risk sharing
Social interaction outside of partnership
Offering incentives to encourage
participation
Leveraging authority to direct behavior
Requesting or granting regulatory relief
Seek/provide third party to mediate
differences
Seek financial resources
Establish contract
Seek/provide information regarding
brownfield property characteristics
Seek/provide information and technical
assistance

(adapted from Agranoff and McGuire 2003)
Several key differences between projects emerge from these findings. First, RPA and
RPB reflect relatively higher emphasis on trust development behaviors than the Buffalo projects.
This is in congruence with expectations regarding differences between high and low capacity
management environments but is also attributable to the individual management styles of the
senior environmental manager who operated at the center of both project networks. Second, each
project, with the exception of BP1, presented wide use of institutional management behaviors
utilizing policy tools. However, data indicate that both the economic development manager in
RPA and the OSP director in BP2 used policy tool strategies towards the end of project processes
as a means to appeal to values of reciprocity on behalf of project partners. By providing a flurry
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of incentives, these managers hoped that project partners would recognize city efforts to meet
their needs and would agree to sacrifice some needs in order to achieve project outcomes.
Table 8-6: Emphasis of Network-Centric Public Management Strategies by Project
Strategy
Type
Relationship

Institutional

Behaviors

RPA

RPB

BP1*

BP2

Negotiation
Trust
development
Persuasion
Coercion
Accommodation

Medium

High

High/Low

High

High

Medium

Low/Low

Low

Medium
Low
Medium

High
Low
High

Medium/Low High
Low/Low
High
Low/Low
Low

High

High

High/High

High

High

Low/Medium High

Arranging
Framing

High

* Findings for BP1 represent data for the housing manager/environmental manager due to the
two-subnetwork nature of BP1 processes.
The story of the environmental manager in RPA supports theory asserting that public
managers operating at the center of project networks obtain significant network influence from
their position (Tsai 2001; Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007; Balogun et al. 2005; Honig 2006).
However, evidence in this study indicates that political forces also shape public management
strategies and their impacts and that, because of this influence, key decisions directly impacting
project outcomes can occur away from actors operating at network centers as well. In these
situations, power to influence network processes becomes decoupled from network position and
highly central managers operate largely as coordinators than initiators.
For example, the OSP director combined his authority as a BURA board member and
confidant of the mayor with his role as a senior public manager to coerce city and non-city
project partners into compliance with his project implementation vision. Evidence from
interviews cited above reveal the extent to which this leveraging of political power compelled
redevelopment to occur. On the other hand, the community development managers in RPB who
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initiated and championed project processes lacked this political legitimacy and were unable to
overcome increasing project uncertainties with political power. Even the environmental manager
in RPA who enjoyed a highly central coordinating position benefitted from political power
through his strong positive relationship with BANG and, subsequently, his strong support from
both the mayor’s office and the city council president. This legitimacy enhanced his and his
community development counterpart’s abilities to collaborate with the homebuilders association.
The influence of political power outside the power of network position in these projects
also became known when project processes required intense negotiations regarding property
acquisition and project financing. Across each project, these negotiations occurred in dyads
consisting of community or economic actors acting on behalf of city council and individual
property owners, lenders or developers. It is evident in each case that the agreements achieved
through these negotiations are necessary for successful project outcomes but do not necessarily
occur at the broader network level. To some extent, the effort to meet the interests of neighbors,
the city, and homebuilders in RPA is an exception to this finding, but even in this case, key
decisions entailed mutual decisions made between the environmental manager and citizens or the
mayor’s office and home builders.
These management findings provide partial confirmation of the propositions presented in
this study. The review of public management research suggested that public managers operating
towards the center of successful brownfield project networks, particularly those embedded in
local governments with higher management capacities, would emphasize policy tool use, or
institutional management strategies, in managing project partners and would only emphasizing
relationship management strategies when project uncertainties increased. While both strategies
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influenced outcomes in different ways, the influence of political power on management efficacy
shaped the extent to which these strategies ultimately impacted project outcomes.
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CHAPTER NINE

SUMMARY, SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS

It's probably been one of the nicest success stories I have been involved in. You know I stand at
that kitchen window and I can look out and see six nice houses . . . I have a friend that bought a
house and lives there and she is very happy being there. She lived out in the suburbs and moved
into the city . . . and she said that she couldn't have asked for a better neighborhood to be
involved in and when I hear that I think ‘Ok. That's it. Did good. We did good.’ – BANG
Leader, Rochester, NY, 2008
Introduction. Using theories of institutional management of public sector networks, this
study examined how project network structures, policy tools, and public management behaviors
interacted to produce remediation and redevelopment outcomes in a set of carefully selected
brownfield projects. With intent to inform both public management theory as well as brownfield
project practice, two questions were asked. First, in what ways do brownfield projects function
as public management networks? And, second, to what extent do network management
behaviors by city-level public managers impact project outcomes?
This chapter summarizes the theoretical contributions and practical lessons derived from
my findings. The first section describes the significance of these findings to public management
theory, particularly as scholars in this area continue attempts to account for increasingly complex
public management processes and environments. The second section highlights findings specific
to the research on brownfield projects themselves. The third section then discusses the manner
by which these theoretical contributions translate into practical lessons for policy makers, public
managers, and public administration educators focusing on addressing brownfield and related
policy problems. Finally, the chapter concludes with a proposal for future research directions.
Then, in a twist on the traditional dissertation format, a tenth chapter follows that presents a
tangible way in which these theoretical and practical lessons may be translated into the public
administration classroom.
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Contributions to Public Management Theory. The research propositions specific to
public management predicted that highly central public managers would effectively utilize policy
tools to shape network rules in achieving project goals, particularly when overall management
capacities were high (Howlett 2005; Matland 1995) and that relationship management strategies
would likely serve to augment these institutional management strategies as project uncertainties
increased (Klijn and Teisman 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).
My findings revealed that effective public management in the two successful projects
occurred when high levels of political legitimacy accompanied management efforts, either
through these central managers themselves as in the case of the strong relationship with citizens
and city council enjoyed by the environmental manager in RPA or through the actions of
political champions separate from the public manager such as the OSP director in BP2. This
political power in both of these cases enhanced the ability of the public managers working a the
center of project networks to more effectively coordinate information diffusion processes by
increasing the priority of this information for network partners. In each case, the potential
consequences of network partners not doing so included exclusion from the project or
diminished relationships with key political stakeholders. For example, in RPA, the city council
president realized the importance of maintaining positive relations with BANG and the citizens
BANG represented and made sure that the environmental manager had access to all the
information required to do so. This included access to public works information, to
environmental engineering information, and to the homebuilders themselves. In BP2, the OSP
director specifically championed the project to a range of network actors by using his political
influence to alter internal budgets to force cooperation of other agencies with the project
manager and to coerce non-city partners to comply by threatening their standing in the eyes of
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the mayor office for future projects. In RPB, the negative case compared to these two positive
cases, the community development managers largely drove the project and, although they
received approval from city council to do so, the city council president herself observed that one
reason for project failure was the lack of assertive political support on behalf of the mayor, city
council, or any visible citizens group. The effects of this were seen towards the end of RPB
project processes when last minute city efforts to retain commitment of the developer failed. It is
possible that a concerted political push to keep the developer engaged may have increased
chances for success.
Accounting for the influence of political power in enabling the efforts of highly central
public managers to success, integrating findings about project network structures, policy tool
use, and network management behaviors across the case studies revealed key differences in how
policy tools were used in public management practice by highly central public managers
(identified in Table 9-1) as they related to project outcomes.
Table 9-1: Highly Central City-Level Public Managers by Project
RPA
Senior Environmental Manager
Community Development
Manager

BP2
OSP Director
Housing Project
Manager
Environmental Manager

RPB
Environmental Manager
Economic Development Manager
Community Development
Managers

First, policy tool selection by these managers and the resulting institutional management
impacts mattered. Tool selection impacted actor behaviors both directly and indirectly with the
anticipation of policy tools being implemented incurring ripple effects, both positive and
negative, experienced further downstream in project processes. In RPA, an important critical
decision shaping project outcomes was the environmental manager’s selection of the state ERP
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policy tool package as the means by which the property would become remediated. The
anticipation of the fiscal and regulatory tools captured in the ERP enabled the central public
managers to leverage early commitment by key project partners that spanned both the
remediation and redevelopment expert domains. The probability that remediation funding would
occur and liability releases obtained convinced city council to allocate up front costs and the
homebuilders association to commence discussions about participating.
This decision to obtain ERP funding for RPA also reinforced the network-centric position
that the senior environmental manager maintained throughout the entire project. With NYSDEC
and county health regulations requiring that he act as the go between for the city, state, county,
and private consultant, and city council compelling him to link directly with the neighbors, this
manager accumulated the project knowledge and relationship ties the community development
manager subsequently needed to pursue the redevelopment portion of the project. Conversely,
influences of policy tools early in project processes may also have negative impacts on project
outcomes. The selection of the Petroleum Spills program in RPB as the regulatory tool
addressing remediation ultimately led to a less than satisfactory situation for potential developers
regarding liability and design restrictions. In addition, the short turn-around of NYSDEC
approvals that accompanied the Spills Program did not allow sufficient time for city officials to
fully comprehend the environmental situation and prepare for the impacts that would have on
developer interests. This policy tool package failed to effectively bridge the gap between
remediation and redevelopment.
However, my findings indicated that, while policy tools are necessary for public
managers to secure resources and address network partner concerns, they are not, by themselves,
sufficient for creating positive brownfield project outcomes. This is clearly evident in the RPB
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case where the developer, the city economic development manager, and the union pension fund
directors engaged in intense negotiations to identify and innovate a number of city-level liability,
insurance, and financial tools to bridge differences. Despite these efforts, the policy tools could
not address the growing project uncertainties and the redevelopment fell through.
The insufficiency of policy tool strategies to achieve project goals suggests that public
managers generally face uncertain prospects for achieving brownfield outcomes but the data in
my cases also revealed the extent to which relationship management strategies can catalyze the
effectiveness of policy tool approaches. For example, the public management team in RPA
achieved outcomes by integrating relationship management strategies into the use of policy tools,
leading to a graduate decrease in tools required at the tail end of project processes. The trust
developed between BANG and the city and, subsequently, the city and the homebuilders,
heightened stakeholder satisfaction with project processes and enabled collaborative decision
making about multiple aspects of the project including end use designation, end use design,
policy tool selection for funding construction processes, and the marketing and sales of the
newly constructed homes. While two important factors assisting the development of this trust
were the preexisting relationships between the development community and the mayor’s office
as well as amongst the public managers from the environmental and community development
agencies within the city, multiple new relationships occurred unique to this project that further
enhanced the ability of the core public managers to access the information needed to drive
processes forward. Even the consulting engineers hired by the environmental manager
contributed to positive relationship building through their constant presence at BANG meetings
and their ability to communicate technical information regarding remediation and engineering to
non-expert audiences.
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While RPA showed that trust between network actors positively impacts policy tools
selection, RPB contained evidence that policy tool selection can be used to generate trust, even if
the overall strategy fails to deliver the desired project outcomes. In this case, the economic
development manager operating at the center of the network during the Construction Planning
phase worked through the city legal counsel’s office to innovate a large number of policy tools in
a short amount of time in an attempt to address an increasing number of lender and developer
concerns. While the strategy ultimately failed, the show of effort and reciprocity on behalf of the
city improved the developer’s perception of the city’s public management integrity, subsequently
increasing his trust in their abilities.
Yet, my findings show that relationship management does not need to be the primary
emphasis of public management behaviors, as indicated in BP2. The success of a more assertive
use of policy tools in BP2 by the OSP director to compel redevelopment amidst financial and
market uncertainties only succeeded when accompanied by his ability to use political power to to
push project partners into allocating resources and participating in redevelopment processes.
While he did successfully frame the project as a must-win situation for the surrounding
neighborhood to appeal to a sense of common good, he still needed to coerce specific actors into
compliance with his goals.
Based upon these findings, it is very important that public management scholars
examining networked governance of complex policy problems not advocate for policy tool or
public management-only explanations for policy outcomes but that they support an integration of
the two approaches. In addition, these researchers must incorporate political influence into their
network mapping techniques in order to discern the extent to which institutional and relationship
management strategies influence network performance and project outcomes. Understanding the
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ways in which this influence can be both integrated into and decoupled from public management
activity will enhance the explanatory power of models of public management as they relate to
networked governance. It is important to keep in mind that the generalizability of this
contribution must be couched in the fact that my findings derived from data from a limited set of
cases based in only two cities. However, future study not paying closer attention to the
relationship of politics and management at the local level will miss an important potential part of
the management puzzle.
Contributions to Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Theory. My findings
also provide theoretical contributions to scholars embedded in the study of brownfield projects
and processes, particularly regarding the extent to which brownfield projects consist of a
dynamic set of networked relationships that evolve over time. This brownfield project model
runs counter to prevailing notions these processes occur primarily through dyadic relationships
between cities and developers commonly known as “public-private partnerships”. While degree
of engagement of private lenders, investors and developers is necessary for the types of projects I
examined, each case provided clear evidence that relationships in these projects actually occur
between city environmental, community development, public works, and economic development
officials, federal and state environmental and health regulators, mayors, city council members,
governors, citizens, consultants, subcontractors, lenders, developers, and future redevelopment
users – all of whom play a role in shaping project processes and outcomes.
Looking at these projects through a network lens across sequential project phases
highlighted the usefulness of social network analysis techniques for measuring degrees of
embeddedness of different brownfield project actors and their influence on project outcomes.
Identifying who was most consistently active at the center of project processes across phases
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provided information about the locus of project knowledge and the nature of project decisionmaking. It also allowed for analysis of other influences on policy use and project outcomes such
as political pressures, resource exchanges, information sharing, and the entry and exit of project
actors to and from the project network.
In addition, social network analysis showed the extent to which positive, productive
relationships between project actors internal to the city mattered for when the city engaged in
negotiations with external actors – the Rochester community development manager’s “two
octopuses.” For example, the ability of city managers across departments during RPA to
coordinate their actions internally led to positive perceptions of city performance from both
citizens and home builders, increasing the willingness of these actors to collaborate with the city.
In contrast, the disjointedness of actors across city agencies in BP2 incurred by poor
communication structures and low citywide management capacities diminished lending and
development partner confidence in city abilities to follow through despite the fact that these
partners expressed support for individual efforts. This lowered confidence contributed to a
management environment where non-city actors were reluctant to participate, requiring that the
OSP director had to leverage his political authority to compel processes forward.
Examining brownfield project network structures over time also revealed the extent to
which project actor turnover impacted knowledge sharing across project phases. The absence of
consistent information diffusion from the center of the network across project phases diminished
the abilities to achieve remediation and redevelopment outcomes, particularly in projects
characterized by high degrees of environmental uncertainty such as BP1 and RPB. My findings
also suggest that brownfield scholars explore the role of private consulting firms and multidisciplinary public managers in enhancing project management efforts. The environmental
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manager in RPA showed a unique ability to retain his network-centric position across all project
phases regardless of the expert orientation of that phase, providing a high level of information
consistency and network stability. His ability appeared to be enhanced by efforts made by the
environmental consultant he retained to manage remediation and, subsequently, redevelopment
processes.
Brownfield researchers should follow the lead of this research and examine brownfield
projects through a social network lens. Doing so will reveal key phenomena that would
otherwise be missed, such as the role of city-level internal coordination, the range of stakeholder
influences on project outcomes, and the extent to which actors entering and exiting the project
impact management processes.
Lessons for Public Administrators and Policy Makers. Several lessons for
practitioners arise from these contributions to theory. First, public managers tasked with leading
networks comparable to those found in brownfield projects should be able to identify the
presence of political power in the network. This power may be found in diverse places such as
elected officials, citizens, and coalitions of actors who control key political resources. Then,
these public managers should find ways to tap into these power sources to provide greater
political legitimacy for their strategies and actions.
Second, efforts should be made by city leaders to preserve institutional memory of
network processes should turnover in central network actors occurs. Doing so is particularly
important for maintaining the internal and external relationships necessary to facilitate access to
key resources and policy tools. Maintaining this memory and momentum of relationships will
minimize the disruptions observed when highly central public managers exited the project
networks in BP2 and RPB.
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Third, policy makers at the state and federal levels should consider the importance of
sufficiently funded policy tool programs for enhancing local-level public management efforts.
Neither of the municipalities examined in this study would have initiated these projects if it
weren’t for some form of financial assistance, or at least promise of financial assistance, for the
environmental portions of the project. Accessing these policy tools, in turn, enabled the
municipalities in this study to leverage investment from private redevelopment partners. For
example, the developer in RPB mentioned several times in his interview that, if the city had not
completed the environmental assessment and remediation themselves, his firm would not have
been interested in the property. This sort of response is significant given the challenges
municipalities face in converting marginally marketable brownfield properties into something
more useful. In addition, the study revealed that the influence of policy tools extends beyond
their direct application to the task at hand. Depending on the opportunities and constraints they
create, the anticipation of policy tool selection and the ripple effect for downstream project
decisions can prove to be significant for project outcomes. Policy makers should consider both
of these ideas when creating future policy tools.
Finally, upper-level administrators in municipal governments that actively pursue
municipality-led brownfield projects should build the capacities of their project managers to be
equally adept with both the environmental and construction engineering portions of these
projects. My findings support this suggestion by revealing the extent to which network stability
and information consistency mattered, particularly regarding stakeholder satisfaction with project
processes. In RPA, project actors frequently commented on the efficiency and effectiveness of
information sharing by city actors while in BP2, where process satisfaction was low, non-city
actors lamented the absence of such well-informed, centralized public managers.
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Public administration educators may further enhance their pedagogical efforts by
considering the network management findings presented in this study. I encourage all faculty
members and skills trainers to explore the teaching case included in the next chapter of this
dissertation as one means by which to convey the complexity, and importance, of influencing
network actors with an integrated relationship and institutional management approach.
Implications for Future Research. While my research contributes to public
management theory regarding the integrated use of policy tool and relationship management
strategies in network situations, much work remains to be done and many questions remain. For
example, if the location of political power relative to the public managers occupying networkcentric positions matters when determining the efficacy of management efforts by these
managers, is it wise to continue to decouple political power from management practice in public
management research? In what ways should the political variable be incorporated into the
modeling efforts undertaken by network scholars seeking to generalize network management
findings to large population of cases? If changes in network structures and composition over
time shaped how outcomes occurred in brownfield projects, do they also shape outcomes in other
types of public management networks? Finally, if multi-disciplinary knowledge sharing matters
in the relatively short-term management environments of brownfield projects, what happens to
its important when the time horizon expands to the generation level as in the case of climate
action planning and sustainable community development?
Multiple avenues exist for addressing these questions. First, new cases should be added
to this research from across different policy, market and management contexts to assess the
transferability of findings. The more frequently the critical factors identified in these projects
apply in explaining outcomes, the greater the external validity. Second, the theoretical
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framework integrating policy tools, public management, and networks should be applied to
different network contexts such as those occurring in the more frequently studied social services
domain. Doing so will enable further exploration of how evolutionary processes impact
management efforts to achieve outcomes. Third, and of great interest to my own immediate
research agenda, researchers should examine the role of multi-disciplinary individuals in current
municipal efforts to develop climate adaptation plans and obtain sustainable community funding
to determine the extent to which these types of individuals, and they means by which they enter
the project network, matter. With increasing attention paid to local government action on wicked
problems that combine the environmental, social, and economic domains as climate change and
sustainability, such multi-disciplinary individuals may be key to planning and implementation
successes.
Concluding Thoughts. Brownfield cleanup and redevelopment projects provide an
important arena for examining how public managers leverage policy tools and network
relationships to achieve project goals that span environmental, economic, and development
domains. The ability to understand these interactions becomes extremely important as more and
more local governments begin to tackle complex policy problems. Hearkening back to the real
estate manager from the city of Rochester who likened work on such projects as “two octopuses
making love,” we can begin to hope that, by simultaneously focusing on networks, policy tools,
and public management, we will learn to better organize the multiple arms supporting these
complex project processes in a manner that truly serves the public interest.
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CHAPTER TEN

APPLYING RESEARCH TO TEACHING PRACTICE

The following chapter serves as an example of how the findings generated by this research
contribute to public administration education practice. The teaching case and role play
simulation that follows was developed for the E-PARCC Third Annual Teaching Case and
Simulation Competition of the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and
Collaboration at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. Entitled “Addressing ELCA”, this
teaching tool was loosely based upon the RPA case study and provides the educator the means to
teach stakeholder meeting design and facilitation, interest-based negotiation, and skill sets
associated with effective relationship building management behaviors.
Addressing ELCA: An Exercise in Designing and Facilitating Stakeholder Processes
Summary
The ELCA street contracting company and their property in the middle of a working class
neighborhood of the mid-sized older industrial city of Lansdale have become more than an out of
place neighbor – they have become a noise nuisance, an environmental health hazard . . . as well
as a political headache for city officials. The City Council president asks two mid-level public
managers to convene stakeholders for a brainstorming/relationship-building meeting to
determine the best use of this property assuming that both the resources and the authority will be
found to obtain, remediate, and redevelop the property. These two managers decide to host the
first of what they hope to be a series of stakeholder meetings that will guide the project.
This simulation provides students with the experience of designing and facilitating a
citizen/stakeholder meeting that occurs in the early stages of a long-term collaborative project
process in which economic, environmental, and social interests converge.
The activity is set up so that each student learns elements of stakeholder meeting design and
implementation through readings, lecture, practice, and reflection. Part A presents the
stakeholder situation and instructs students to plan out their own process for facilitating the first
stakeholder meeting. Part B then contains role sheets to be used when pairs of students
implement the process design they developed. Part C includes the second half of the case study,
telling how the collaborative network in the real life case evolved and produced a successful
outcome. Part D contains the general instructions for the instructor as well as content and
resources about stakeholder processes, meeting design, facilitation, and brainstorming to be used
in a pre-exercise lecture.
After completing the activity, students will have a better understanding of the complexities
behind stakeholder engagement in multi-actor environmental and land use planning processes.
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Part A: Case Scenario and Process Design Instructions
ELCA – A Brownfield in Our Midst
“Brownfields” as barriers to community sustainability
In the face of today’s economic crisis, many municipalities in the United States with strongly
industrial pasts face difficult challenges in maintaining delivery of government services and
ensuring the quality of life expected by taxpaying residents. Once heralded as prominent centers
of production and manufacturing up through the 1950s, these municipalities carry the burdens of
decaying water, sewer, and street infrastructures, aging housing stock, and inadequate space for
new commercial and industrial employers (Vey 2007; Goldman 2007).
Embedded within the economic struggle of older industrial cities is the extensive soil and water
contamination resulting from decades of unregulated commercial and production activity.
Termed brownfields, properties containing this contamination lie underused because of fears,
real or perceived, that they are contaminated with environmental pollutants25. Some of these
properties exist in prime locations where private investors willingly acquire and transform them
into more productive spaces while others are contaminated enough to qualify for state and
federal hazardous waste cleanup programs such as Superfund. In between lies a third category
(Area B in Figure 1) of weakly marketable properties for which market forces alone do not
compel their cleanup but the regulatory hammers of Superfund laws do not reach (Davis 2002;
Howland 2003; Silverstein 2003). Brownfield public policy programs target these target
properties by diminishing barriers for private and public investment in cleanup and
redevelopment.
Figure 1: Property Marketability and Brownfield Redevelopment (derived from Davis
2002, and Howland 2003)

25

http://www.epa.gov/brownfields accessed May 13, 2009
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The following exercise is based upon a real story of such a brownfield cleanup and
redevelopment project located in a mid-sized northeastern U.S. city. The identities of the city
and the individuals involved have been altered to uphold confidentiality agreements and a few
details have been adjusted to raise the pedgogical usefulness of the case.
A Neighborhood Unsettled
In 1996, a group of neighbors in the city of Lansburg had had it. For the past fifteen years, they
had put up with a growing nuisance based in their backyard. In the middle of their 1940’s
working class neighborhood was a six-acre property owned and operated by two brothers as a
staging site for their asphalt and construction contracting business. Grandfathered into the
neighborhood when the city first zoned the area residential, the property had a long history of
light industrial and large vehicle use, but the neighbors had reached their limits.
Roy Lagin, whose backyard ran right up to the fence surrounding the overgrown property noted
an increase in what sounds like digging with a backhoe at around 3 o’clock in the morning,
leading to suspicions that something illicit was being buried there. Michelle Huggins, located on
the other side of the property has been increasingly concerned about gunshots emanating from
the middle of the ELCA property as well as the heavy petroleum smell that seems to fill her
kitchen on warm summer days. Several neighbors on the down slope, including Troy Schultz,
started documenting shimmery run-off every time there was a substantial downpour. After initial
phone calls to the city did not elicit any response, neighbors brought their complaints to the
property owner, only to be laughed at and, in some instances, threatened. Small acts of
vandalism started to occur on the properties of these most vocal residents. Candace Jones, who
had only recently moved to the neighborhood two years ago, was one such neighbor and she
decided it was time to get organized.
I got really involved with the two women sounding the call to action. We called the
committee neighborhood together and started meeting down at the library every month to
review what little bit of information we had. We wanted to figure out our next approach
in going after the city to clean up the property and realized that we had to be recognized
as a formal representation for the neighborhood. We knew that once Councilwoman
Suffolk started recognizing us as a formal neighborhood committee, we would get a little
headway.
Armed with photos, audio recordings, and petitions from neighbors about the various nuisances,
Candace Jones and her increasingly organized Oceanic Neighborhood Association colleagues
caught the attention of (City Council President, and, consequently, their representative) Dawn
Suffolk, and brought her to witness things first hand. Shocked at the conditions and concerned
for political fall out, Suffolk was immediately convinced that the city had to address what was
quickly becoming a politically explosive issue. Suffolk, in consultation with Mayor Byron
Jordan, enlisted City Environmental Manager Dmitri Brown and City Real Estate Manager Paula
Rodriguez to look into possible options for acquiring this property and finding a better use for it.

183
An untested challenge
In the past, Rodriguez’s office had always avoided acquiring properties with potential
environmental contamination because of the possible liability headache, the politically sensitive
issue of city land ownership and, last but not least, the unknown but likely large costs of
remediating soil and groundwater contamination. When properties were acquired for this
purpose, either the property was determined to be so highly contaminated that it qualified for
state and federal hazardous waste dollars or there was a private partner for whom the property
held enough potential return on investment once redeveloped that they were willing to assume
the cleanup and its costs. However, with relatively moderate contamination likely and the
location of the property amongst $40,000 single-family homes, the property in this case did not
fall in either of these two categories. Where, then, would money be found for remediation if the
city went forward with some sort of property acquisition strategy?
Fortunately, help appeared at the state level. At around this time, Brown had been carefully
watching a new policy program at the state level, the Municipal Brownfield Cleanup (MBC)
program. This program proposed to provide money for municipalities to clean up
environmentally polluted properties they acquire that have potential positive reuses. If this
legislation were to pass, there would be a program available through which municipalities could
be reimbursed for up to 75% of total cleanup costs. While this was promising, it still relied upon
City Council to agree to the up front financial and political costs of acquiring the property. If
anything, it was worth a shot . . .
Acquiring and assessing the property
Having pitched the idea of applying to the new MBC to Councilwoman Suffolk and Mayor
Jordan for covering cleanup costs, Brown and Rodriguez obtained the go-ahead to acquire the
property and investigate the application further. Coordinating with the city Real Estate office,
the Mayor’s office, and the city police, Rodriguez began the process of buying out the brothers
and relocating their asphalt business to a new location outside the city limits. This freed up
Brown and the environmental engineering consultant retained to run initial soil and water tests,
Ted Pomeroy, to enter the property and create an initial assessment of the contamination (for
extent of eventual materials removed, see Appendix). Drawn from their report:
“There were two dilapidated buildings in the central portion of the Site which were used
for office space, warehouse storage and equipment repair and maintenance. There were
also various above and below ground petroleum storage tanks and a construction and
demolition debris landfill. In addition, various metal drums lay exposed throughout.”
There was clearly work to be done.
An invitation to meet
In reviewing the requirements and making an initial consultation with State Environmental
management Department (EMD) representative, Dan Simmons, Brown and Rodriguez discerned
that a required element of the application was as follows:
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III. Contemplated Use
The Municipality represents that the Site will be used for: ___________________ (the
Contemplated Use), and Municipality agrees for itself and for its lessees and successors
in title that any proposed change to the Contemplated Use shall be governed by the
provisions of EML 35-3992 and any implementing regulations thereto.
This stipulation, in combination with a requirement for public participation (see Appendix) in the
grant application, meant that a proposed end use must be in place as part of the application
process and that engaging the neighbors to be part of it would be an important next step.
Knowing that the state would be looking for a slam-dunk application to kick off the new MBC
reimbursement program, Brown and Rodriguez realize that a gathering of stakeholders would
potentially help with application development and, if granted, subsequent remediation and
redevelopment implementation. This was not to be a standard public meeting the two public
managers had become accustomed to where any and all attendees were brought together to
provide data and input as part of a regulatory requirement . . . this was to be the start of what
could be a long working relationship with a variety of actors on what could be an award-winning
project for the City. Therefore, determining who should attend was a key first step.
The first list came from Councilwoman Suffolk who felt strongly that Candace Jones, three of
her Oceanic Neighborhood Association leaders, and a representative from the Southwest
Lansburg Neighborhood Association (SLNA) be there. In addition to Jones, Suffolk’s list
included Michelle Huggins, Troy Schultz, and Roy Lagin as well as Harry Frederickson from
SLNA.
From the city, and in addition to themselves and Councilwoman Suffolk, Brown and Rodriguez
decide to invite their colleague from the City Housing office, Chen Kim. Kim had been
instrumental in the property acquisition process and would likely be helpful in thinking through
the permitting issues of possible end uses. Brown knew that Ted Pomeroy, whose environmental
engineering consulting firm had been retained by the city for the remainder of this project, would
need to be there as a contracted agent of the city. Brown knew full well that he, as the
environmental manager, would need an outside person like Pomeroy to help explain what would
likely be complex technical data as remediation moved forward and to think through what the
remediation plan might look like based upon the selected end use.
Brown and Rodriguez also decided to invite Dan Simmons from the State EMD as the person
who would likely be reviewing the initial application in hopes that he would have some ideas for
the project and that he would be impressed by the extent to which the City was engaging with
citizens so early in the application process.
Finally, at the last minute, Maria Echevarria from Mayor Jordan’s office called saying that the
Mayor would like Jeremy Baffin of the area Homebuilders Association to sit in. Thinking that
the Mayor’s office might already have some ideas for what to do with this property, Brown and
Rodriguez send Baffin, as well as Echevarria, an invitation.
Preparing for the meeting
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Pushing back from his desk, Brown stretched and looked out the window towards the part of the
city he knew contained the ELCA property. This upcoming stakeholder meeting was both
exciting and daunting. Exciting in that it could be the beginning of a new set of tools and
processes the city could use to address it’s significant contaminated property problem. Daunting
in that he knew that each individual invited, including himself, had a strong interest in a wide
array of outcomes. Paula Rodriguez and he agreed to facilitate the meeting together, knowing
that sharing responsibility for the meeting would enhance their efforts. However, now that the
meeting neared, Brown realized that they should have asked Councilwoman Suffolk for approval
to hire an outside facilitator, but it was now too late to do so. How, then, was he going to handle
the meeting? How could he insure that all voices would be heard in such a way that they would
be willing and interested in working together in the long-run, assuming that the financial
resources came through? How would he balance the broader city and state level political
interests with the narrow neighborhood interests? In less than two days, he would know the
answers to these questions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------Your task is to design and facilitate an initial stakeholders meeting regarding the question “what
should be done the ELCA property after it has been remediated?” The purposes of this meeting
are threefold:
•
•
•

To allow stakeholders to meet each other;
To generate a list of ideas for property use and their subsequent pros and cons from the
perspective of each stakeholder; and
To earn their commitment to attend a follow-up meeting.

Using what you know about facilitation and incorporating what you understand about this case,
design a meeting process that a facilitator may implement with stakeholders in order to arrive at
the other end with the desired deliverables listed above. This meeting process must include the
following components:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

An ice breaker
The establishment of ground rules
A structured process wherein participants have the opportunity to generate ideas for
uses of the ELCA property while being consistent with the ground rules.
A structured process wherein participants have the opportunity to list the pros and
cons of each idea while being consistent with the ground rules.
For advanced groups: A structured process wherein participants have the opportunity
to brainstorm, evaluate, and decide the next steps in the collaborative process.

Remember that this is the first meeting of potentially many for this group of stakeholders, so
starting out on the right foot with minimal conflict will be very desirable. Write out this process
design in a scripted manner that a professional facilitator could pick up and use with minimal
coaching. Upon completing your process design, write up a rationale for the components you
include and the order in which you include them. Show how your process design meets both the
short-term goals of the meeting and the longer-term goals of building trust and strengthening
stakeholder relationships.
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Part B: Roles and Role Play Instructions
Notes to Instructor: The following thirteen characters represent the array of stakeholders most
relevant to our case of remediating and redeveloping brownfields for residential end use. While
every role may be used, the intent of providing thirteen is to allow flexibility to meet your course
needs. If the primary focus of your course is on citizen engagement, then most role-play
participants should assume one of the citizen roles. If your primary focus is on
interorganizational power dynamics or the complexities of political conflict, then more of the
public agency, elected official, and private firm stakeholders should be incorporated. Table D
suggests two combinations of roles and possible processing questions that may accompany them.
Caution: Role sheets are written to include interpersonal relationship histories. It is
important to address inconsistencies that will occur when certain roles are removed or added to
the role play exercise.
Table D: Two possible role combinations
Roles Characters
Dmitri Brown
Dawn Suffolk
Candace Jones
Chen Kim
Paula Rodriguez
Maria Echevarria
Roy Lagin
Troy Shultz
Michelle Huggins
Harry Frederickson
Dan Simmons
Ted Pomeroy
Jeremy Baffin

Affiliations
City Department of
Environmental Quality
City Council
Oceanic Neighborhood
Association
City Department of Housing
City Office of Real Estate
Mayor’s Office
Oceanic neighborhood
Oceanic neighborhood
Oceanic neighborhood
Southwest Lansdale
Neighborhood Association
State Environmental
Management Department
Private Consulting Firm
Homebuilders Association

Citizen-focused
X

IOR-focused
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Role-play activity: The purpose of having students take on the roles as described in this section
is to create a case-context in which two of your students can implement their meeting process
design. Since the focus of the activity is on the act of facilitating, it is important that students
taking on stakeholder roles do not hijack the activity. Depending upon the maturity level of the
students, it is possible for charismatic students to overwhelm quieter students, for students to not
“let go” of their role when it is time to end the activity and begin processing, for role
stereotyping to occur, and for students to be distracted by character conflicts and forget to
respond to the facilitators actions26. To avoid these events, it is important to instruct students
26

http://serc.carleton.edu/introgeo/roleplaying/challeng.html (accessed 2/24/10)
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to not only incorporate their character’s positions and interests in their actions but to also
respond to the actions of the facilitators. As help towards this goal, none of the character
descriptions include information about direct conflict with the facilitators.
Role-play alternate activity: In the primary version of this activity, two of the project
stakeholders, Dmitri Brown and Paula Rodriguez, serve as the meeting facilitators. If you have
the time and interest in rotating facilitation duties amongst multiple pairs of students, you may
assign students to act as facilitators without having an additional role to play. In this instance,
inform the students that, instead of assuming facilitation responsibilities themselves, Brown and
Rodriguez obtained permission and funding from City Council to hire outside facilitators. In this
situation, multiple iterations of the meeting may occur by having students rotate characters.
Non-role-play alternate activity: The roles may also be used as a case study without actually
playing out the meeting. Instead, you may have students read through a subset of roles and
identify potential conflicts and issues that may exist between stakeholder positions and interests.
Then, tell students to review their meeting process design and analyze how their design may or
may not minimize, address, or ignore these conflicts.
Role descriptions: Role descriptions are organized in alphabetical order. Each role sheet
contains:
•
•
•
•

A description of the personal positions and interests for each character;
The organizational positions and interests influencing them (if relevant);
Information about the project that that character may only know themselves; and,
Any relevant interpersonal relationship information.
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Role-Play Instructions for All Participants
Your role-play character sheets are confidential and should only be viewed by yourself. Please
take your time in reading through it and pay attention to your personal positions and interests,
your organizational positions and interests, any project information you bring to the table, and
the history of relationships you share with other stakeholders who will be attending.
It is extremely important that, in performing your role, you enact these characteristics while you
simultaneously respond to those around you, especially the facilitators. The more realistically
you respond to their efforts, the deeper and richer the post-activity conversation will be.

YOU ARE INVITED!
ELCA PROPERTY COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER MEETING
7PM – OCEANIC COMMUNITY LIBRARY
Dear Stakeholder:
We are enthusiastic for you to participate in our upcoming stakeholder meeting addressing the
future use of the property formerly occupied by the ELCA Corporation. As you well know, this
property has been acquired by the City of Lansdale for the purpose of environmental cleanup and
redevelopment. While action has already taken place regarding assessment of environmental
contamination, no decisions have been made regarding how this property will be used.
With your input and assistance, we hope to generate some concrete ideas that meet all of our
interests. To achieve this, have asked two facilitators to assist and have provided additional
information that may help you think through the best use of this property embedded in the
Oceanic Neighborhood.
We look forward to seeing you at the Community Library.
Sincerely,
Dawn Suffolk
President, City Council
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ELCA PROPERTY COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER MEETING
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
City of Lansdale Standard Brownfield Project Processes
Phase
Stage
Description
Site Identification
Potential developers (public and private) identify
contaminated sties of interest with assistance from
public brownfield directories or through marketing
by current property owners.
Initial Site
Assessing to determine whether contamination is
Cleanup
Assessment – Phase present through historical records and examination of
I Investigation
neighboring sites.
Detailed Site
Environmental engineers sample and analyze
Assessment – Phase chemical parameters of site if Phase I Investigation
II Investigation
suggests potential for contamination.
Remedial
Assessment
Economic
Assessing for potential economic return vs. cost of
Assessment and
restoring site to productive use. Sites categorized
Planning
into viable, threshold, and nonviable groups
according to this potential/cost ratio. End use
plans generated.
Redevelopment
Project
Assuming financial feasibility studies are complete,
Development and
developers arrange financing for clean up and
(Overlap)
Financing
redevelopment. This is a likely stage for meetings
between multiple stakeholders.
Cleanup
Cleanup Planning
Selecting and implementing a clean up plan in
and Execution
compliance with regulations.
Redevelopment
Redevelopment of
Altering the site for suitability to its new use.
Site
State Contamination Limits for Residential Use of Property
Total Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
5 ppm in soil
Mercury
1 ppm in soil
Benzene
60 ppb in soil
Benzene
1 ppb in groundwater
Toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene
5 ppb in groundwater
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LANSDALE HOUSING MARKET INFORMATION
The following table summarizes the market potential for housing development within the City of
Lansdale. The capture rate is an estimate of the percentage of new units the market is likely to
support each year. The number of new units is the raw number based on this percentage.

The following table describes the strategies utilized by the City of Lansdale Division of
Community Development in assisting its neighborhoods. The Oceanic Neighborhood is
considered to be on the boundary of Transitional Low and Transitional High. The Southwest
Lansdale Neighborhood is considered to be on the boundary of Stable and Exceptional.

Source: Interface Studio
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THE ELCA PROPERTY IN THE CITY OF LANSDALE
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Dmitri Brown (City Environmental Manager)
Male, Age 45
How did you get so involved in this project so quickly? Part of the reason is that you always saw
your position at the city as more than the environmental “cog” in the wheel that addresses past
and present environmental problems. Instead, you have always felt that your department should
be more proactive in seeing the larger picture of environmental projects, extending services to
the social and economic aspects of property remediation. Therefore, you are happy to have the
opportunity to engage with this stakeholder group so that you can use your interdisciplinary
knowledge and skills to communicate across interests.
Personal Background: You have spent your entire career working for the city of Lansdale in its
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) as both a budget analyst and an environmental
project manager. Your commitment to quality of service has grown over time and you have
developed a reputation for fairness and thoroughness in your work. While you are not
specifically trained in negotiation or facilitation, you enjoy working with citizens and
representatives of business and social interests and have many strong relationships built up over
time, particularly with state EMD officials involved with funding contaminated property
remediation.
Organizational Background: The DEQ has positioned itself over the years as central in
economic and community development efforts but would like to showcase their ability to play on
a bigger stage. The size of the ELCA property provides a great opportunity to do so, particularly
with the introduction of the new EMD brownfield program. Knowing that many eyes at the state
level would be on them as the first project in this program, the DEQ would like to maximize
cleanup efforts depending upon the selected end use. Residential cleanup would require the
greatest extent of cleanup with recreational a close second. Commercial or industrial uses would
require less extensive cleanup.
Project Information: At this point in time, most of the environmental information you have
about the property comes from the private consultant the DEQ contracted to conduct the Phase I
and Phase II Assessments, Ted Pomeroy.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: Through extensive project work within the city of
Lansdale, you have developed strong relationships with Paula Rodriguez in the Office of Real
Estate, Dan Simmons of the State EMD, and Ted Pomeroy with the private consulting firm you
have retained.
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Dawn Suffolk (City Council President)
Female, Age 58
Personal Background: With the ELCA property sitting smack in the middle of your district,
you are very interested in seeing what is currently an eyesore and a popular joke in the media
turn into a very successful project pleasing to all involved. After twenty years serving on City
Council, you plan to step down at the end of your current term (unknown to all but family).
Therefore, you are more willing than usual to take political risks in moving this project forward.
This means that you are more willing to back the citizen neighbors, in this process as much as
possible, even if it will rule out ideas that may be more lucrative for the city. These individuals
had suffered long enough next to this property under your watch so you are more than willing to
go to bat for them. If it turns out that the Oceanic Neighborhood Association has no clear ideas,
you would like to see housing for seniors in this neighborhood.
You welcome the fact that the meeting will be facilitated and look forward to seeing how the
facilitator has planned their meeting process. If asked, you are interested in seeing strict ground
rules set down that creates formal guidelines for who speaks when and how. When you run your
City Council meetings, you require all members to first ask you for permission to speak. To you,
this maintains order and respect.
Organizational Background: City Council, as the budget watchdogs for the city, would like to
see potential end uses include options that are low-cost to the city. City Council trusts the
abilities of city staff members to apply for and receive state and federal grants but would like to
see more investment from the private sector in redevelopment projects. At the same time, City
Council would like to see some sort of end use that would benefit the city in the long run,
preferably by generating new tax revenue.
Project Information: City Council relies upon Dmitri Brown and Paula Rodriguez for projectlevel information.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You are aware that members of the Oceanic
Neighborhood Association do not have favorable views of you. While politically, this is not as
relevant to you, you have a personal desire to leave your office on a positive note. In the past,
you have butted heads with Candace Jones but are interested in making amends.
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Jeremy Baffin (Home Builders Association Executive Vice-President)
Male, Age 42
Personal Background: Having caught wind of the ELCA property and the opportunities it
presents from your friend the Deputy Mayor, you are attending this meeting to see if there is any
hope that the city would be willing to figure out some way to turn it into market-rate housing.
Personally, you think that there might be interesting ways to put suburban-style housing in the
middle of a traditional, single family home city neighborhood.
You hear that the meeting will be facilitated and are unsure as to what that means. In your
office, meetings seem to work best when the conversation guides itself without much formality
or rules, but you are open to new experiences.
Organizational Background: The Association has been exasperated in the past by Mayor
Jordan making several off-hand public comments that the environmental problems of urban
sprawl around his city are largely due to home builders building too much new housing stock on
cheap land further and further from city limits. No matter how many times it has been explained,
the Association still could seem to get through to the Mayor homebuilders members largely do
not work on projects within the city because ever single home building opportunity in the past
fifteen years has been for single “in-fill” homes located in already existing neighborhoods –
projects that do not attract most mid- to large-sized building firms. The ELCA property may be
an opportunity to prove the Mayor wrong.
Project Information: Association members who have built infill housing in this neighborhood
are familiar with the property values in the area of the ELCA property. As a result, they would
only get involved if it seemed like there was to be a return-on-investment for houses sold. Based
upon what you know about the neighborhood it is unlikely that, if homes were constructed on the
ELCA property, they would fetch the prices necessary to turn a profit for Association members,
especially if they were also responsible for street and sidewalk construction, as is the case in
suburban developments.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: As inferred above, you have a good relationship with
the Deputy Mayor but not so much with the Mayor and his assistant, Maria Echevarria.
Echevarria has been known to lead the criticism of homebuilding as the cause of sprawl and you
and she have sparred in the editorial section of the Lansdale Times. While you have never met
her, you are interested in introducing yourself and seeing if you can push a few of her buttons,
just for fun. In the big picture, you want to be on the Mayor’s good side in case the ELCA
property provides profit opportunities for your members.
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Candace Jones (Oceanic Neighborhood Association Leader)
Female, Age 48
You are looking forward to the upcoming meeting because you see the project as an opportunity
to finally have the city put its money where its mouth is and do something significant with this
property. Having gotten to know neighbors who have fought with the city about this property for
over fifteen years, you look forward to seeing some pay out.
Personal Background: You are vaguely aware of the situation at the state level where potential
funding for property remediation may come down the line to help move this project forward.
Your job as a management consultant has shown you that state grant programs across the board
like to see active citizen engagement in the applications that come to them. When wearing your
“neighbor” hat, you have a strong interest in seeing something quiet like a park or a senior living
facility built on the property.
In your profession as a project manager, you are familiar with facilitation practice and don’t like
to experience what you consider to be “bad facilitation.” If you feel that a facilitator is losing
control of the group, you have no qualms about stepping in and taking over the process.
Organizational Background: Your new position as the de facto leader of the Oceanic
Neighborhood Association puts you in the position of representing overall neighborhood
interests. When wearing the “ONA” hat, you are compelled to put aside your personal interests.
ONA’s interests are 1) to remove all contamination and potential health risks, 2) compensate any
neighbors whose property has been compromised by the ELCA property, 3) find a non-nuisance
use for the property once it is cleaned up, 4) find a use for the property that will stabilize
property values, decrease crime, and enhance neighborhood aesthetics and, 5) obtain an apology
from the City of Lansdale regarding the years of inaction prior to the meeting.
Project Information: You have no project information beyond a laundry list of past grievances
of the ELCA owners compiled by neighbors that include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Backhoe digging at 3AM
Mailbox sabotage of five neighbors who had called the police regarding disturbances
Yard damage from illegal dynamite blasting
Guard dogs barking all night long and escaping and terrorizing neighborhood pets
Loud parties on the property
Foul smelling run off killing flowerbeds

Interpersonal Relationship Information: Needless to say, you do not fully trust City
Councilwoman Suffolk or any city employee to do the right thing for the neighborhood based on
past performance. However, you are open to seeing what happens at this meeting. Your instinct
is to resist participation so that you can observe until you are certain that the city is, indeed,
serious about their intent to make a difference.
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Ted Pomeroy (Consulting Engineer)
Male, Age 52
Personal Background: Having worked on a few projects before with Dmitri Brown and the City
of Lansburg, you are familiar with the type of environmental assessment and remediation
processes associated with city-owned properties and the technical nature of the data that ends up
being generated and disseminated. However, you are unsure as to the extent to which you think
non-experts should be involved in project implementation. While you have presented data at
public meetings before it seems to you that anything beyond that setting would require a great
deal of time and effort to keep citizens up to speed, especially on your behalf. If at all possible,
you would like limited neighbor involvement, especially during environmental processes.
You are very familiar with what a facilitated meeting looks like and are appreciative that a
facilitator will arrive with a meeting agenda.
Organizational Background: Your consulting firm has worked with the city on a number of
environmental remediation projects and has built up good rapport by doing so. It is firm policy
that field consultants show a good faith effort in working with citizens, but only as far as giving
them information appeases them and quiets their complaints.
Being a large firm whose expertise extends to construction project management, there is a
broader interest in seeing an expensive project selected for the ELCA property. The firm
partners are certain that, if the field consultants do a good job on the environmentals, the firm
would be in strong contention to pick up the lucrative construction sub-contract.
Project Information: Being the consultant for the Phase I and Phase II Assessments, you have
all of the environmental information about the property. Based upon your work, you estimate
that cleanup costs will approach $4 million based upon the findings in the table below:
Environmental Problem
Impacted Soils
Construction and Demolition Debris
Asphalt
Asbestos Wastes
Scrap Metal
Municipal Solid Waste
Tires
Impacted Water

Amount
18,200 tons
4,500 tons
375 tons
220 tons
70 tons
27 tons
230 cu. yds.
280,000 Gallons

Assuming that this project will be accepted into the State MBC program, the state would
reimburse 75%, or $3million of these costs, requiring the City of Lansdale to locate $1 million in
cleanup funding.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You like working with Dmitri Brown and, as he is
your client, you are prepared to do anything to support his efforts at the meeting.
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Chen Kim (City Housing Manager)
Female, Age 33
Personal Background: You are pleased to have been invited to this meeting, knowing that the
probability a property this large would open up in a residential area is a once in many years
event. However, you are unsure how it might look to the public at large to be putting housing on
top of what sounds like quite the environmental nightmare. Yet, you trust the skills of Dmitri
Brown in handling environmental situations and envision a good space for filling crucial city
housing needs once he and his consultant complete their work. Your personal interest is in
filling what you see as a great need for livable senior housing in the city. This neighborhood is
perfect for this housing type based upon its walkability to a range of services including a drug
store, a diner, two churches, and a social services office.
You have attended several facilitated citizen engagement meetings before and have not been
impressed with the ability of facilitators to contain rowdy attendees. You hope this meeting will
be different.
Organizational Background: For several months now, the Lansdale Housing Department has
been trying to keep up with the demands of a recent U.S. Housing and Urban Development grant
requiring that a certain number of affordable housing units be constructed within the city by the
end of the year. This property sounds like an ideal place to put up some of the newer
condominium-style subsidized housing units preferred by HUD. With the increasing role HUD
has been playing in the shrinking economy, pleasing HUD would be in your department’s best
interest. You are aware that this would likely mean that the City would remain owner and your
office would help manage these properties, but the pressure of maintaining good graces with
HUD is quite strong.
Project Information: You do not have any addition information about the property or project to
bring to the meeting.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: While you are aware that your office has been in
conflict with the city Real Estate Office over the proper allocation of resources for housing or for
economic development, you hold no ill will towards the representative from Real Estate you
know will attend the upcoming ELCA property meeting, Paula Rodriguez. However, you are not
against arguing in opposition to her ideas of what the proper use of the property is.
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Dan Simmons (State Environmental Management Department)
Male, Age 38
Personal Background: With 15 years of experience working at the EMD, you have become
quite competent at working with local partners interested in remediating their contaminated
properties. However, you have never been in charge of piloting a new program before and want
to make a mark with the opportunity to find the first project for the new Municipal Brownfield
Cleanup (MBC). For the upcoming meeting, you are very interested in listening and learning to
see if this project might qualify.
In your mind, a high quality project is one where the municipality has the resources and capacity
for environmental remediation project management, a positive relationship with the private
development community in its jurisdiction, and skills to reach out to affected citizens. You have
worked with the City of Lansburg before and have had positive experiences so are curious to see
how they handle this brainstorming meeting. If asked for input during the meeting, your interest
is to see this property cleaned up in a manner appropriate to the designated end use. If the end
use is to be residential, the cleanup must be extensive and expensive. If the end use is to be light
industrial, the cleanup will be less extensive and will require less up front money from the city.
Your only stipulation regarding end use is that the end use be agreeable to as many stakeholders
as possible.
You take it as a good sign that a facilitator will be running this meeting and look forward to the
information you anticipate will become revealed in the facilitated process.
Organizational Background: The EMD is traditionally neutral regarding local projects once
projects have been accepted into an EMD policy program. Due to relations with the state
assembly and the governor, the EMD feels pressure to accept projects likely to succeed and to
provide maximum benefits to the community.
Project Information: The EMD relies upon local applicants for project information so you do
not bring anything new to the meeting.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You have a strong working relationship with Dmitri
Brown but have not met any of the other stakeholders invited to the meeting. While you will be
friendly, your primary goal is to observe the group in action.
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Paula Rodriguez (City Real Estate Manager)
Female, Age 28
Your work with the city of Lansdale over the past four years has been interesting at best as your
office has struggled to keep pace with increasing foreclosures and pressure for the city to acquire
and maintain a range of newly vacant properties. Each day brings a new challenge that makes
you feel like you are still learning your job as if starting anew.
Personal Background: The ELCA property presents a different challenge that you welcome.
Given the size of the property and what you perceive to be high political stakes, you know that
the city will take a team approach, not leaving you in the lurch for handling the property
yourself. When you have the opportunity to work on a team for this kind of project, you feel
good about providing a service to neighbors who might be otherwise put upon by criminal,
environmental, or other undesirable behaviors that seem to congregate around such derelict
properties.
However, from this point forward, you are skeptical about the ability to do anything with this
property other than keeping it light industrial. It is an odd shape, is still zoned industrial, and
would require extensive street infrastructure if it were to be designated residential or retailcommercial. It is important to you that people who might promote those kinds of projects
understand that road construction is no laughing matter and often comprises upwards of 40% of
site preparation costs.
You have had some exposure to facilitation and facilitation practice and feel confident that the
meeting will go well.
Organizational Background: In recent years, the Lansdale Real Estate department has been at
odds with their counterparts in Housing in terms of best use for vacant properties. Members of
the Real Estate department feel that the challenges facing downtown Lansdale result from a loss
of jobs, so emphasis on newly vacant properties should be on small to medium sized businesses.
The Housing office, on the other hand, seems to think that the primary challenge is loss of
workers living downtown and therefore key properties should be used for housing.
Project Information: City real estate statistics indicate that the ELCA property lies in a
transition zone between small single family homes in the Oceanic neighborhood assessed on an
average of $40,000 and large single family homes in the
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You have enjoyed working with your colleague,
Dmitri Brown, on smaller properties in the past where you handle acquisition processes and he
tackles the environmental impact requirements. While this is new territory, you will rely upon
this past goodwill to feel comfortable that your needs will become met.
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Maria Echevarria (Aide to Mayor Jordan)
Female, Age 30
Personal Background: You have been working for Mayor Jordan for seven years as his primary
aide on urban development issues, an issue that strikes you close to home. Growing up in center
city Lansdale, you see much potential in revitalizing cities from the urban core out. As a citizen
and urban development expert, you think the ELCA property is a great opportunity to do
something special like a commercial/cultural marketplace. However, your role as representative
of the Mayor is a bit more complicated (see below).
You understand that the meeting will be facilitated. While you are fine with facilitated
processes, you are wary of how power dynamics happen within them, particularly the tendency
for men to dominate the process and to marginalize women. If you feel this begins to happen,
you will assert yourself and reveal what you think is a power imbalance.
Organizational Background: Your presence at this meeting is to represent Mayor Jordan’s
interest in establishing better relationships with area homebuilders with whom the Mayor had
been arguing for several years regarding the cause of urban sprawl. In the Mayor’s mind, the use
of this property would coincide with the interests of Jeremy Baffin. However, the project must
also generate increased property taxes, so, while the Mayor does not want to be seen as visibly
opposed to what the neighbors might want, if there is an opening to steer the conversation away
from turning the property into a park, you should take it.
Project Information: Like City Council, the Mayor’s office relies upon the work of city
employees in the housing, real estate, and environmental divisions as to the characteristics of the
property. However, sources close to the Mayor in the state capital indicate that the state EDM is
very interested in funding a cleanup for this property.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: In the past, you have experienced conflict with
Jeremy Baffin of the Homebuilders Association in the pages of the local newspaper over the
causes of urban sprawl in the region – you believe it is the result of short-sighted developers
while he pins the cause on decaying inner city cores causing residents to flee. While you have
never met him in person, you know it will be tough for you to find common ground and shared
interests as directed by the Mayor. Your strategy is to cautiously observe him before making
attempts to work with him.
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Roy Lagin (Neighbor)
Male, Age 62
Personal Background: You are so sick and tired of complaining to the city about the smells and
peculiar run-off from the ELCA property entering your own that you were almost dumbstruck
when you got the Oceanic Neighborhood Association email that the city had acquired the
property and now wanted to obtain neighborhood input on the next use of the property. As an
owner of property immediately adjacent to ELCA, you would love to see the land divided such
that existing neighbors have the opportunity to extend their current lots further back. You think
this would be a great way to enhance your property and ensure that you maintain privacy, peace,
and maybe even a little bit of wildlife. The remaining property should then be turned into a park.
One of your primary concerns, and one that you are certain is shared by a number of your
neighbors, is that the ELCA property may be turned into an expensive redevelopment that will
rapidly increase your property value to a level you cannot afford. As a retired plumber, you
receive a pension, but not one significant enough to pay a significant increase in property taxes.
You have no interest in leaving the neighborhood as your house was the one in which you and
your wife raised your family.
Someone told you that a “facilitator” will be running the meeting. You are not sure what that
means but hope that they won’t make you talk about “what you feel” and stuff like that. If they
do, your strategy is to sit back and pass on the activity.
Organizational Background: While a member of the ONA, you have not been particularly
active except when you see an upcoming event that directly pertains to you and your own
property. However, if push comes to shove, you will defend ONA interests against all others.
Project Information: You really don’t have any additional information about the property, but
plenty of opinions.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: While you grudgingly respect the work that ONA de
facto president Candace Jones has been doing as a liaison to the city, you are uncomfortable with
being represented by a woman. That is part of the reason that you do not attend ONA meetings
regularly. You are wary of Jones and need to test the waters to see if you trust she is open to
your interests and ideas.
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Troy Schultz (Neighbor)
Male, Age 28
Personal Background: Having been active in Oceanic Neighborhood Association meetings
since they really got going the past few months, you are very enthusiastic not so much about
what the ELCA property should become, but more about what it shouldn’t. Based on
conversations you have had with friends after Association meetings at the local dive bar, you are
confident that most neighbors do not want to see anything that would attract loud kids or provide
space for teenagers to congregate and get into trouble. In addition, you are against anything that
would increase traffic and parking problems on already congested streets. This includes highrise apartment and condominium buildings regardless of who would live there. You are
especially against subsidized housing because your experience growing up near the north side of
Chicago had led you to believe that public housing only generates crime and litter, especially
when government is the landlord.
To be honest, you really don’t care what goes on the ELCA property as long as it is not anything
previously mentioned.
You know what facilitation is due to team meetings you sit through at work and, in general, are
OK with it. However, if you feel there is a lull in the conversation, you fill the gaps with your
own ideas and opinions.
Organizational Background: As an avid supporter of ONA, you stand by the interests the
group developed at your last meeting in preparation for this upcoming stakeholder meeting.
ONA’s interests are 1) to remove all contamination and potential health risks, 2) compensate any
neighbors whose property has been compromised by the ELCA property, 3) find a non-nuisance
use for the property once it is cleaned up, 4) find a use for the property that will stabilize
property values, decrease crime, and enhance neighborhood aesthetics and, 5) obtain an apology
from the City of Lansdale regarding the years of inaction prior to the meeting.
Project Information: You do not possess any information regarding the property that others do
not know.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You generally like your own neighbors who you
know will be attending the meeting but you are not too happy that Harry Frederickson from the
Southwest Lansdale Neighborhood Association has been invited. You have met Harry at other
city events and think he is an elitist know-it-all who likes to hear the sound of his own voice.
You don’t trust that he has the best interests of the Oceanic Neighborhood in mind and intend to
challenge his ideas for use of the ELCA property.
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Michelle Huggins (Neighbor)
Female, Age 55
Personal Background: Having grown up in this neighborhood and living in the house once
occupied by your parents, you have great pride and connection to the Oceanic area. In addition,
your work volunteering at your son’s school has gotten you involved with various environmental
and beautification projects in and around the neighborhood. As a result, you are very upset that
the city has allowed such a significant property as the ELCA property become so polluted, or so
you are led to think.
It is extremely important to you that, regardless of what happens to the ELCA property, the city
remains as transparent as possible with its environmental assessment data and redevelopment
data. At the same time, you want the future of the ELCA property to somehow acknowledge it’s
dirty environmental past. If the use is to be industrial, it should be for a company involved with
alternative energy. If the use is to be a public park, then it should include a public educational
display about brownfields. If the use is to be residential, then the houses should be LEED
(Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) certified for green building standards.
Organizational Background: You belong to numerous environmental and community
development groups around the city, but find ONA to be the most useful regarding this property.
Attending this last meeting, you learn that the group has prioritized a list of interests of which
you care about only two: 1) to remove all contamination and potential health risks, and, 2) obtain
an apology from the City of Lansdale regarding the years of inaction prior to the meeting.
Project Information: You do not possess any additional information about the property.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: While you have no strong opinion about anyone who
will be present at this meeting, you are generally suspicious of city employees, especially elected
officials like City Councilwoman Dawn Suffolk.
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Harry Frederickson (Southwest Lansburg Neighborhood Association - SLNA)
Male, Age 60
Personal Background: Being a city resident whose house straddles two neighborhoods, you
have been very interested in tracking the ongoing saga of the ELCA property, primarily because
a high-investment development project would likely increase and stabilize the weakest side of
the Southwest Lansburg (SL) neighborhood – the one closest to the Oceanic neighborhood in
which your house sits. Therefore, you think that the Oceanic neighborhood should conform to
the street design plans of the more affluent Southwest Lansburg neighborhood. In addition, you
know that the best use of the property is for an upscale grocery store, something you feel the SL
neighborhood needs to make it the best neighborhood in the region.
In addition, as a longtime board member of SLNA, you feel that you have a lot to offer the
“newbies” when it comes to organizing and working with the city and would love to give lots of
unsolicited advice.
Organizational Background: SLNA has a long tradition of pushing the city to provide added
value projects in their neighborhood, considered the wealthiest of all the city neighborhoods and
the area with the best schools. While the area has never had to deal with environmental
contamination on the scale of what the ELCA property presents, SLNA has a strong record of
advocating for better recycling services and more efficient storm water systems. Proud of your
status as a city neighborhood, SLNA has often been quite vocal about their disdain for the more
suburban-style housing pressing up against the western edge of the neighborhood.
Project Information: While direct information regarding the ELCA property is not something
you have had access to, you are able to testify to the increasing property values of the strip
bordering the Southwest Lansburg Neighborhood and the Oceanic Neighborhood. Based on
estimates put together by a member of the SLNA board who works in the real estate industry,
you are convinced that property values in ONA, with the introduction of the grocery store, will
double.
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You are aware that there might be individuals
present who might not be as passionate about the SL neighborhood as you, but you are confident
that everyone will be welcoming to your advice.
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Part C: Case Outcomes: From ELCA to Ontario Oaks
In the real-life case upon which this exercise was based, the initial meetings between city
managers, citizen stakeholders, and private homebuilders proved to be crucial in building
positive relationships that contributed to an award-winning “new urbanism” market-rate housing
development. Key to this success was the role played by the environmental manager and the
president of city council who took the time in the early stages to meet with neighborhood
residents on multiple occasions prior to property acquisition just to listen.
Involvement by the citizens of the neighborhood, however, was not an automatic
occurrence. As one leader of “ONA” revealed, once the city acquired the properties and began
looking at possible uses, much chaos ensued. Because of where the neighborhood lay, factions
of two adjacent neighborhood associations who felt they had a stake in the property development
attended initial meetings and asserted their opinions. What “ONA” leaders quickly realized was
that these factions only clouded the conversation and neighborhood meetings took on a
combative tone with no one really listening to each other and city officials not able to fully
understand neighborhood needs. So, the de facto “ONA” leaders took stock of the situation and
made the decision to exclude outside groups and rebuild their own capacity for engagement from
within. This entailed a formalization of the group and a lot of door-to-door visits by group
leadership to build internal trust and commitment. As a result, a core group of members began
attending meetings regularly, committed to participate until the development was complete.
When that happened, the group decided that they would disband, enabling them to focus on a
single purpose.
The first meeting between the city environmental manager and “ONA” representatives
revealed a cultural divide. On one hand was a city manager dressed in a coat and tie and on the
other were blue-collar homeowners upset over city inaction to their complaints. Told to “loosen
your tie and take off the jacket”, the environmental manager quickly adapted and recognized that
his early role was to provide complete transparency regarding any and all environmental
information about the property. With help from the environmental consultant retained by the
city, this proved easy to do.
What was more difficult was discerning the best use for the property once it was revealed
that it would be cleaned up as the first municipally led brownfield funded under the state
“MBC”. The first neighborhood meeting on this topic revealed that there were many ideas on
what could be done with the contaminated property, including cleaning up the site and turning it
into a public park, but city council members were not interested in spending a large amount of
money for something that they already had challenges maintaining. So, the ideas quickly
transformed into ones that would generate funding either from state and federal grants or from
private investment. Although market-rate housing was far from the norm for city-owned
properties, several city government stakeholders saw the opportunity to pursue it and, given the
probable addition to city tax rolls, the idea took off. This was especially of interest to certain
more affluent neighbors of the property who were not keen on having subsidized, low income
housing appearing so close by. “ONA” neighbors themselves were slower to jump on this idea
mainly that they were concerned with increased traffic, the construction process itself, potential
impact on property values, and the style of homes that were to be built. Again, the city
environmental manager, this time with the city housing manager, assuaged their concerns by
including “ONA” leadership in all internal communications and decision-making regarding
development design.
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During this phase of the project, “ONA” leaders served as proxies for the city, educating
other neighbors about the unfolding of events, disseminating any new data that appeared, and
helping convince neighbors to allow city employees to inspect their properties for ongoing
concerns. Proof of this role was found in the basement of one “ONA” leader who revealed that
she had a more complete set of files about the project than what was subsequently made
available to the general public. To help integrate neighborhood leadership into the role of
information disseminator, the city, in turn, invested in their capacities, sending one leader to a
brownfield-related conference in Colorado to talk about what became known as the Ontario Oaks
development.
While these meetings ensued, members of the city housing manager began conversations
with the regional homebuilders association about the possibility of building market-rate
suburban-style homes on the properties assembled. With the pre-existing interests of the
association in getting involved with new housing in the city to show that it could be done, the
groups soon generated a vision that brought several homebuilders on board. This vision
involved the city cleaning up the properties, obtaining liability releases, producing design
standards and building up the surrounding infrastructure while the homebuilders committed to
building demo homes, sponsoring a home show, and building houses for each buyer. Homes
were to be financed through individual mortgages acquired by the homebuyers and homebuilders
were fronting the construction costs.
In retrospect, each stakeholder interviewed in this study felt that the Ontario Oaks project
was very successful and that part of the success was due to the amount of time spent talking to
each other, working through conflicts, asserting interests, and engaging in collaborative decisionmaking. Today, an innovative single family home subdivision exists in the center of the Oceanic
Neighborhood that has added property taxes for the city, addressed environmental threats to
neighbors, and provided profit, albeit small, to developers. An additional legacy is the set of
lessons learned by all involved:
• Capacities and management cultures matter. The first neighborhood meeting sponsored
by the city was patterned after the typical “citizen engagement” meeting city managers
were used to sponsoring. This meeting had a typical agenda that was heavy on
information provision and time for citizens to volunteer comments, but light on structured
process. While fulfilling state MBC requirements, these meetings did not produce much
forward progress until the ONA leadership became organized. At this point, one of these
leaders stepped forward as an individual familiar with facilitated process design. She, in
conjunction with the environmental manager, proceeded to transform these meetings into
more productive and efficient affairs and the collaboration took off.
• Framing of initial problem matters. The first meetings where neighborhood activists and
homebuilders were present together were successful due to the a common framing of the
problem at hand – what designs best blend the suburban expertise with the neighborhood
style and interest in moderate property value increases. Framing the problem in this
manner enabled citizens and homebuilders to quickly get to the idea generation stage.
• TIME is needed. The city environmental manager spent a disproportionately large
amount of time with neighborhood leaders compared to other projects of similar size and
scope – a factor that contributed heavily to the amount of trust the neighborhood had in
the city at the end of the project. It is important to note that this investment in citizen
relationships would not have occurred without support from the environmental manager’s
boss, the Environmental Commissioner.
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•

•

Stability of collaboration membership matters. Another key attribute mentioned by
several project participants was the consistency of representation across city,
homebuilder, and citizen actors. By not having to restart relationships with a new set of
city officials or new neighborhood leadership, the bonds between actors deepened to a
point where, after meetings at the neighborhood library, the group would go across the
street for a beer and socializing.
Collaborations exist in broader social contexts. It is important to note that stakeholder
collaborations are embedded within broader social, legal, market, and environmental
contexts. In this case, the project would not have happened if it were not for a strong
market environment supporting the profit needs of both the homebuilders and the city.
This condition was necessary for project success. Without it, the strongest collaborative
team possible likely would not have reached the same levels of success.
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Part D: Teaching Note – Process Design, Collaboration, and Facilitation
Introduction
Much attention is placed upon collaborative processes as they pertain to citizen and
stakeholder engagement but most experiential activities focus on conflict management during the
process. This exercise encourages students to consider how process design and before the
process begins by requiring students to design an initial meeting with stakeholders of what could
be a high-conflict brownfield cleanup and remediation project. In addition, the exercise provides
facilitation practice for two students at a time to implement and facilitate their meeting design
while other students take on the stakeholder roles, enacting behaviors that may challenge, or
enhance, the designed process.
Intended Use
This activity is intended for use with both undergraduate and graduate level public
management and policy analysis courses, particularly as they pertain to stakeholder meeting
design and process. It complements coursework on neighborhood politics, economic
development, and environmental issues and can easily be plugged into existing activities
teaching conflict management and negotiation practice. There are multiple ways in which to
present this activity, depending upon the goals and time availability of the course. Table A
below compares the options:
Time Frame
1 class session
(1 hour)
2 class sessions
(1 hour each)
3 class sessions
(1 hour each)

Activity Components
Lecture – Process Design and Facilitation

Take Home Assignments
Process Design

Lecture – Process Design and Facilitation
Process Design
Role Play and Role Play Discussion
Role Play Reflection Paper
Lecture – Process Design and Facilitation
Process Design
Role Play and Role Play Discussion
Role Play Reflection Paper
Case Discussion
Case Analysis
Due to the situational nature of “effective facilitative practice”, instructors are
encouraged to tap into resources on their campus and in their community to present the
background content on process design and facilitation if their personal capacity to teach this
topic is limited. For example, many communities contain community mediation centers and
private consulting groups that provide facilitation services and may provide educational outreach
services. In addition, the human resource departments of many large organizations, church
groups, and local governments may have professionals trained in facilitative practice.
The following sections provide the minimal content and resources needed to present the
three activity components listed in Table A.
Component #1: Lecture – Process Design and Facilitation
Background
As public sector leaders and managers increasingly turn to interorganizational
collaborations to solve complex problems, more attention has been paid to the mechanisms
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through which these collaborations succeed. Management research has determined the
importance of building the trust, interdependence, and network governance mechanisms needed
for effective collaborative function (Lundin 2007; Edelenbos and Klijn 2007; McKnight,
Cummings, and Chervany 1998; Jones and George 1998). However, establishing the social
relations and structural ties necessary for successful collaboration does not happen automatically.
Instead, collaborative leaders must strategically build relationships over time to build group
cohesion and then develop group capacities to perform at the highest levels. One skill that is
essential in building these relationships and capacities is group facilitation.
“Facilitation” is the application of experiential techniques to empower groups to move
through problem solving processes (Heron 1999). A “facilitator” is therefore an individual
trained to help move a group through a preset arrangement of experiential activities towards the
group goals, ostensibly improving group decision-making effectiveness (Schwarz 2002).
Facilitators exhibit skills that have been associated with positive interpersonal relationships such
as conflict management, reflective listening, assertion, negotiation, and mediation (Elliott 1999).
An integral part of facilitation is “process design”, or the strategic planning of group
meetings towards a concrete set of goals. In public sector stakeholder situations, process design
often means laying out a sequence of activities that, when implemented, build social capital,
gather data, elicit interests, and generate ideas. Recent studies of the impact of process planning
on levels of stakeholder conflict and collaboration productivity indicate that effective process
design and implementation directly relates to positive outcomes (Edelenbos and Klijn 2006;
Thomas and Poister 2009). This brief review examines what is known about group
effectiveness, the role group facilitators play in enhancing it, and specific process design
strategies facilitators use when playing this role.
Basic Facilitation Theory
Understanding effective facilitation requires an understanding of effective groups and a
brief tour through theories of group psychology and workgroup function. Integrating past
research, Schwarz (2002) offers a comprehensive group effectiveness model that has, at its core,
group structure and group process when a group functions in a stable context. Group structure is
comprised of a clear group mission and shared vision, clear goals, a motivating task, clearly
defined roles, and sufficient time. Group process pertains to problem solving, decision-making,
conflict management, communication, and boundary management. Theory suggests that a proper
balance between these components enhances group effectiveness (Elliott 1999). When
individuals in a group represent different organizations, as in the case of public sector
stakeholder groups, these core elements of group function apply but are made more complex by
the influence of the group cultures of each home organization, changing the group context
component of effectiveness (Schwarz 2002).
In order to empower groups within their own problem-solving processes, facilitators must
understand how to mobilize without leading, how to control a process without controlling the
outputs generated by process participants. While complete neutrality is difficult to achieve and
verify, facilitators can maintain this value by designing a process that ensures representation and
participation, clarifies how decisions will be made, and is accountable and fair (Elliott 1999).
Heron (1999) writes that facilitation occurs across six dimensions, summarized below in
Table B. In each of these dimensions, the key questions may be dealt with in a hierarchal mode
where the facilitator directs the group by exercising power and controlling the process, a
cooperative mode where power over the process is shared with the group, and an autonomous
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mode where the facilitator allows the group to experience full self-determination. In any given
facilitative process at any given stage for any given group, facilitators must find a balance
between these three modes to maximize effectiveness but, for newly formed groups, it is
common that the early stages require that the facilitator operate in the hierarchal mode, the
middle stages require a cooperative mode, and the latter stages the autonomous mode. The rate
in which a group incurs these facilitative shifts varies widely (Heron 1999). Within group
experiences, it is important to discern between content and process. The content refers to the
stated task or activity confronting the group at the moment while the process is the social
phenomena that occur during implementation of that task (Schwarz 2002).
Table B: Dimensions of Facilitation (Heron, 1999)
Dimension
Key Question
The Planning Dimension
How will the group determine its objectives?
The Meaning Dimension
How will meaning be found in group behaviors?
The Confronting Dimension
How will the group address barriers and difficult situations?
The Feeling Dimension
How will group emotions be handled?
The Structuring Dimension
How will group learning be structured?
The Valuing Dimension
How will a climate of respect be generated?
Topics relevant to this role-play underlined.
Facilitating a Problem-Solving Model
Many group processes center upon problem solving (Table D). Group problem solving
processes follow a general model that starts with group members agreeing to work together and
has the end goal of implementing agreed upon solutions. The first step is defining the problem
they have agreed to address. Then, they develop the criteria for decision-making and the process
by which decisions will be made. After that, group members share information about positions
and interests so that they can begin brainstorming possible solutions to the problem. Next, the
group applies decision criteria to the list of options to determine the course of action and seek
agreement on a package of solutions. Upon reaching this agreement, the group then proceeds to
the implementation phase (Carpenter 1999; Schwarz 2002). In reality, group problem solving
processes are rarely as linear as this model makes them seem, with many instances of moving
back and forth between phases as new information arises and interpersonal relationships evolve.
Nevertheless, the use of a trained, skilled facilitator streamlines this process, particularly when
defining the problem, establishing evaluation criteria, and brainstorming options.
Table D: A Problem Solving Model (Schwarz, 2002)
Problem Solving Steps
5. Evaluate alternative solutions
1. Define the problem
6. Select the best solutions
2. Establish evaluation criteria
7. Develop an action plan
3. Identify root causes
8. Implement the action plan
4. Generate alternative solutions (brainstorm)
9. Evaluate outcomes and the process
Developing Activities for a Facilitated Problem Solving Process
In Heron’s (1999) framework, facilitators face two planning considerations. First, they
must consider the objectives of the group. What will the group learn as a result of participating in
the group process? Then, the must determine the program within which objectives are to be
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reached. Program elements include the activities planned, their time allowance, the teaching
methods involved, resources needed, and how they will be assessed (Heron 1999).
The structural dimension encompasses activity creation. Heron (1999) suggests that
activities developed for a process incorporate the experiential learning cycle. In this cycle,
facilitators first model the desired behavior and while providing activity instructions. Then,
participants practice the activity, obtain feedback, and engage in the activity again. Once the
activity is complete, participants reflect individually and then review their reflections as a group
(Kolb 1984). In designing a group activity, it is also important to pay attention to the space in
which the activity is conducted and the composition of the group in terms of existing
interpersonal dynamics or special needs. A group sitting in a circle of chairs responds and reacts
differently than a mix of people sitting and standing in rows. Likewise, group attributes such as
gender, age, race, and cultural background may all play a role in how a room is set up for a
facilitated activity.
Similarly, an important piece of the structural dimension for facilitators is the
establishment of ground rules. These rules should be reasonable, fair, and relevant to the
purpose of the meeting. Common ground rules include paying attention to time, taking breaks
by group agreement, paying full attention to others when they are speaking, eliminating
distractions, respect for people and property, etc. (Heron 1999). Schwarz (2002) writes that
ground rules must, at the minimum, address issues of attendance, how decisions will be made,
and confidentiality. Ground rules may be determined ahead of the meeting and presented to the
group or generated by the group itself as an activity, depending on the composition and purpose
of the group. Regardless, buy-in for these ground rules is important.
A common subset of activities includes icebreakers, which are activities serving to
initiate relationship building by facilitating knowledge sharing. These activities are often
implemented at the start of group processes and designed to segue into more substantial activities
at the core of a meeting. For example, a facilitator may ask a group to introduce themselves by
stating their name, their affiliated organization, and one goal they hope to accomplish by being at
the meeting. This information can then be used in a follow-up activity asking participants to
develop a group mission.
Due to the wide variety of exercises that could be incorporated into a facilitated
stakeholder meeting, it is often easier to state what exercises should NOT be. Schwarts (2002)
considers it inappropriate to use an exercise that requires withholding information or relying on
deception, that has outcomes predetermined by the facilitator, that demands a level of risk not
agreed to by the group, that requires more time for processing than is allowed, that is inconsistent
with group objectives, and the outcomes of which the facilitator is not confident they can handle
(p. 374.)
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Brainstorming and Evaluation
Brainstorming is a creative process in which groups generate unedited ideas about an
answer to a question, the definition to a problem, or possible solutions (Schwarz 2002). Schwarz
(2002) lists four rules for conducting a brainstorm: do not evaluate ideas generated, include the
wildest ideas possible, generate as many ideas as possible, and combine and build upon ideas
already generated (p. 227). Brainstorming may be conducted numerous ways, from group
members stating ideas as they come to their head to giving each group member equal turn until
no more ideas come forth, to working in small groups to create lists of ideas that are then
combined as a whole group. It is important that the ideas generated be presented visually to the
entire group so that the next step, evaluation, may occur (see visual facilitation below). Many
resources exist that provide specific ways in which brainstorming can occur27.
Evaluating ideas generated relies upon the prior generation of decision-making criteria.
Common criteria include efficiency, effectiveness, feasibility, and cost, but can vary based upon
the group objectives and goals. Once a list of options has been generated, the criteria may be
applied to narrow down the list to a manageable number for decision-making. Similar to
brainstorming, there are many ways in which to apply criteria for evaluating a list. One common
way is to write the options in a single column, create subsequent columns with headings of the
criteria to be used, and then to have each group member rate each option based on each criteria.
Once this is complete, a visual list will remain that indicates which options are more popular
than others. For more information and ideas, see the Consensus Building Institute
(www.cbuilding.org), the International Association of Facilitators (www.iaf-world.org), and the
Policy Consensus Initiative (www.policyconsensus.org) in addition to a range of private
consulting firms found on the internet.
Visual Facilitation
Often times, and in the instructions for the role play presented above, facilitators work in
teams of two, enabling one facilitator to work directly with the group while the other “scribes” or
keeps track of group progress on charts visible to all group members. Scribing, or visual
facilitation, enables groups to see progress, obtain bearings on group process, and evaluate ideas.
In specific activities, such as brainstorming, effective visual facilitation is essential for activity
success. An effective visual facilitator is able to listen to and summarize ideas, ask clarifying
questions when unsure about idea summaries, and write clearly and efficiently. Strong
communication between the primary facilitator and the visual facilitator is also very important.
Putting it All Together
For the purpose of this role-play simulation, it is important to make sure that students
understand these basics of facilitation technique and the role facilitation can play in moving a
stakeholder group towards positive collaboration. It is also important to provide students with
concrete ideas about creating activities for their process design as instructed in Part A. If you are
not comfortable with class comprehension of either of these components, consider the non-roleplay alternative for utilizing this activity.
27

Many web and paper resources exist from commercial, academic, and non-profit resources.
For example, http://www.mycoted.com/Brainstorming and
www.tacoma.washington.edu/tlc/docs/Brainstorming%20Exercises.pdf (accessed 2/24/10)
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Component #2 – Possible Role Play Processing Questions
Questions for facilitators
• What happened? Describe the evolution of events.
• As a facilitator, what were your greatest challenges? How did you address them? What
would you do differently next time?
Questions for stakeholders
• From your stakeholder perspective, what did you hope to gain from the meeting? Were
your stakeholder goals met?
• From your stakeholder perspective, evaluate the meeting using the following criteria:
o Fairness
o Inclusiveness
o Order
o Productivity
o Effectiveness at achieving intended goals
Questions for all about the activity
• In what ways did the following barriers to positive collaboration development manifest
during the role-play?
o Power imbalances
o Conflicting positions and interests
o Personal biases (gender, age, race)
o Pre-existing relationship problems
• How did facilitator actions address/not address the following barriers to positive
collaboration development? (see The Consensus Building Handbook, 1999, for additional
content on this topic)
o Power imbalances
o Conflicting positions and interests
o Personal biases (gender, age, race)
o Pre-existing relationship problems
• How did components of the process design address/not address the following barriers to
positive collaboration development?
o Power imbalances
o Conflicting positions and interests
o Personal biases (gender, age, race)
o Pre-existing relationship problems
• Based upon this meeting, do you think this collection of stakeholders could form a strong
collaboration over time? Why or why not?
Questions for all about the use of facilitated processes in building collaborations
• In what ways did the process design meet/not meet the objectives of the meeting?
• Group development theory suggests that, early in a collaborative arrangement, facilitators
need to take a more directive role and that, later in the collaboration, facilitators should
step back and allow groups to guide themselves. Based on this meeting experience, do
you agree or disagree with this proposition?

214
Component #3 – Possible Case Analysis Questions
These questions pertain to the use Parts A, B, and C as a case study rather than an experiential
role-play.
Part A: Students generate a meeting process design as if they will be facilitating
• In what ways does your process design meet the following goals?
o Stakeholder introductions
o Generating a list of ideas for future property use
o Generating commitment to meet again
• Why might ground rules be important at the start of a collaborative problem solving
process? How do you propose establishing ground rules?
• Given the prospect that the stakeholders attending this meeting will need to work together
for a period of years, what are ways in which this first meeting might impact future ones?
• What challenges do you think your process design might face if it were implemented?
Part B: Students read through the stakeholder role sheets
• What potential conflicts do you see between stakeholders? Are these conflicts due to preexisting interpersonal relationships, individual personalities, or organizational missions?
• Based upon these role sheets, what dynamic might you anticipate between elected
officials and citizens at this meeting? Elected officials and public managers? Public
managers and citizens? Explain.
• Are there any power imbalances inherent to this group? What are they? How might they
impact the meeting process and outcomes?
• Thinking about your process design and using the information in the role sheets, which
activities do you think will work well? Which activities will possibly fail? Why?
• Thinking about how a first meeting of this group might unfold, what are some
generalizations you might make regarding the initial steps of forming any problem
solving collaboration?
Part C: Students read the “Case Outcomes: From ELCA to Ontario Oaks” follow-up
• What constraints might local government managers face when engaging with citizens for
long-term collaborative projects?
• If you were the city environmental manager, how might you have approached initial
meetings with citizen stakeholders differently?
• Do you think that the amount of time invested by city officials in this project was
realistic? Why or why not? Why do you think city officials made the investment?
• Do you think strong collaborative relationships between the stakeholders in this case
could overcome a downturn in the real estate market? Why or why not?
• What are management strategies that could be used in a collaboration to address turnover
in collaboration membership?
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APPENDIX A
Interview Protocol – Organized by Framework and Key Concepts
Key
Question
Concept
Question
Order
Addressed
1
Cognition When did (PROJECT NAME) begin and what key
process
decisions were made over time?
2
Cognition goals
Who initiated (PROJECT NAME) and why?
3
At what point did you become involved with
Motivation
(PROJECT NAME) and why?
4
With whom did you interact over the course of
(PROJECT NAME), why, and how?
Actors
5
Of these key actors, with whom do you interact the
Actors
most and why?
6
Describe the process of:
• Establishing a contract?
• Obtaining approvals?
Management
• What was your strategy to accomplish
behaviors
(SPECIFIC TASK)?
7
What are/were the biggest challenges to the
Cognition remediation and redevelopment of (PROJECT
problem
NAME)?
8
What key incentives and arrangements were used
to produce participation by other agencies and
Policy tools
firms in (PROJECT NAME)?
9
Cognition What role does the brownfield status of the
problem
property play in redevelopment strategies?
9
In hindsight, would you have done anything
Motivation
differently?
9
Which of these key actors influenced project
outcomes the most?
Without whom the project would not have
Power
happened?
9
Where did money come from along the course of
Power
(PROJECT NAME)?
9
Was there any change in the project over mayoral
Power
transitions?
9
Alternate
explanations What ultimately affected project outcomes?
9
Resource
How has the city allocated resources for brownfield
allocation
remediation and redevelopment?
9
Resource
In what ways is (CITY NAME) organized to
allocation
address brownfields?

Framework
Contextual
Interaction
Contextual
Interaction
Contextual
Interaction
Network
Structure
Network
Structure
Strategic
Management

Contextual
Interaction
Institutional
Contextual
Interaction
Contextual
Interaction
Contextual
Interaction
Contextual
Interaction
Contextual
Interaction
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
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9
Resource
allocation
9
Success
9
Success

What proportion of your time is dedicated to
brownfield remediation and redevelopment
compared to all other duties of your job?
What are the biggest challenges to brownfield
remediation and redevelopment in the city?
How do you measure performance of brownfield
redevelopment projects?

Institutional
Institutional
Strategic
Management

Post-Interview Survey: Main Questions
1) Based on data collected for this project so far, I have divided the APCO/Newcroft
project into nine distinct project phases. Please indicate below all of the phases in
which you were actively involved.
Property identification and assembly
Economic assessment
Environmental assessment
Cleanup financial planning
Construction financial planning
End use design
Cleanup process
Construction process
End user sales
2) For each individual that you worked with on APCO/Newcroft during the Property
Identification and Assembly phase, please fill in the information to the right of their
name. Please do not answer for your own name. Definitions of information types
are listed below:
Cleanup financing = grant, loan information regarding environmental cleanup
Cleanup assessment = technical environmental information about property
Cleanup action = cleanup process information
Construction financing = lending, loan, grant, investment information regarding construction
Construction action = construction processes information
End use design = city planning and architectural design information
Legal information = legal information - any type
Political information = electoral politics, citizen engagement information
Social/relationship building = personal information, "getting to know you" information
a. What dominant information type was transferred with this person?
b. What secondary information type was transferred with this person during this
phase?
c. How frequent were your information exchanges with this person during this
project phase?
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3) Using the list below, please verify which agencies and organizations your agency or
organization worked with during this phase.
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Brownfield Redevelopment Networks in the State of New York: Four Case Studies
Dear _________________.
I am a doctoral student under the direction of Professor Rosemary O’Leary in the Department of
Public Administration in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. I am conducting a
research study to understand the implementation processes of brownfield redevelopment in
the state of New York.
Your participation will involve answering questions regarding your and your organization’s role
in brownfield redevelopment processes. These questions will be asked in the setting of either an
in person or telephone interview and, if you agree, will be recorded for purposes of transcription
and data analysis. Your recording will be assigned a code for which only I will have a key. All
recordings will be destroyed after completion of the research study. If you do not wish to be
recorded, your responses will be recorded by hand. Depending upon your role in the
redevelopment project, you may be asked for a follow-up interview. Each interview may last up
to an hour in length. Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose not to
participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, that decision will be kept confidential by
the researcher.
Your personal name will not be used in any of the writings stemming from this research and
references to your agency and organization will be made generically. Because of the case study
format of this research, please be aware that it is possible for readers of the research who have
detailed knowledge of the particular cases used may be able to infer your identity. This risk will
be minimized by the use of generic language when referring to interview subjects and their
relationships. The research will be published as a doctoral dissertation in addition to research
articles in public administration and environmental management journals.
Although there may be no direct benefit to you, your participation may benefit a greater
understanding of brownfield redevelopment processes in the state of New York, potentially
aiding future policy development.
If you have any questions concerning this research study, please contact me at rwalexan@syr.edu
or 303-818-0418 or Professor Rosemary O’Leary at roleary@syr.edu.
Sincerely,
Rob Alexander
*******
___ I agree to be audio taped.
___ I do not agree to be audio taped.
___ I confirm that I am over 18 years of age.
__________________________________ _______________ ____________________
Signature of participant
Date
Print name of participant
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_________________________________________
Signature of researcher (or witness)

_________________________
Date

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel
you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Syracuse University Institutional Review
Board at 315-443-3013.
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APPENDIX B
Historical Backgrounds to Management Capacities
A key component to the research design for this study was the selection of two cities that
matched along various economic and environmental variables but exhibited different levels of
management capacities. The logic behind this selection was to enable comparison of successful
and less than successful brownfield projects under different management circumstances. This
comparison provided insight not only into the relevance of management capacities but also the
ways in which management capacities related to project outcomes. The measures used in city
case selection are repeated in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Network Management Capacity Variables for City Case Selection
Rochester
Buffalo
Network
Number of FTE personnel
2.5
0.5
management
committed to brownfield
capacity – Personnel projects and average time
Capacity
on job
Network
Type of agency housing
Environmental
Planning office
management
brownfield operations
project
capacity – Expert
management office
Capacity
Network
Per capita city
$2,060/person
$1,539/person
management
expenditures
capacity – Resource
Capacity
While these initial measures were deemed sufficient for the selection of case cities, subsequent
capacity data were collected as part of the explanatory model for project success. These data
relate to key capacities for network management including interpersonal skills, structures for
information exchange, and qualities of the political and resource environment. This section
describes the broader story of these capacities as they pertain to both brownfield and residential
development, laying the groundwork for integrating capacity data in the explanation of case
outcomes.
Capacities for Brownfield Management. The City of Rochester became involved in
contaminated property redevelopment before any significant brownfield-specific legislation
existed at either the federal or state levels. The nearby example of Love Canal and an
examination of contamination on city-owned properties compelled the city to engage in a few
small projects in the mid-1980s. However, it was not until a hazardous waste problem on 18
acres at the regional fire-training academy reached the agenda in 1993 that the city of Rochester
began to build its capacity to address brownfield problems. During this project, a team of city
managers obtained $27 million of local, state and federal funding to remediate the property for a
new, multi-government public safety aircraft rescue fire-fighting project. The success of this
project laid the foundation for steady development of the Division of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) in the city’s Department of Environmental Services (DES).
As assessments of city properties began to reveal the extent to which environmental
problems constrained development, the DEQ quickly built upon this initial capacity for project
management. The DEQ’s original role focused on city compliance with state and federal
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environmental regulations across its functions, but managing brownfield projects required more
complex abilities. Initially, the city contracted out much of the early project management work
to private consulting firms, leading to hefty contract payments. Drawing from his budget analyst
roots when he began work with the city in 1986, the lead DEQ manager successfully argued to
city leadership and the budget office that the city would save money in the long run by hiring in
the technical capacity for contaminated property project management. By 2010, seven
environmental scientists, engineers, and geologists were employed as project managers with an
average tenure in the Division of 10 years. Together, this team developed strong working
relationships with regulatory counterparts in the Monroe County Department of Health
(MCDOH) and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC)
regarding brownfield projects, building a database of potential and real brownfield sites and
developing a local revolving loan program for private firms to remediate properties supported by
a grant from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Contrary to Rochester’s experience and while the City of Buffalo had more than enough
brownfield properties within its jurisdiction, the capacities for managing them grew outside of
City Hall. One interview respondent described that there is “more expertise on the outside than
on the inside”. This lack of internal capacity can be attributed largely to an ongoing fiscal crisis
within the city compounded by decades of diminishing tax revenues, decreasing numbers of city
personnel and rigid unions battling contract changes. By 2003, after multiple annual bailouts
from the State Legislature, the Governor created the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority (BFSA).
The BFSA, governed by five gubernatorial appointees, the mayor, the county executive, and an
appointee from both the state comptroller and the legislature, held the authority to approve or
deny the city’s annual four-year financial plan. In exchange, the city receives the ability to
acquire loans from the state during its road to recovery (Staba 2003).
Instead, much of the initial clean up and redevelopment activity occurred through federal,
state, county, and regional government efforts. For example, the Erie County Industrial
Development Agency (ECIDA), a county-level quasi-governmental organization and its Buffalo
Urban Development Corporation (BUDC) emerged as key facilitators for these larger,
commercial and industrial development opportunities through an EPA pilot grant. Meeting some
success at turning these properties into viable sites for new industries and warehouse facilities,
BUDC became the lead agency for the larger brownfield properties around the city.
Internally, the City of Buffalo maintained few employees trained specifically in an
environmental or earth science field. Those that had some environmental knowledge worked
mainly within the Public Works Department and the Buffalo Water Authority, assessing and
implementing infrastructure projects around the city. When city-owned properties were
determined to have environmental concerns, the City Engineer handled the regulated procedures,
but he did not have a strong environmental background. Additional, but limited, environmental
governance was provided by the Buffalo Environmental Management Commission, an advisory
board comprised of appointed members serving two-year terms.
The first specific environmental project manager was originally brought to the city
through an EPA Brownfield Pilot Grant in 1996 to assess the extent of brownfield properties
around the city. When he arrived on the job, he quickly realized that the complex regulatory
path dictated by the NYSDEC and the EPA would have to be learned on the job, as there was
little institutional knowledge easily accessible. This began what was a slow cultural shift within
City Hall regarding the need for environmental professionals, or at least an infrastructure that can
support the work of environmental professionals on brownfield projects. However, a department
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devoted to environmental services, as in Rochester, did not emerge. In fact, what had existed as
a four-person environmental management department working with the City Environmental
Management Commission dwindled down to a single project manager. As a result, brownfield
projects with residential end uses became addressed by a set of ad hoc working teams comprised
primarily of public managers in the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency (BURA), its Office of
Strategic Planning (OSP) and the Department of Public Works. To a lesser extent, the Planning,
Real Estate, Law, and Economic Development Departments have participated as well.
While data suggest that both the cities of Rochester and Buffalo show signs of certain
capacities for assessing, remediating, and redeveloping brownfields into residential end-use
projects, these capacities manifest in different ways. The City of Rochester has greater internal
capacity for project management with its large environmental services staff and pre-existing
structures for internal information exchange with other city agencies. On the other hand, the
City of Buffalo’s capacities rely upon a single environmental manager and his ability to work
with the state DEC office and the ECIDA, a county-level quasi-governmental organization.
Capacities of Key Governmental Partners. With local government action towards
brownfield redevelopment contingent upon compliance with local, state, and federal
environmental and health-related regulation, it is relevant to briefly describe the capacities of
these agencies in whose jurisdictions the cities of Rochester and Buffalo fall. For the City of
Rochester, the Monroe County Department of Health (MCDOH) and NYSDEC Region 8 are
unique regulatory partners while the City of Buffalo relies upon the Erie County Department of
Health (ECDOH) and NYSDEC Region 9. Both Rochester and Buffalo fall into the Western
Region of the NY State Department of health (NYSDOH), the auspices of the Central Office of
the NYSDEC, and Region 2 of the EPA.
In Rochester, a regular meeting of a Waste Site Advisory Committee occurs
approximately seven or eight times a year to exchange information regarding targeted properties.
Meeting attendees include the MCDOH Director, the Rochester office member of the NY State
Department of Health, the brownfield manager from Region 8 NYSDEC, a State University
geologist, and the lead manager at the city DEQ and one of his staff members. At each meeting,
the NYSDEC shares information about new sites in their programs, the health departments share
decisions made by the NYSDEC central office that may not have been known by the regional
offices, and the city shares information regarding on the ground and citizen-oriented events.
Through this Committee and the work it developed, a relationship solidified between the city of
Rochester, the NYSDEC, and the County Health Department the streamlined the regulatory
processes associated with brownfield projects.
Managers in both Rochester and Buffalo reported positive and consistent relationships
with their regional counterparts in the NYSDEC. These relationships were enhanced by long
tenures of NYSDEC staff and the resulting accumulated knowledge. In addition, the regional
NYSDEC managers interviewed for this research exhibited strong interpersonal skills and high
motivation for the mission of their agency. However, both city and NYSDEC regional officials
reported frustration with the NYSDEC central office. All parties found the central office highly
bureaucratic and more susceptible to the political influence of the Governor’s office, leading to
slow response rates during key decision-making points.
Finally, at the federal level, both Rochester and Buffalo lie in Region 2 of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) whose brownfield office has a history of staff turnover.
While both cities have received several brownfield assessment and cleanup grants from the EPA
since the mid-1990s, individuals in both cities report that EPA technical support has waned with
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increasing local experience. Key local managers confirm that the EPA currently plays a minimal
role in brownfield project implementation.

238
VITA
NAME OF AUTHOR: Rob Alexander
PLACE OF BIRTH: Camp Hill, PA
DATE OF BIRTH: August 24, 1971
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
Indiana University – Bloomington, Bloomington, IN
Duke University, Durham, NC
DEGREES AWARDED:
Masters of Public Administration, 1998, Indiana University
Masters of Science in Environmental Science, 1998, Indiana University
Bachelor of Science in Geology, 1993, Duke University

